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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to examine what rhetorical themes and features are present 
in the speeches of Julius Caesar’s De bello Gallico and De bello civili. The 
investigation is based on the 172 speeches found in De Bello Gallico and the 83 
speeches found in De Bello Civili. Lausberg’s Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A 
Foundation for Literary Study provides the theoretical framework for the analysis. 
The analysis also entails a study and comparison of the 255 speeches. 
 
The investigation shows, among other things, that Caesar, through the use of 
rhetorical themes and features, in connection with the use of certain keywords is 
keen to show that his actions are justified, i.e. that he is “in the right”. The use of 
rhetorical features and propagandistic elements increases in those sections where 
Caesar’s position could be described as tenuous. There are also several recurring 
themes, some scenes tend toward the formulaic; Caesar’s opponents, whether Gallic 
or Pompeian, are given the same inherent traits, e.g. greed, cruelty and hubris. In 
his work Caesars Commentarii – Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede, 
Detlev Rasmussen makes the claim that the style becomes more rhetorical as the 
two works progress. The current investigation cannot find anything to support this 
claim.  
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1. Introduction 
 
When setting out to write a thesis on Caesar’s two works, about the campaigns in 
Gaul, De bello Gallico, and the Civil War, De bello civili, hereafter referred to as BG 
and BC, it is impossible not to feel dwarfed and daunted by the sheer amount of 
existing secondary literature about the man and his Commentarii. Helga Gesche’s 
bibliography in Caesar - Erträge der Forschung contains 1907(!) entries and, as it 
was published in 1976, does not account for any research published in the last 40 
odd years. Furthermore, Luca Grillo’s The Art of Caesar’s Bellum Civile: Literature, 
Ideology and Community, which was published in 2012, is described as 
“[p]articipating in a new wave of Caesar studies” (Cambridge Classical Studies 
catalogue 2012, p. 7, my italics) and its bibliography is 23 pages long. Having said 
that, it is still my hope that this effort will add something to the existing literature.  
 
In my bachelor thesis I argued that Cicero’s Pro Caelio contains a great number of 
metaphors, thus contradicting the statement made by von Albrecht in Cicero’s style 
– A Synopsis (2003) “For civil cases the plain style is most appropriate…Of course, 
pure Latin is a requirement, and aphorisms, witticism, irony and humour are not 
forbidden; even metaphors may occur, but no neologisms” (22). The aim here is to 
prove that there is plenty of rhetorical adornment in the direct and indirect speeches 
in the BG and BC, contrary to Cicero’s comment in Brutus (Valde quidem, inquam, 
probandos; nudi enim sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis tamquam veste 
detracta (262)) and Conte’s statement: “The unadorned style of Caesar’s 
Commentarii, the rejection of rhetorical embellishments characteristic of true 
historia, the notable reduction of evaluative language - all contribute greatly to the 
apparently objective, impassive tone of Caesar’s narration” (229). 
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2. Caesar and the Commentarii – A short background 
 
A few words must be said about Caesar himself, his rhetorical abilities and the 
commentarii. For a brief summary of the separate books of the BG and a chronology 
of events in the BC, please see Appendix II.  
 
Adcock provides a succinct summary of Caesar’s life up to the point when he set off 
for Gaul: “He had been an adventurous politician, who had evaded or surmounted 
the dangers that beset the advance to high office of a man whose early connexions 
had been suspect, who had been a spendthrift, a fashionable gallant, not made 
respectable by bribing his way to the headship of the State religion” (1). To this can 
be added the fact that Caesar, particularly because of his tempestuous consulship 
in 59, had made many powerful enemies, including L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, one 
of the “villains” in the BC, who wanted to annul Caear’s laws and later, when 
announcing his intention to run for consul in 55, demanded that Caesar be recalled 
from Gaul and prosecuted1. And then there was of course Cato, who, after Caesar’s 
campaigns against the Tencteri and the Usipetes (described in book 4 of the BG), 
wanted Caesar to be handed over to the Germans “to atone for his infamous breach 
of faith so that the curse might fall not on Rome but on the guilty party”2. It is 
therefore not far-fetched to believe that Caesar wanted the senate and indeed the 
citizens of Rome to believe that his pro-consulship in Gaul was a successful one.  
 
Caesar’s reputation as a very accomplished speaker is well-documented; his 
rhetorical skills are praised by Cicero, Suetonius, Quintilianus and others. His 
tutor, Marcus Antonius Gnipho, was a master of Greek and Latin rhetoric. Caesar 
also travelled to Rhodes and received training from the rhetorician Apollonius 
                                                             
1 Gesche, 58-61.  
2 Gelzer, 131. 
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Molon, who also was Cicero’s teacher at one stage3. Adcock says of Caesar’s 
achievements as a public speaker: “When Caesar set out for Gaul he was not yet in 
the first rank of generals, but he was an orator of an acknowledged eminence at a 
time when oratorical power was one hall-mark of literary distinction...As between 
the florid style of the Asianic school and the austere plain style of the Atticists 
Caesar was inclined to the Atticists, if not slavishly or to excess” (14). Nordling (17) 
points out that the preserved fragments of Caesar’s speeches, other than the 
commentarii, prove that Caesar was versatile and well able to use any style he liked 
when it suited him.    
 
The BG consists of 7 books plus a supplementary eighth book by Aulus Hirtius, one 
of Caesar’s commanders (never mentioned by Caesar in the BG or the BC) written 
after Caesar’s death. The BC consists of three books. The exact dates of composition 
and publication of Caesar’s efforts are not known4, but they were written closely 
after the occurrence of the events they describe and irrespective of when they were 
published it is clear from the description of Labienus, who goes from being perhaps 
Caesar’s most reliable commander in the BG to a cruel and bloodthirsty Pomepian 
in the BC5, that Caesar wrote the BG before the civil war started. Regarding the 
genre and Caesar’s contributions to it, Conte says: “The term commentarius, a 
calque on the Greek hypomnema, indicated a type of narration intermediate between 
the collection of raw materials…and their elaboration in the artistic form typical of 
true historiography, that is to say, enriched with stylistic and rhetorical 
embellishments…In fact Caesar’s attitude may have concealed a certain trickery: 
beneath the humble clothing, the commentarius as he conceived and practiced it 
probably came close to historia. This is evidenced by his dramatization of certain 
scenes and by his recourse to direct speeches in certain passages” (Conte, 226). 
                                                             
3 Gelzer, 23. 
4 Cf. chapter 3.1. 
5 Welch (104) states that Labienus in the BC is described as a “vicious buffoon”. 
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Why Caesar chose this particular literary form is something we can only speculate 
on, and it is also outside the scope of this work. However, Welch6 puts forward the 
interesting hypothesis that the BG was Caesar’s “presentation of himself as the great 
Roman Imperator to the Roman people, in a manner befitting a literary stylist and 
major orator. Most importantly, it was his answer to the popularity and reputation 
of Pompey, perhaps especially as that reputation was given literary permanence by 
Cicero’s speech of 66, De Imperio Cn. Pompeii”7.  
 
                                                             
6 Levick echoes Welch’s theory on p. 71 in the same work. 
7 Welch & Powell, 85. 
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3. Overview of Existing Research  
 
The judgement on the literary qualities of Caesar’s commentarii has been varied over 
the years. Caesar’s contemporaries were impressed with his style and later 
Suetonius remarked “Eloquentia militarique re aut aequavit prestantissimorum 
gloriam aut excessit” (Divus Julius, 55). During the Middle Ages Caesar’s works were 
not widely known; he was “rediscovered” as a writer during the Renaissance, but 
later his reputation sank8: during the first half of the 20th century the prevalent 
opinion was that Caesar was suitable for schoolboys learning Latin, but little else. 
Conte wittily finishes his chapter on Caesar with the following words: “[S]tarting in 
the nineteenth century, the De Bello Gallico has become one of the standard school 
texts for beginning students of Latin prose…We cannot know how many potential 
readers Caesar thereby lost” (232). N.J. DeWitt said of the commentarii in 1942 
“there is no rhetorical elaboration”9. The publication of such works as Adcock’s 
Caesar as a Man of Letters (1956), Welch’s & Powell’s Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter 
(1998) and Grillo’s The Art of Caesar’s Bellum Civile (2012) has meant that this 
opinion by and large has been re-evaluated, although it should be noted that Hall 
says “there is little by way of fancy rhetorical elaboration”10. Conte makes the 
important point that Caesar’s style is “deceptively easy” (232). The re-evaluation of 
the role of rhetorics in the commentarii makes perfect sense as Caesar was a 
consummate speaker with a thorough schooling in rhetoric.    
 
Most of the scholarly works which deal with rhetoric in Caesar’s texts focus on the 
BG, perhaps because the text is longer and more “subtle” in its argumentation, thus 
providing a richer material for analysis. Luca Grillo’s The Art of Caesar’s Bellum 
Civile (2012) is one of the exceptions. Grillo argues that the polarised values, such 
as intergrity vs. shamelessness, loyalty vs. treachery and mercy vs. cruelty which 
                                                             
8 Conte, p. 232 
9 Nordling, p IV, note 1. 
10 Welch, Powell (ed.), p. 17. 
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are ascribed to the Romans and the Gauls respectively in the BG are applied in a 
similar fashion in the BC, and that the Pompeians, and Pompey himself in 
particular, are given the same traits as the Gauls. Caesar’s amicitia and lenitas is 
contrasted with Pompey’s threats towards Caesar’s allies and those who remained 
neutral (cf. BC 1.33), something which served to evoke memories of the Sullan 
proscriptions. Grillo also argues that Caesar rearranges the chronology of events to 
suit his message: Book 1 ends with Caesar’s merciful treatment of the Pompeian 
soldiers after the battle of Ilerda, although the battle of Massilia, which is described 
in book 2, happened before this. Similarly, the Battle of Bagradas, where Caesar’s 
men are unmercifully slaughtered at the hands of Pompey’s barbarian ally, king 
Juba, ends book 2, although Caesar’s arrival in Spain, which is described earlier in 
book 2, happened after this. The “unsatisfactory”11 end to book 3 serves as a 
reminder to the readers that “Caesar wins a battle but not the war”12. The validity 
of this statement obviously depends on whether the BC was published during 
Caesar’s lifetime or not, an issue which scholars have not been able to agree on13, 
(see chapter 3.1. ‘Disputed issues’’ for more about this).  
 
One of the most important studies of the rhetorics of the direct speeches, i.e. 
speeches reported in oratio recta (OR), as opposed to oratio obliqua (OO), in BG and 
BC is Detlef Rasmussen’s Caesars Commentarii – Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der 
direkten Rede (1963) from which I will be quoting liberally in the analysis (chapter 
6). Earlier scholars like Klotz had argued that the direct speeches did not belong in 
the commentarii-genre14. Rasmussen refutes this and argues convincingly that the 
21 direct speeches in the BG and the BC cannot be seen as simply later 
interpolations or exceptions15. Rasmussen’s main argument is that the direct 
                                                             
11 Grillo, 168. 
12 Ibid., 172. 
13 See Gesche, pp. 122-4. 
14 Rasmussen, 15 (the word he uses when discussing Klotz’s argument is ‘Stilwidrigkeit’). 
15 Rasmussen, 160. 
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speeches play a central role in the text; those who use direct speech achieve what 
they want (see for example pp. 116-7). Furthermore, he argues that the direct 
speeches are turning points in the narrative (134) and “ein Mittel der Intensivierung 
und Steigerung” (135). According to Rasmussen, the BG and the BC have the same 
structure when it comes to direct speech. “Im bellum Gallicum wird die direkte Rede 
bei einem Gesamtumfang von 348 Kapiteln in den ersten 141 Kapiteln, das sind 
etwa 40%, vermeiden. Beim bellum civile wird in 117 von 243 Kapiteln, also bei etwa 
48%, die oratio recta nicht gebraucht” (144). The argument is thus that there is a 
steady increase16 in the use of direct speech towards the end of both works.  
 
By means of a comparison with the geographical/ethnological excursions  in the 
BG, Rasmussen argues that these excursions develop in parallel with the direct 
speeches: “Die geographisch-ethnographischen Partien unterliegen dem gleichen 
Gesetz eines allmählichen Stilwandels; sie formieren sich – bei genetischer 
Betrachtung – zum Bild einer Kurve, die der stetig ansteigenden Kurve der Reden 
weitgehend parallelläuft” (79). Rasmussen does not quite manage to establish the 
purported connection between these excursions and the direct speeches, except to 
say that “Beide Stilformen werden im Laufe der Darstellung ausfürlicher und somit 
auch umfangreicher” (103). 
 
Rasmussen attributes less importance to the indirect speeches: “Die indirekte Rede 
ist zwar nicht so rhetorisch wie die direkte: Sie ist jedoch gleichsam angelegt in 
Richtung auf die direkte Rede” (62-63). A comparison between OO and OR according 
to Rasmussen shows the following difference: “Ist die direkte Rede gekennzeichnet 
durch Schärfe, Bedeutsamkeit und Pathos, so eignet der indirekten gemeinhin 
Ebenmass, Ruhe, Distanz. Die indirekte Rede ist im allgemeinen konzentrierter als 
die emphatische direkte; sie enthält mehr Gedanken-Dinge, ist sachlicher” (137). 
Conversely, “[d]er indirekt Redende vertritt die schwächere Sache” (116), a 
                                                             
16 Rasmussen uses the term “ansteigende Kurve”. 
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statement which is somewhat remarkable seeing as Caesar speaks in Oratio Recta 
only once in BC and never in the BG, but in OO a total of approximately 70 times, 
of which 9 speeches are longer than 100 words. Why, for example, does Caesar not 
speak in OR in book 7 of the BG? It should also be noted that the 21 instances of 
direct speeches in the two works, with the exception of Labienus (one speech in BG 
and two in BC), Vercingetorix (one speech), Curio (one speech), Pompeius (two 
speeches) and Caesar himself (one speech) are often delivered by characters who 
appear in the text to deliver their speech and then disappear from the narrative, e.g. 
the unnamed aquilifer in BG 4.25, the Gallic leader Critognatus in BG 7.77 and 
Crastinus, the veteran soldier in Caesar’s army, in BC 3.94 Furthermore, the last 
instance of OR in the BC is Pompeius’s despondent words when he realises that the 
battle at Pharsalus is lost (3.94), hardly an example of someone using Oratio Recta 
to achieve what they want. Rasmussen does not explain how this fits his theory.  
 
Rasmussen also seems to contradict his argument regarding the difference between 
the direct and indirect speeches when he states that “Diese indirekte Rede verzichtet 
keineswegs auf rhetorischen Schmuck” (p.67, referring to the indirect speech in the 
BG, 1.17) and “Man fragt sich, warum der quidam die oratio recta vermeide, wo doch 
hier alles auf dem Spiel mit Worten beruht” (p.68-9, referring to the speech in the 
BG, 1.42). Rasmussen also goes on to say that the indirect speeches are divided into 
various “stages” (Ger. Stufen) and that “Vom knappen Bericht, in dem nur die 
Hauptpunkte der Rede zur Sprache kommen, bis zur breit angelegten, fast 
wortgetreuen Wiedergabe gibt es fein abgestufte Grade der Ausführlichkeit. Die 
letzte Stufe der indirekten Reden unterscheidet sich in diesem Punkte kaum von 
der oratio recta” (63). Exactly what Rasmussen means by “fast wortgetreuen 
Wiedergabe” is not explained, however.  
 
Perhaps the main criticism that can be levelled at Rasmussen is that his empirical 
data is rather scant and that his conclusions are too far-reaching and adjusted to 
suit his theory; Rasmussen does seem to find a way of neatly fitting the various 
speeches into his model and the reader is sometimes left with the feeling that it is 
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all perhaps a little too neat to be true. Rasmussen also seems to give Caesar too 
much credit at times (eg. pp. 120-1): Every word in the direct speeches seems 
perfectly placed according to Rasmussen, but he still goes on to say that “[d]em 
schnell niedergeschribenen commentaries wird man ein gewisses Mass an 
Fehlbarkeit zugestehen müssen” (151). Somehow the equation does not quite add 
up.  
 
Mutschler in his very thorough Erzählstil und Propaganda in Caesars 
Kommentarien17 draws on Rasmussen’s research but comes across as more 
nuanced and less hasty to reach conclusions. He investigates the occurrence in each 
of the ten books of the BG and the BC of six stylistic features which he refers to as 
“nicht-kommentarienhaft” (i.e. in his opinion not suitable for the commentarii 
genre18), e.g. direct speech, unusual positions of the verb and vocabulary from 
another, higher register (words predominatly used in poetry and “high” prose) and 
concludes, in contrast to Rasmussen, “die Konzentration der katalogisierten 
Stilelemente in bestimmten Partien der Kommentarien, scheint auf ein formales 
Prinzip nicht zurückführbar” (147). Mutschler does, however, not investigate the 
indirect speeches.  
 
In his dissertation “Indirect Discourse and Rhetorical Strategies in Caesar’s Bellum 
Gallicum and Bellum Civile” John G. Nordling points out the importance of 
Rasmussen’s research: “Before Rasmussen’s important contribution scholars were 
apt to exclude direct speech from Caesar altogether as an aberration of the 
commentarius genre…Rasmussen’s scholarship ingeniously transformed the 
existence of those previously suspected direct speeches into a powerful argument 
for the stylistic unity of the two works (77-78)”. Nordling, like Mutschler, however, 
goes on to argue that Rasmussen overstates the importance of the direct speeches, 
                                                             
17 Mutschler, 1975. 
18 Cf. p. 7. For a more thorough discussion on the genre of the commentarius, see Batstone & Damon, pp 8-11.  
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and that indirect speech is equally important: “If Caesar wrote both types of 
discourse in unique commentarii which, in composition and rhetorical astuteness, 
rivalled formal historiae, why could he not have applied his rhetorical skill to both 
written types of discourse also?” (81).  
 
While it is quite easy to find the 21 instances of direct speeches in the BG and the 
BC, it is considerably more difficult to find all the passages containing indirect 
speeches, as they “constitute a much larger and more amorphous body of discourse” 
(Nordling, 96). To elucidate the different speeches (direct and indirect) in the BG and 
the BC Nordling uses “a kind of continuum” (102) consisting of five levels (and a 
“miscellaneous” category), where the higher levels (C-E) contain the longer and more 
easily analysable speeches: 
 
Miscellaneous: Self-Reflection; Private Audience; Rumors and Gossip: Challenges 
and Insults, etc. 
Level E: Exhortations and Harangues 
Level D: Council Speeches 
Level C: Legations 
Level B: Military Intelligence, Orders, Letters 
Level A: "Discourse" Ablative Absolutes  
 
According to Nordling, whose study focuses on “the higher level of the continuum” 
and on those speeches where Caesar himself is involved, Caesar uses the direct and 
indirect speeches to present himself as the “ideal imperator”. Nordling divides 
Caesar’s idealized self-image into four categories. The first category is Caesar as the 
self-consistent thinker (pp. 159-170); here Nordling deals with Caesar’s inner 
thoughts, which in the continuum Nordling refers to as Self-Reflection. My study 
will focus on the speeches delivered by the various characters and therefore this 
category will be of less interest here. The second category is Caesar as the well-
informed and decisive commander (pp 170-183), corresponding to Level B in 
Nordling’s continuum; there are 178 occurrences of the finite forms of the word 
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‘iubere’ – Caesar is the subject 128 times. This, coupled with Caesar’s “elaborate 
intelligence network”, conveys the image of Caesar as a spider in the centre of its 
web. The third category is Caesar the diplomat (pp. 183-192), which corresponds to 
level C of the continuum. Nordling’s main observations here are that Caesar, eager 
to portray himself as the ideal imperator, never sends any legations of submission 
himself, although he and his army are many times portrayed as being “underdogs”. 
However, Caesar is always ready to receive these legations and Nordling shows that 
they often contain “unmistakeable signs of propagandistic distortion” (191): Caesar 
portrays himself as the party who is willing to avoid confrontation at any cost, but 
if negotiations fail, he is never satisfied with less than the complete surrender of the 
enemy. The fourth and final category, which corresponds to levels D&E in the 
continuum, is probably the most important category, at least as far as a study of 
Caesar’s rhetoric goes: Caesar as the inspirer of men, by which is most often meant 
his soldiers. Here can be found some of the most rhetorically sophisticated speeches. 
Nordling points out that Caesar uses two main arguments to appeal to his soldiers: 
their greed for booty and the inherent justness of the fight (197). Caesar downplays 
the first argument, and when he does use it, e.g. before the sacking of Gomphi 
towards the end of the BC (chapter 3.80), Nordling says that Caesar manages to 
“convert the destructive potential of the mobbish soldiery to positive political 
advantage” (198); after the sacking of Gomphi Caesar is quick to point out that this 
one act of ruthlessness leads to many other civitates willingly submitting to Caesar 
and thus many people’s lives are spared. Caesar also uses the discourse in this 
category to emphasize the different leadership styles of Caesar and Pompey/the 
Pompeians. Before the battle at Pharsalus the Pompeians are preoccupied with the 
future, dividing the spoils of the victory, whereas Caesar focuses on winning the 
day. This part of the commentarii contain Caesar’s only speech in Oratio Recta 
(3.86). The speech is very short and stands in stark contrast to the long speeches 
by Pompey and Labienus which follow immediately after. Nordling finishes with the 
remark “If Caesar was not the leading rhetorician at Rome (right behind Cicero) he 
may well have been the greatest propagandist of antiquity, due to his ability to 
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translate his skills as a speaker into the quite persuasive written works of 
propaganda the commentarii are” (213).  
 
Nordling and Rasmussen both draw heavily on Rambaud’s L'Art de la Deformation 
Historique dans les Commentaires de Cesar (1953) while at the same time being 
critical of his findings. As can be evinced by the title, Rambaud’s thesis is that 
Caesar is “guilty of” historical distortion (fr. deformation). The various speeches in 
the commentarii play an important role in this distortion, Rambaud argues. For 
example, Caesar always occupies the second position in the exchanges with 
Germanic or Gallic enemies, which means that “this pattern of discourse forces the 
reader to sympathize with Caesar, whose reasonable and Roman response, always 
freshest in the reader's mind, clashes with the counter-proposals (or even threats 
and insults) of antagonists” (Nordling, 69). It must be admitted that Caesar’s 
character seems nearly always to react to the threats and invitations of others rather 
than initiate narrative action himself. The overall effect of this is to make Caesar’s 
story seem all the more impartial, credible, and, therefore, suspicious – as far as 
Rambaud is concerned. Nordling argues that “Rambaud has his own ‘axe to grind’ 
– [As] Rambaud must derive the bulk of his evidence from the commentarii, it seems 
to me that Rambaud's constant criticism of Caesar, while extremely well-informed, 
useful, and interesting, should not be preferred to Caesar's own record of the events 
described. This seems to be the virtually unanimous opinion of most Caesar 
scholars nowadays” (60-61).   
 
3.1 Disputed issues 
 
Although modern scholars seem to agree on the validity of Caesar’s accounts, at 
least in broads terms, there are still some issues that are subject to debate, e.g: 
when were the works written, were they written all at once or year by year; when 
were they published; what audience did Caesar have in mind; did Caesar intend 
them to be the final version or did he write them for later embellishment by a 
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historian19; even the division of the individual books are not set in stone – some 
argue that the BC originally consisted of two books and not three.  
 
Regarding the publication, T.P. Wiseman says about the BG that “[t]he prima facie 
assumption ought to be that the books of the commentaries were written and 
published year by year, and the onus of proof ought to be on those who believe 
otherwise” (2). Wiseman belives that books 1-4 and books 5-7 should be seen as two 
different “stages”, and that “[i]n the latter, with the political stakes rising 
remorselessly, Caesar’s style rises too, from commentarius proper (providing the 
material for a ‘real’ historian) to something which comes close to the status of full-
scale historiography. Wiseman also launches the theory that the “commentaries 
were written to be delivered by a speaker at a public meeting”, (8), which would 
explain why the narrative is in the third person. However, this does not explain the 
occasional first person verb forms, which often occur when Caesar refers back to 
previous events, e.g. BG 2.24 (…quos primo hostium impeto pulsus dixeram…) and 
BG 4.16 (Accessit etiam quod illa pars equitatus Usipetum et Tencterorum, quam 
supra commemoravi praedandi frumentandi causa Mosam transisse)). 
 
Rasmussen is of the opposing opinion and uses the ‘ansteigende Kurve’ (see 
“Previous research”, p.9) as an argument that the books of BG were all written at 
the same time (157). Von Albrecht (332-333) also adheres to this theory with the 
argument that “if changes in indirect discourse in De Bello Gallico are replayed over 
the couse of Caesar’s later Civil War commentary, it is hard to attribute either 
development to mere change over time”. Riggsby (9-11) gives credit to both 
viewpoints, but concludes “[n]evertheless, I am inclined to accept the theory of serial 
composition, simply because of the obvious value to Caesar in keeping the public 
aware of his deeds throughout the war”.  
 
                                                             
19 Nordling discusses this question on pp. 71-77; see also Gesche, p. 71. 
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4. Method  
 
By means of a close study of the direct and indirect speeches in the BG and the BC, 
with the help of Lausberg’s Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, I hope to answer the 
questions posited in chapter 4.1, “Research questions”, below. I will analyse the 
result book by book in the hope that some interesting inter- and intratextual 
patterns will occur. It should be noted here that many speeches are too short to 
divide into different parts in accordance with classic rhetoric, e.g. exordium, 
narratio, argumentation, peroratio. Rather it is the elocutio and ornatus of these 
speeches which are worth studying (cf. chaper 5, “Theory/Rhetorics”). There are 
also some speeches which are too short or do not contain any rhetorical “finery” to 
warrant an analysis. These can be found in Appendix I. 
 
4.1 Research questions 
 
The questions I hope to answer are manyfold: How many speeches are there in each 
book? Who are the speakers? Are there any persons who are not allowed to speak? 
Is there a difference between the speeches of Caeasar and the speeches of other 
persons, and if so, what? Do the speeches reveal any bias or propaganda on Caesar’s 
part and if so, what?  Are there any differences between the speeches in direct and 
indirect discourse? What rhetorical themes and figures occur in the direct and 
indirect speeches in the two works? What are the differences and similarities 
regarding the use of rhetorical themes and figures in the the two works, if any? How 
does Hirtius approach direct and indirect speech? Are there any discernible 
differences between the individual books, if so does it shed any light on some of the 
disputed issues mentioned in chapter 3.1, e.g. the year of production, publication, 
Caesar’s intended audience, etc?  
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4.2 Limitation 
 
As mentioned above in 4.1, there are a number of speeches or representations of 
speeches which are very brief, for example BG 1.25, “cohortatus suos proelium 
commisit” or the three short speeches in BG 1.27 Helvetii…legatos de deditione ad 
eum miserunt…seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem 
petissent, atque eos in eo loco quo tum essent suum adventum expectare iussisset, 
paruerunt. Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos 
perfugissent, poposcit. In my opinion, these segments are too short to merit any 
analysis.  
 
In his study Nordling has included self-reflection and rumors and gossip (see 
appendix 2). These will be of less interest here as the focus is on how Caesar’s 
representations of the spoken word (whether in direct or indirect discourse) is used 
to affect the audience and the reader. Thus, segments like BG 4.13 and 6.9 will not 
be included20. 
 
BC 2.29 will also be excluded as it is known that the text is corrupt. 
 
Rasmussen makes the important argument that Caesar’s contemporary audience 
was more attuned to rhetorical fineries: “Der antike Leser, der ein Hörender war, 
hat diese feinen klanglichen Nuances genauer aufgenommen, als uns das heute 
möglich ist” (17). A thorough analysis in the vein of Gallo’s discussion of the metrics 
of the speeches in BC 1.84-1.85 (pp. 90-91) would therefore most probably be 
rewarding, but I feel it is beyond the scope of the current study to cover this.  
 
 
 
                                                             
20 See Nordling 143-149 for further detail. 
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5. Theory/Rhetorics 
 
In one sense, Cicero, de Witt et al.21, are of course right when they say there is very 
little in the form of rhetorical elaboration: Caesar avoids some of the more artful 
rhetorical features like correctio22 or prosopopoeia (lat. fictio personae)23 (cf. Cicero’s 
In Catilinam, 1.18) and some of the speeches are quite “dry”. However, as we will see 
in the analysis (chapter 6), it is clear that Caesar is well familiar with rhetorics and 
certainly knows how to use it. Here follows a short summary of those aspects of 
rhetorical theory which seem most relevant in an analysis of Caesar’s texts. This 
chapter will mainly be based on Lausberg’s A Handbook of Literary History – A 
Foundation for Literary Study, with some examples from Rhetorica ad Herennium 
and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria.  
 
One very important tenet of ancient rhetoric is the idea that a good speaker needs 
virtus. This means that there is a strong link between the character of the speaker 
and the quality of the opus. Quintilianus uses the definition “vir bonus dicendi 
peritus” (Institutio Oratoria, 12.1.1, my emphasis), i.e. it is not enough to be skilled, 
the orator also needs to be of good moral character24. The other virtues which the 
orator must be in possession of in order to create and deliver a speech which meets 
the requirements of elocutio are latinitas, the idiomatically correct manner of 
expression, perspicuitas, intellectual comprehensibility, and most importantly 
ornatus, the ability to deliver an embellished speech, the purpose of which is to grab 
the listeners’ attention. We need not ask whether Caesar, in the view of his 
contemporaries (with the possible exception of his most vehement enemies, e.g. Cato 
and Ahenobarbus), possessed these qualities: clearly he did, as he was considered 
the most prominent speaker in Rome after Cicero.  
                                                             
21 See p. 5 and 9 
22 Lausberg 346-349. 
23 Lausberg, 369-372. 
24 Lausberg, p. 4, 17, 502. 
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The officium of the orator is to exert influence over the audience, or more precisely 
to persuadere, to convince. There are three different ways of doing this: docere¸ 
delectare, movere – teach, delight and move (emotionally). Caesar uses all three 
methods, but, as we shall see, delectare and movere to a lesser extent than docere. 
Knoche argues that in a comparison with Cicero: “Caesars Ziel ist das ‘docere’. 
Ciceros oberstes Ziel das ‘movere’, das Hinreiβen”25. In the case of literary speeches, 
such as Caesar’s accounts, there are two audiences: The actual (or fictional26) 
audience when the speeches were delivered and, upon publication of the books, the 
reader/listener. For Caesar the author the main aim is of course to influence his 
readers/listeners.  
 
There are three types of speeches: demonstrativum, deliberativum, iudiciale. The 
demonstrativum deals with praise or censure of a certain person; the deliberativum 
involves the persuasion or dissuasion in a particular matter and the iudiciale is a 
speech before a court of law, either for the prosecution or the defence. (Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, 1.2). Much rhetorical theory deals with juridical speeches, i.e. the genus 
iudiciale, which is understandable as the courts were important “battlefields” for 
aspiring politicians – Caesar made his name by prosecuting. This type of speech is 
not very common in the BG and the BC27, where a majority of the speeches belong 
to, or form a part of, the genus deliberativum (Lausberg, §§289-348) or genus 
demonstrativum (Lausberg, §§239-254). 
 
The ancient rhetoricians are not in agreement when it comes to what parts a speech 
contains. Cicero, in de Inventione, and the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium state 
that there are six parts: exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, confutatio, peroratio, 
but Lausberg list 9 different types of divisions, ranging from two in Aristoteles to 
seven in the works of the grammarian Martianus Capella.  Lausberg himself uses a 
                                                             
25 In Mutschler, 81. 
26 Cf. sermocinatio on p. 25 
27 Although, note for example Ariovistus’s and Caesar’s speeches in book 1 of the BG, discussed in chaper 6.1.1 
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division consisting of 4 parts: Exordium, the beginning of the speech, which is used 
to gain the sympathy of the audiece, narratio, which is the (biased) statement of 
facts, argumentatio, the central decisive part of the speech and peroratio, the 
conclusion in which the speaker refreshes the memory of the listeners and tries to 
influence their emotions. As mentioned in “Limitations” (chapter 4.2), few of the 
speeches in BG and BC can be given the full rhetorical analysis because of their 
brevity, i.e. they do not contain all parts of a speech; in fact, some speeches are so 
short they only contain a fragment of one of these four parts, therefore the focus of 
this study will be on the words and phrases used in the speeches and the elocutio, 
the “linguistic garment”28, i.e. how the orator (or rather in this case, the author, i.e. 
Caesar) chooses to express his ideas.  
 
Central to the concept of elocutio, of which ornatus is the most important element 
(cf. p. 19), is the idea of the four categories of change (Lausberg, 217), quadripartita 
ratio. These four categories are: adiectio (addition), detractio (detraction), 
transmutatio (internal change) and immutatio (change using external elements). To 
create a speech which contains ornatus, the orator has a number of tools at his 
disposal, which can be applied in two different domains: verba singula and verba 
coniuncta, i.e. single words and groups of words.  
 
Tropi are examples of immutatio and apply to single words. Included here are familiar 
concepts like metaphor, metonymy, irony, emphasis, hyperbole and others which 
might need some explanation: antonomasia is the use of a periphrasis instead of a 
proper name, Lausberg gives “Romanae eloquentiae princeps” (i.e. Cicero) as an 
example (265); litotes is the combination of emphasis and irony, e.g. “not small” for 
the meaning “very large”29. 
 
                                                             
28 Lausberg, 215. 
29 Lausberg, 268. 
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In addition to tropi there are also various figurae available to the orator, divided into 
figurae elocutionis and figurae sententiae. As opposed to tropi these pertain to verba 
coniuncta rather than verba singula, they also refer to the other categories of change, 
adiectio, detractio and transmutatio. The distinction between the two figurae lies in 
the level of concretization: figurae elocutionis are concerned with lingustic 
formulation, whereas figurae sententiae deal with the conception of ideas30.  
 
To begin with figurae elocutionis, these can be used as additions or repetitions for 
the sake of emphasis, with the omission of words to achieve economy of expression, 
but also with the arrangement of words in a certain order to achieve certain effects. 
Here are some of the most pertinent examples: Geminatio is the “repetition of the 
same word or word group in one place in the sentence, usually at the beginning of 
the sentence” (Lausberg, 275); anaphora and epiphora are the repetition of the 
beginning and the end of a clause. There are also different types of play on word, 
such as annominatio where small phonetic changes of the words create different 
meaning, e.g. non emissus ex urbe, sed immissus in urbem esse videatur (Cicero, In 
Catilinam, 1.27, my emphasis)31. Alliteration also falls within this category, but it is 
worth noting that the term didn’t exist in antiquity; it was coined by the humanist 
Pontanus in the 15th century32. The Romans were nevertheless aware of the 
existence of the phenomenon; as Peck points out: “the author of the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium (4.12)33 calls it ‘eiusdem litterae nimia assiduitas’”34. Lausberg also 
connects alliteration with homoeoprophoron, which is defined as: “the frequent 
repetition of the same consonant chiefly the initial consonant, in a sequence of 
several words” (432). This is in fact considered an error and something that should 
be avoided, which the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium also agrees with (nimia 
                                                             
30 Lausberg, 273. 
31 Lausberg, 287. 
32 Lausberg, 847. 
33 Incorrect source reference. Correct reference should be: 4.18 
34 Peck, 59. 
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assiduitas). Another type of word play is polyptoton, in which the inflected form of 
the word is changed to create variatio, e.g. pater hic tuus? patrem hunc appellas? 
patris tui filius es?35 The change of the words themselves is know as synonymia, 
which hardly needs any explanations. Related to synonymia is adiectio where the 
same phenomenon is described, with different, i.e. non-synonymous, words, e.g. 
multa simul eum revocabant: officia, consuetudo, tempus, existimatio, periculum, 
religio36. Here multa is expounded on, not with synonyms, but with added 
clarification. Polysyndeton is a special type of adiectio where the conjunction is 
repeated throughout the sentence. The opposite of polysyndeton is asyndeton which 
involves the omission of conjunctions. Further figurae include anastrophe: the 
reversal of the natural/normal word order; commutatio (in modern rhetorics called 
chiasm), which is the cross arrangement of words or clause element (e.g. pro vita 
hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur37); hyperbaton, the separation of words which 
normally belong together, by the insertion of one or two words. Homoeoteleuton is 
the homonymous ending of successive clauses or word groups (cola), e.g. audaciter 
territas, humiliter placas38.  
 
Figurae sententiae, as mentioned above, deal with the concept of ideas, including 
figures such as obesecratio, licentia and apostrophe (turning away from the normal 
audience to address another audience)39 which are orientated towards the audience. 
However, as these do not occur in Caesar they don’t need to be expounded on here. 
Of more importance are figures orientated towards the matter and figures of 
questions, which include, i.a., antitheton, the opposition of two contrasting 
concepts, and oxymorons. Included here are also emotive figures, such as 
                                                             
35 Lausberg 289. 
36 Lausberg 301. 
37 Lausberg, 322 (taken from BG 6:16) 
38 Lausberg 323. 
39 Lausberg, 336-39. 
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exclamatio (e.g. Cicero’s O tempora, o mores!), interrogatio (the use of rhetorical 
questions), subiectio (mock dialogue) and conciliatio, the exploiting of an argument 
of the opposing party for the benefit of one’s own party. Perhaps most important in 
the context of Caesar and the genre of history-writing is sermocinatio40 – the 
fabrication of statements and conversations, etc. 
 
In the same way that words or groups of words can be subjected to the four 
categories of change, so can ideas. Worth mentioning among the addition of ideas 
are interpositio (the introduction of a parenthesis), subnexio (addition of an 
explanatory idea) and sententia (the introduction of a universal truth; “a piece of 
wisdom with the same authority as a legal judgement or a written law” (Lausberg, 
388). As regards the removal of ideas the following seem relevant for Caesar’s 
writings: percursio (the brief enumeration of ideas which would merit a more 
thorough treatment), praeteritio (an announcement of the intention not to mention 
something), reticentia (breaking off a sentence to hold back on information). Figures 
involving the expression of ideas by means of other ideas (immutatio), includes a few 
which are likely to be familiar also to those who have not studied ancient rhetorics 
such as allegoria, ironia, emphasis and hyperbole. Synecdoche (quantitative 
metonymy) is also included in this category. 
 
One important aspect of rhetorics, with particular regard to Caesar and his 
supposed impartiality, is amplificatio – perhaps also that very phenomenon which 
in the end gave rhetorics a bad name for a very long perod of time – the strengthening 
of the own argument and weakening of the opponent’s argument. There are four 
types of amplificatio: incrementum – the gradual build-up of the item/event etc. 
described to make it more favourable to the speaker’s cause; comparatio where an 
                                                             
40 In this thesis I use the term sermocinatio in the sense defined by Lausberg in §§820-825: “Sermocinatio is the 
fabrication – serving to characterize natural (historical or invented) persons – of statements, conversations and 
soliloquies or unexpressed mental reflections of the person concerned” (366). 
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exemplum is surpassed by the matter at hand; ratiocinatio – an indirect amplificatio, 
in the case of BG, for example Caesar’s praise of the strength of the Gauls and 
Germans41, and congeries – the piling up of synonymous words and sentences42. 
    
Compositio (also called structura) refers to the formation of sentences. The highest 
form of sentence is called periodus, familiar to all students of Latin, which can 
consist of cola and commae. In this category Lausberg also includes numerus, i.e. 
the use of short and long syllables to create a speech which contains pedes (metrical 
feet) pleasing to the ear, but as mentioned in “Limitations” (chapter 4.2) I will not be 
covering this matter.  
                                                             
41 It should be noted that ratiocinatio is a term with many meanings (cf. Lausberg, pp. 753-54). Here and elsewhere in 
this thesis, I use the term as defined in Lausberg §405: “Ratiocinatio is an indirect amplificatio via coniectura (Quint. 
Inst. 8.4.26) based upon attendant circumstances of the intended object: the attendant circumstances of the object are 
amplified” (192).   
42 Lausberg, 189-193. 
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6. Analysis 
 
I will analyse the speeches/utterances, book by book and state who speaks and how 
many words their speeches/utterances contain. As it is sometimes difficult to 
determine exactly what words belong to the actual speeches and what words are 
use to introduce the speeches, the number of words will be approximations of 5. I 
believe this will still give a good overview of the different speeches and their 
importance. After the tables detailing the speeches in each book, there follows an 
analysis of those speeches/utterances which I feel merit further comment. These 
speeches/utterances are marked in bold in the tables. Relevant/interesting parts in 
these quotes are either underlined and/or in bold. Speeches/utterances which I 
have felt merit no further analysis can be found in Appendix I. The speeches in OR 
are marked with an asterisk (*). 
 
6.1 De Bello Gallico 
 
Here follows an account of the speeches in the 8 books of BG, the seven books 
written by Caesar and Hirtius’s supplement. In chapter 6.1.9 can be found a 
summary of the findings, together with comparisons between the books and my 
conclusions. 
 
6.1.1 Book 1  
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no. of words 
1.2 Orgetorix (leader of the Helvetii) 20 
1.3 Orgetorix 30 
1.7 Nammeius and Verucloetius, legati 
from the Helvetii 
25 
1.7 Caesar 10 
1.8 Caesar 20 
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1.10 nuntius/nuntii43 25 
1.11 legati from the Aedui 25 
1.13 Divico, leader of the Helvetii 100 
1.14 Caesar 165 
1.14 Divico 20 
1.16 Caesar 35 
1.17 Liscus, magistrate of the Aedui 95 
1.18 alii (Gauls) 190 
1.19 Caesar 40 
1.20 Diviciacus, magistrate of the Aedui 95 
1.20 Caesar 55 
1.22 Considius, experienced soldier in 
Caesar’s army 
15 
1.26 Caesar, via messengers  15 
1.28 Caesar 25 
1.30 Chiefs of the Gallic states 110 
1.31 Diviciacus/Gallic chiefs 400 
1.32 Diviciacus 55 
1.33 Caesar 20 
1.34 Caesar 20 
1.34 Ariovistus, king of the Germans 65 
1.35 Caesar (through legates) 130 
1.36 Ariovistus (presumably through 
legates44) 
145 
1.37 Legates from the Aedui and the Treveri 40 
1.39 Gauls and traders  30 
                                                             
43 The verb is ‘renuntiatur’ so it is not possible to say who the messenger(s) is/are. 
44 The preceding speech by Caesar is made through legates and this speech begins with “ad haec Ariovistus respondit”, 
but there is nothing to suggest that Ariovistus delivered the speech himself. 
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1.39 People in Caesar’s camp with no 
experience of combat 
90 
1.40 Caesar 370 
1.41 Tribunes of the various legions  40 
1.42 Ariovistus 45 
1.42 Soldier in the 10th legion 20 
1.43 Caesar 155 
1.44 Ariovistus 360 
1.45 Caesar  80 
1.47 Ariovistus 35 
1.50 German prisoners 35 
1.53 Procillus, legate sent by Caesar to 
Ariovistus 
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Number of speeches: 40 
Total number of words spoken: 3165 
Total number of words in Book I: 8200 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 35-40 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 14 (2 of which through legates) 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 1140 
 
1.2 civitati persuasit ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent: perfacile esse, cum 
virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri  
 
Already in the first speech, although short, delivered by Orgetorix, leader of the 
Helvetii, we find several rhetorical features: assonance (‘i’-sounds) and consonance 
(‘p’-sounds), antitheton in finibus suis and omnibus copiis and again in omnibus 
prestarent and totius Galliae. There is also commutatio in cum omnibus copiis and 
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cum virtute omnibus. Torigian45 points out that the word perfacile only occurs three 
times in the BG – twice spoken by Orgetorix (cf. discussion on chapter 1.3 below) 
and once by Vercingetorix in 7.64. It could be argued that Caesar is using 
ratiocinatio here – already in 1.1 Caesar states that the Helvetii and the Belgae are 
the bravest of the Gallic tribes, yet in less than 30 chapters (1.27) the Helvetii will 
be throwing themselves at the feet of Caesar asking for mercy. 
 
1.3 Perfacile factu esse illis probat conata perficere, propterea quod ipse suae civitatis 
imperium obtenturus esset: non esse dubium quin totius Galliae plurimum Helvetii 
possent; se suis copiis suoque exercitu illis regna conciliaturum confirmat. 
 
Again the word ‘perfacile’ is used, which together with perficio in the same clause 
adds emphasis to the ambitions of Oregtorix and the Helvetii. The contrast between 
totius Galliae and plurimum Helvetii possent is enhanced through juxtaposition. In 
these two short speeches Caesar shows that the Helvetii pose a serious threat to the 
Roman province; the use of words and phrases like imperium potiri/obtinere, regnum 
and tota Gallia (twice) will most likely have served as a proverbial red flag to the 
Roman readers, whose fear of Gallic marauding was well-known46. 
 
1.7 respondit diem se ad deliberandum sumpturum: si quid vellent, ad Idus Apriles 
reverterentur 
 
This is Caesar first appearance in the BG and it is worth noting how inconspicuous 
he is; this is a short order to the legates of the Helvetii to return in a few days, the 
purpose of which is to save himself time to gather more troops. 
 
1.8 negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare et si 
vim facere conentur, prohibiturum ostendit.  
                                                             
45 Welch, Powell, ed., p. 53 
46 Catilina’s conspiracy, which involved the Allobroges, will have been fresh in the minds of the readers.   
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Caesar’s second “speech” is also very brief. Here one of the most important themes 
of the first book is introduced: populus Romanus, a phrase Caesar will be repeating 
no less than 14 times in book 1 (for more on Caesar’s use of these words, see chapter 
6.1.9). By using the phrase more et exemplo Caesar states that he is not acting in 
his own interest, rather he is forced by precedent not to allow the Helvetii to travel 
through the Roman province. There is also a strong contrast between the finite verbs 
used by Caesar here and in 1.7 (respondeo, nego, ostendeo) and those used by 
Orgetorix in 1.2 and 1.3 (persuadeo, probo, confirmo). The Gauls are portrayed as 
the aggressors, the active party, whereas Caesar is the defender, reacting to the 
threat posed by the Gauls. Torigian47 thoroughly analyses Orgetorix speeches in 1.2 
and 1.3 and contrasts “the rhetorical dazzle of Orgetorix before his various listeners” 
with “the impression of a straightforward, frank, and completely non-rhetorical 
account created by Caesar’s own use of Latin”. She goes on to say: “If Orgetorix 
treachery is promulgated through rhetoric, then Caesar’s claim of validity for the 
Gallic campaigns, by contrast, is only enhanced by his plain and simple style” (56). 
This may be true of Caesar’s initial comments (i.e. here and in 1.7), but he is 
certainly no stranger to employing his knowledge of “rhetorical dazzle” in his own 
speeches (in book 1 see in particular 1.14, 1.40 and 1.43). 
 
1.11 legatos ad Caesarem mittunt rogatum auxilium: ita se omni tempore de populo 
Romano meritos esse, ut paene in conspectu exercitus nostri agri vastari, liberi eorum 
in servitutem abduci, oppida expugnari non debuerint. 
 
Again Caesar is assuming the role of the defender; here he is expected to react to 
the plea of the Aedui, who in their request for help also state that it is because of 
their services to the Roman people they deserve Caesar’s help. 
 
                                                             
47 Welch, Powell (ed.), pp 53-56.  
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1.13-1.14 is ita cum Caesare egit: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis faceret, 
in eam partem ituros atque ibi futuros Helvetios ubi eos Caesar constituisset atque 
esse voluisset; sin bello persequi perseveraret, reminisceretur et veteris incommodi 
populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum. Quod improviso unum pagum adortus 
esset, cum ii qui flumen transissent suis auxilium ferre non possent, ne ob eam rem 
aut suae magnopere virtuti tribueret aut ipsos despiceret. Se ita a patribus 
maioribusque suis didicisse, ut magis virtute quam dolo contenderent aut insidiis 
niterentur48. Quare ne committeret, ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitate populi 
Romani et internecione exercitus nomen caperet aut memoriam proderet. [1.14] His 
Caesar ita respondit: eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res quas legati Helvetii 
commemorassent, memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre, quo minus merito populi 
Romani accidissent; qui si alicuius iniuriae sibi conscius fuisset, non fuisse difficile 
cavere; sed eo deceptum, quod neque commissum a se intellegeret quare timeret, 
neque sine causa timendum putaret. Quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, 
num etiam recentium iniuriarum, quod eo invito iter per provinciam per vim 
temptassent, quod Haeduos, quod Ambarros, quod Allobrogas vexassent, 
memoriam deponere posse? Quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur 
quodque tam diu se impune iniurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere. 
Consuesse enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione 
rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores 
interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. Cum ea ita sint, tamen, 
si obsides ab iis sibi dentur, uti ea quae polliceantur facturos intellegat, et si Haeduis 
de iniuriis quas ipsis sociisque eorum intulerint, item si Allobrogibus satisfaciant, sese 
cum iis pacem esse facturum. Divico respondit: ita Helvetios a maioribus suis 
institutos esse uti obsides accipere, non dare consuerint; eius rei populum Romanum 
esse testem.  
 
                                                             
48 Both Caesar (1.40) and Vercingetorix (7.29) will later use a similar turn of phrase. 
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Here we find striking antitheton in et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae 
virtutis Helvetiorum and again in veteris contumelia, which refers to 1.12-13 where 
Caesar explains that Divico had been the commander of the Helvetii in their 
campaign against Lucius Cassius, which had ended in the latter’s slaying and his 
army being put under the yoke, and recentium inuriarum. In the section in bold the 
rhetorical featurs abound: there are no less than seven anaphoras, a rhetorical 
question (interrogatio) as well as a sententia (consuesse enim deos immortales…) 
Caesar also accuses the Helvetii of iniuria, no less than four times. Iniuria is a 
powerful word thanks to its connotations with ius. By making this accusation, 
Caesar is stating that he needs to correct these injustices; he is giving himself the 
right to turn from defender to aggressor. The accusations of iniuria are conveniently 
used again by Caesar in 1.31, 1.33, 1.35 and 1.36 (see below), but there it applies 
to Ariovistus, the German king49. The purpose of this exchange is most likely also 
to set a precedent; as Nordling discusses on pp. 183-85 and 191-92, Caesar always 
presents himself as the party who receives legations of submission, he never sends 
them50. Obviously it would not befit a Roman proconsul to have any terms and 
conditions dictated to him by the leader of a Gallic tribe. Last but not least, the 
reader is given a premonition by the vocabulary which Caesar uses: words like 
impune, impunitas, vetus contumelia, ulciscor, and, fairly unusually for Caesar, a 
reference to the deos immortales, sets the reader up for the imminent downfall of 
the hubristic Helvetii.   
 
1.17 Tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus quod antea tacuerat proponit: 
esse nonnullos, quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat, qui privatim plus 
possint quam ipsi magistratus. Hos seditiosa atque improba oratione multitudinem 
deterrere, ne frumentum conferant quod debeant: praestare, si iam principatum 
Galliae obtinere non possint, Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre, neque 
dubitare [debeant] quin, si Helvetios superaverint Romani, una cum reliqua Gallia 
                                                             
49 See chapter 6.1.9 for a further discussion on ius and iniuria 
50 Although, please note the exceptions in 1.34 and 1.35 
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Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi. Ab isdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur 
hostibus enuntiari; hos a se coerceri non posse. Quin etiam, quod necessariam rem 
coactus Caesari enuntiarit, intellegere sese quanto id cum periculo fecerit, et ob eam 
causam quam diu potuerit tacuisse. 
 
In this speech by Liscus, one of the magistrates of the Aedui, Caesar seems to use 
incrementum – note the change from proponit and adductus in the first sentence to 
enuntiarit and coactus in the last sentence. There is also allitteration in the first 
sentence, plebem plurimum…privatim plus possint, which perhaps is intended to 
emphasize the strength of these non nulli. The purpose of this speech is most likely 
to impart the message that the Gauls pose a real threat (cf. 1.30)51.  
 
1.18 Eadem secreto ab aliis quaerit; reperit esse vera: ipsum esse Dumnorigem, 
summa audacia, magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum 
novarum. Complures annos portoria reliquaque omnia Haeduorum vectigalia parvo 
pretio redempta habere, propterea quod illo licente contra liceri audeat nemo. His 
rebus et suam rem familiarem auxisse et facultates ad largiendum magnas 
comparasse; magnum numerum equitatus suo sumptu semper alere et circum se 
habere, neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates largiter posse, atque 
huius potentiae causa matrem in Biturigibus homini illic nobilissimo ac potentissimo 
conlocasse; ipsum ex Helvetiis uxorem habere, sororem ex matre et propinquas suas 
nuptum in alias civitates conlocasse. Favere et cupere Helvetiis propter eam 
adfinitatem, odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos, quod eorum adventu 
potentia eius deminuta et Diviciacus frater in antiquum locum gratiae atque honoris 
sit restitutus. Si quid accidat Romanis, summam in spem per Helvetios regni obtinendi 
venire; imperio populi Romani non modo de regno, sed etiam de ea quam habeat gratia 
desperare. Reperiebat etiam in quaerendo Caesar, quod proelium equestre adversum 
paucis ante diebus esset factum, initium eius fugae factum a Dumnorige atque eius 
                                                             
51 See also Mutschler 151-54. 
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equitibus – nam equitatui, quem auxilio Caesari Haedui miserant, Dumnorix praeerat 
– ; eorum fuga reliquum esse equitatum perterritum. 
 
This is the longest speech so far in the book and Caesar uses it to deliver a character 
assassination of Dumnorix, which includes giving him the blame for the lost cavalry 
battle and shows his persistent work to increase his personal power (complures 
annos; neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates). There are quite a few 
examples of hyberbole (see underlined) and antitheton: Dumnorix is both loved and 
feared, has great ambitions and hates the Romans and Caesar. In short, in this 
speech belonging to the genus demonstrativum Dumnorix is portrayed as the perfect 
villain. To make matters worse, he also wants regnum – the word is repeated twice 
in the same sentence, but imperio populi Romani is neatly wedged between them, 
almost like a road block.  
 
1.20 consolatus rogat finem orandi faciat; tanti eius apud se gratiam esse ostendit uti 
et rei publicae iniuriam et suum dolorem eius voluntati ac precibus condonet. 
Dumnorigem ad se vocat, fratrem adhibet; quae in eo reprehendat ostendit; quae ipse 
intellegat, quae civitas queratur proponit; monet ut in reliquum tempus omnes 
suspiciones vitet; praeterita se Diviciaco fratri condonare dicit. 
 
Worth noting in this segment are the anaphors and the dual wrong-doings of 
Diviciacus – both to Caesar and the Roman republic and that Caesar puts the rei 
publicae iniuriam in the first position (at least in the text). 
 
1.30 intellegere sese, tametsi pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani ab his 
poenas bello repetisset, tamen eam rem non minus ex usu terrae Galliae quam populi 
Romani accidisse, propterea quod eo consilio florentissimis rebus domos suas Helvetii 
reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur, locumque domicilio 
ex magna copia deligerent quem ex omni Gallia oportunissimum ac fructuosissimum 
iudicassent, reliquasque civitates stipendiarias haberent. Petiverunt uti sibi concilium 
totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris facere voluntate liceret: sese 
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habere quasdam res quas ex communi consensu ab eo petere vellent. Ea re permissa 
diem concilio constituerunt et iure iurando ne quis enuntiaret, nisi quibus communi 
consilio mandatum esset, inter se sanxerunt. 
 
This segment sets the scene for what follows in 1.31, the repeated mentions of 
phrases like omnia Gallia and tota Gallia serve to alert the reader to the fact that 
what Caesar is about to find out about Ariovistus in 1.31 will pose a threat not only 
to the Gallic tribes but also to the Roman province; the threat posed by the Helvetii, 
which in 1.10 makes Caesar think that “magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut 
homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis 
finitimos haberet” is repeating itself – just like the Helvetii, Ariovistus’s goal is imperio 
potiri (cf 1.2). The above speech by the Gallic chiefs could also be said to show the 
recurring pattern of the Gauls not telling the whole story, promising something they 
do not intend to keep or even resorting to outright lies (cf. 2.32, 5.26-27, 7.38, etc.). 
 
1.31 idem princeps civitatum qui ante [ad]fuerant ad Caesarem reverterunt 
petieruntque uti sibi secreto in occulto de sua omniumque salute cum eo agere liceret. 
Ea re impetrata sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt: [exordium] non 
minus se id contendere et laborare ne ea quae dixissent enuntiarentur quam uti ea 
quae vellent impetrarent, propterea quod, si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum 
se venturos viderent. Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Haeduus: [narratio] Galliae totius 
factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos, alterius Arvernos. 
Hi cum tantopere de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse uti ab 
Arvernis Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur. Horum primo circiter milia XV 
Rhenum transisse; postea quam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac 
barbari adamassent, traductos plures; nunc esse in Gallia ad centum et viginti milium 
numerum. [argumentatio] Cum his Haeduos eorumque clientes semel atque iterum 
armis contendisse; magnam calamitatem pulsos accepisse, omnem nobilitatem, 
omnem senatum, omnem equitatum amisisse. Quibus proeliis calamitatibusque 
fractos, qui et sua virtute et populi Romani hospitio atque amicitia plurimum ante in 
Gallia potuissent, coactos esse Sequanis obsides dare nobilissimos civitatis et iure 
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iurando civitatem obstringere sese neque obsides repetituros neque auxilium a populo 
Romano imploraturos neque recusaturos quo minus perpetuo sub illorum dicione 
atque imperio essent. Unum se esse ex omni civitate Haeduorum qui adduci non 
potuerit ut iuraret aut liberos suos obsides daret. Ob eam rem se ex civitate profugisse 
et Romam ad senatum venisse auxilium postulatum, quod solus neque iure iurando 
neque obsidibus teneretur. Sed peius victoribus Sequanis quam Haeduis victis 
accidisse, propterea quod Ariovistus, rex Germanorum, in eorum finibus consedisset 
tertiamque partem agri Sequani, qui esset optimus totius Galliae, occupavisset et nunc 
de altera parte tertia Sequanos decedere iuberet, propterea quod paucis mensibus 
ante Harudum milia hominum XXIIII ad eum venissent, quibus locus ac sedes 
pararentur. Futurum esse paucis annis uti omnes ex Galliae finibus pellerentur atque 
omnes Germani Rhenum transirent; neque enim conferendum esse Gallicum cum 
Germanorum agro neque hanc consuetudinem victus cum illa comparandam. 
Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum copias proelio vicerit, quod proelium factum sit 
ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crudeliter imperare, obsides nobilissimi cuiusque liberos 
poscere et in eos omnia exempla cruciatusque edere, si qua res non ad nutum aut ad 
voluntatem eius facta sit. Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium: non 
posse eius imperia, diutius sustineri. [peroratio] Nisi quid in Caesare populoque 
Romano sit auxilii, omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut 
domo emigrent, aliud domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a Germanis, petant 
fortunamque, quaecumque accidat, experiantur. Haec si enuntiata Ariovisto sint, non 
dubitare quin de omnibus obsidibus qui apud eum sint gravissimum supplicium 
sumat. Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus vel recenti victoria vel nomine 
populi Romani deterrere posse ne maior multitudo Germanorum Rhenum traducatur, 
Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniuria posse defendere. 
 
As soon as Caesar has set right the first iniuria (c.f. 1.30 pro veteribus Helvetiorum 
iniuriis populi Romani) he is presented with a new one, this time committed by 
Ariovistus (see underlined in the last sentence).  The justification for the attack on 
the Germans merits a long speech by the Gallic chief, Diviciacus, which is a fine 
example of a well-structured speech of the genus deliberativum (where the 
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recommended action is that Caesar stop the Germans) with exordium, narratio, 
argumentatio and peroratio: In the exordium the Gallic leaders are looking to gain 
Caesar’s sympathy, Diviciacus gives the background information in the narratio, a 
description of the current situation follows in the argumentatio and the speech 
concludes with a summary and an emotional appeal to Caesar in the peroratio. In 
the text I have suggested where the various parts of the speech begin, but the exact 
division can of course be discussed. The speech does not really contain anything 
which can be classified as delectare (which is not surprising, considering the subject 
matter), but there are elements of both movere and docere. When it comes to the 
ornatus of the speech it can be noted that Caesar the author, in order to heighten 
the contrast between the Germans and the Romans, uses polysyndeton 
(vel…atque…vel…vel) for himself and asyndeton for Ariovistus (barbarum, 
iracundum, temerarium), which could also be seen as an example of congeries and 
that some expressions tend towards hyperbole and antitheton (see underlined in 
the text). There are also no modifiers used to describe the qualities of Caesar and 
the Romans, i.e no adjectives are appended to nouns like auxilium, hospitium and 
amicitia, whereas Ariovistus and the Germans and their actions are only described 
by adjectives or adverbs: barbarus, ferus, superbe, crudeliter, iracundus, temerarius. 
Caesar would of course have welcomed this speech – the call for help fits his purpose 
perfectly, and perhaps it is all a little too neat; I strongly suspect that Caesar is 
using at least a certain amount of sermocinatio here. 
 
1.32 Cum ab his saepius quaereret neque ullam omnino vocem exprimere posset, idem 
Diviciacus Haeduus respondit: hoc esse miseriorem et graviorem fortunam 
Sequanorum quam reliquorum, quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium 
implorare auderent absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem, velut si cora adesset, 
horrerent, propterea quod reliquis tamen fugae facultas daretur, Sequanis vero, qui 
intra fines suos Ariovistum recepissent, quorum oppida omnia in potestate eius 
essent, omnes cruciatus essent perferendi. 
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Muschler points out that Caesar’s involvement in the exchange in 1.30 – 1.32 is 
minimal: “Caesar erscheint nur einmal als Subjekt…vor ihm als Zuschauer agieren 
die anderen Gesprächsteilnehmer” (150). Caesar thus continues to describe himself 
as the reacting, rather than the acting, party. As opposed to the speech in 1.31 
which contained both docere and movere, here Diviciacus is focusing on the movere 
(see underlined words) and I would say that the fulcrum around which everything 
in this speech revolves is the phrase Ariovisti crudelitatem.  
 
1.33 Caesar Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est sibi eam rem curae 
futuram; magnam se habere spem et beneficio suo et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum 
finem iniuriis facturum.  
 
Caesar here emphasizes the contrast between right (himself) and wrong (Ariovistus) 
and this also serves as a prelude of sorts to his speech in 1.40 (see below) where he 
extols his leadership skills. The word iniuria is again applied to the actions of the 
enemy.  
 
1.34 placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum legatos mitteret, qui ab eo postularent uti aliquem 
locum medium utrisque conloquio deligeret: velle sese de re publica et summis 
utriusque rebus cum eo agere. Ei legationi Ariovistus respondit: si quid ipsi a Caesare 
opus esset, sese ad eum venturum fuisse; si quid ille se velit, illum ad se venire 
oportere. Praeterea se neque sine exercitu in eas partes Galliae venire audere quas 
Caesar possideret, neque exercitum sine magno commeatu atque molimento in unum 
locum contrahere posse. Sibi autem mirum videri quid in sua Gallia, quam bello 
vicisset, aut Caesari aut omnino populo Romano negotii esset. 
 
This and the following speech in 1.35 are unique in the BG: Nowhere else does 
Caesar send legates to ask for a conference. Although Caesar cloaks the decision in 
the phrases placuit ei and ab eo postularet to make it sound more commanding, 
Caesar still takes a very timid position in comparison to his later modus operandi. 
As Nordling (pp. 160-70) and Mutschler (pp. 148-51) point out, Caesar needs to 
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tread carefully here: In 59 BC when Caesar himself was consul, Ariovistus was 
honoured by the Roman senate (in consulate suo rex atque amicus a senatu 
appellatus esset, see below) and thus he cannot treat him like a common enemy. 
Worth noting in this speech is also the last sentence: That Ariovistus calls it sua 
Gallia will no doubt have grated on the ears and eyes of the Roman readers. Mirum 
videri is a periphrasis for miror to emphasize Arivistus’s superciliousness and omnino 
serves to strengthen the link (and thus Caesar’s mandate) between Caesar and 
populus Romanus. Perhaps the omission of the senate in this context also serves to 
distance himself from the senate’s/his own previous decision, which no longer suits 
his purposes. 
 
1.35 iterum ad eum Caesar legatos cum his mandatis mittit: quoniam tanto suo 
populique Romani beneficio adfectus, cum in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu 
appellatus esset, hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam referret ut in conloquium venire 
invitatus gravaretur neque de communi re dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, 
haec esse quae ab eo postularet: primum ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius 
trans Rhenum in Galliam traduceret; deinde obsides quos haberet ab Haeduis 
redderet Sequanisque permitteret ut quos illi haberent voluntate eius reddere illis 
liceret; neve Haeduos iniuria lacesseret neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret. Si 
id ita fecisset, sibi populoque Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eo 
futuram; si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus 
censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae 
facere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum 
iniurias non neglecturum. 
 
This is Caesar first reply to Ariovstus and the start of an exchange of words which 
continues in 1.36, 1.43, 1.44, 1.45 and ends in 1.47. As Rambaud points out52, 
Caesar lets Ariovistus have the first and the last word. These exchanges between 
                                                             
52 Nordling 69-70. 
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Caesar and Ariovistus can be likened to the verbal battle between two lawyers in 
court; these speeches thus belong to the genus iudiciale and the question before the 
judge (i.e. the readers) is who has the right of possession to Gaul, or in rhetorical 
terms the status qualitatis of the case is to judge whether the actions are iure or non 
iure. Caesar accuses Ariovistus of iniuria (cf. discussion of the speech in 1.13-14) 
and continues to link himself to the populus Romanus and states that his actions 
are based on a decision by the senate and carried out in the interest of the republic; 
in short, this is a justification for the inevitable battle (1.50-1.53). 
 
1.36 Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: ius esse belli ut qui vicissent iis quos vicissent 
quem ad modum vellent imperarent. Item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius 
praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse. Si ipse populo Romano non 
praescriberet quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere se a populo Romano in 
suo iure impediri. Haeduos sibi, quoniam belli fortunam temptassent et armis 
congressi ac superati essent, stipendiarios esse factos. Magnam Caesarem iniuriam 
facere, qui suo adventu vectigalia sibi deteriora faceret. Haeduis se obsides 
redditurum non esse neque his neque eorum sociis iniuria bellum inlaturum, si in eo 
manerent quod convenisset stipendiumque quotannis penderent; si id non fecissent, 
longe his fraternum nomen populi Romani afuturum. Quod sibi Caesar denuntiaret se 
Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse. 
Cum vellet, congrederetur: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, 
qui inter annos XIIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent. 
 
Ariovistus starts his speech with a sententia. He then goes on to respond to Caesar’s 
allegations of iniuria with a counterallegation and at the end of the speech brushes 
aside Caesar’s accusation with a boastful threat that those who had tried to defeat 
him in battle had only lead to their own destruction (sine sua pernicie). Worth noting 
are also the repetitions of the phrases populus Romanus and suo iure and the 
alliteration in non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua…Although Ariovistus 
argues well in the beginning of the speech, the end smacks of superbia, something 
which obviously must (and will) be punished.  
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1.39 ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti 
magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis esse 
praedicabant – saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem 
oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse […] quorum alius alia causa inlata, quam sibi ad 
proficiscendum necessariam esse diceret, petebat ut eius voluntate discedere liceret 
[…] abditi in tabernaculis aut suum fatum querebantur aut cum familiaribus suis 
commune periculum miserabantur […] Qui se ex his minus timidos existimari 
volebant, non se hostem vereri, sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae 
intercederent inter ipsos atque Ariovistum, aut rem frumentariam, ut satis commode 
supportari posset, timere dicebant. Non nulli etiam Caesari nuntiabant, cum castra 
moveri ac signa ferri iussisset, non fore dicto audientes milites neque propter timorem 
signa laturos. 
 
This chapter is a good example of ratiocinatio: the Germans are described as having 
exceptional powers and characteristics. When they have been defeated at the end of 
the book, it will make the feat of the Romans seem even more impressive (although 
it must be admitted that they come across as anything but impressive in this 
chapter). Caesar also grabs the opportunity to take a swipe at those in his camp 
with no battle experience. T.P Wiseman53 argues that Caesar here shows that he is 
a popularis and makes a connection to the fact that Caesar so often repeats the 
phrase populus Romanus in book 1. It also serves as a contrast to the praise given 
to the regular soldiers of the 10th legion in the following chapter and the remark in 
chapter 1.42 (see below).  
 
1.40 Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio omniumque ordinum ad id 
consilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam 
in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent. 
                                                             
53 In: Welch and Powell, ed., p 3. 
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Ariovistum se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse; cur hunc tam 
temere quisquam ab officio discessurum iudicaret? Sibi quidem persuaderi cognitis 
suis postulatis atque aequitate condicionum perspecta eum neque suam neque populi 
Romani gratiam repudiaturum. Quod si furore atque amentia impulsum bellum 
intulisset, quid tandem vererentur? Aut cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia 
desperarent? Factum eius hostis periculum patrum nostrorum memoria Cimbris et 
Teutonis a Gaio Mario pulsis non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator 
meritus videbatur; factum etiam nuper in Italia servili tumultu, quos tamen aliquid 
usus ac disciplina, quam a nobis accepissent, sublevarint. Ex quo iudicari posse 
quantum haberet in se boni constantia, propterea quod quos aliquam diu inermes sine 
causa timuissent hos postea armatos ac victores superassent. Denique hos esse 
eosdem Germanos quibuscum saepe numero Helvetii congressi non solum in suis sed 
etiam in illorum finibus plerumque superassent, qui tamen pares esse nostro exercitui 
non potuerint. Si quos adversum proelium et fuga Gallorum commoveret, hos, si 
quaererent, reperire posse diuturnitate belli defatigatis Gallis Ariovistum, cum multos 
menses castris se ac paludibus tenuisset neque sui potestatem fecisset, desperantes 
iam de pugna et dispersos subito adortum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute 
vicisse54. Cui rationi contra homines barbaros atque imperitos locus fuisset, hac ne 
ipsum quidem sperare nostros exercitus capi posse. Qui suum timorem in rei 
frumentariae simulationem angustiasque itineris conferrent, facere arroganter, cum 
aut de officio imperatoris desperare aut praescribere viderentur. Haec sibi esse curae; 
frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta 
matura; de itinere ipsos brevi tempore iudicaturos. Quod non fore dicto audientes 
neque signa laturi dicantur, nihil se ea re commoveri: scire enim, quibuscumque 
exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo 
facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam. Suam innocentiam perpetua vita, 
felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam. Itaque se quod in longiorem diem 
conlaturus fuisset repraesentaturum et proxima nocte de quarta, vigilia castra 
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moturum, ut quam primum intellegere posset utrum apud eos pudor atque officium an 
timor plus valeret. Quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima 
legione iturum, de qua non dubitaret, sibique eam praetoriam cohortem futuram. 
 
This is arguably one of the most important speeches in the whole of the BG. Welch 
convincingly argues that Caesar in this speech claims for himself many of the 
qualities outlined by Cicero in De Imperio Cn. Pompeii55: in summo imperatore 
quattuor has res inesse oportere,—scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, 
felicitatem (28); Neque enim illae sunt solae virtutes imperatoriae, quae volgo 
existimantur,—labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in 
conficiendo, consilium in providendo (29); Ac primum, quanta innocentia debent esse 
imperatores? quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia? quanta fide? quanta 
facilitate? quanto ingenio? quanta humanitate? (36); ego enim sic existimo: Maximo, 
Marcello, Scipioni, Mario, et ceteris magnis imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem, 
sed etiam propter fortunam saepius imperia mandata atque exercitus esse commissos 
(47). In an echo of Cicero’s decription of the summus imperator Caesar compares 
himself with Marius (Caesar’s uncle), states that he knows how to deal with the 
German enemy in case of war, he mentions his virtus (in a rhetorical question, for 
added emphasis), he asserts his authority (vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod 
aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum 
putarent and again in haec sibi curae esse) and he asserts his felicitas in the 
campaign against the Helvetii. Furthermore, he points out the aequitas of the terms 
he has given Ariovistus (which shows his temperantia and humanitas) and he ends 
the speech by showing his decisiveness/swiftness, something which was to become 
one of his trademarks. From a rhetorical perspective, Caesar demonstrates that he 
is a vir bonus. This is an effective speech which greatly influences the mood in the 
camp as Caesar states in the beginning of the next chaper (hac oratione habita 
mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes). Not only does the speech serve to 
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remind the soldiers of Caesar’s splendid qualities as a commander, Caesar also uses 
it to strengthen the bond between himself and his soldiers (Aut cur de sua virtute 
aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent?; non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse 
imperator meritus videbatur), and yet again the connection to the populus Romanus 
(mentioned twice) is made. Last but not least, the speech emphasizes the contrast 
between himself/the Romans and Ariovistus; the words Caesar to describe his 
own/Roman traits are: virtus, diligentia, constantia, innocentia, whereas Ariovistus 
could start the war because of his furore atque amentia and he managed to defeat 
the Gauls magis ratione et consilio quam virtute (the virtus that Ariovistus boast 
about at the end of his speech in 1.36 is thus debunked). Ariovistus is also shown 
to be anything but swift and decisive: ”cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus 
tenuisset”.  
 
1.43 Caesar initio orationis sua senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit, quod rex 
appellatus esset a senatu, quod amicus, quod munera amplissime missa; quam rem 
et paucis contigisse et pro magnis hominum officiis consuesse tribui docebat; illum, 
cum neque aditum neque causam postulandi iustam haberet, beneficio ac liberalitate 
sua ac senatus ea praemia consecutum. Docebat etiam quam veteres quamque iustae 
causae necessitudinis ipsis cum Haeduis intercederent, quae senatus consulta 
quotiens quamque honorifica in eos facta essent, ut omni tempore totius Galliae 
principatum Haedui tenuissent, prius etiam quam nostram amicitiam adpetissent. 
Populi Romani hanc esse consuetudinem, ut socios atque amicos non modo sui nihil 
deperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, honore auctiores velit esse; quod vero ad amicitiam 
populi Romani attulissent, id iis eripi quis pati posset? Postulavit deinde eadem quae 
legatis in mandatis dederat: ne aut Haeduis aut eorum sociis bellum inferret, obsides 
redderet, si nullam partem Germanorum domum remittere posset, at ne quos amplius 
Rhenum transire pateretur. 
 
Caesar more or less repeats his speech from 1.35, with the important difference that 
the beneficia bestowed upon Ariovistus were awarded by Caesar and the senate and 
not, as in 1.35, by Caesar and the Roman people. It seems the two terms are 
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interchangable and Caesar thus establishes a trinity where he, the Roman senate 
and the Roman people are acting as one, which is not surprising, considering that 
the standard phrase was senatus populusque Romanus, but it does emphasize how 
important Caesar seems to think it is to show that he is acting not for himself, but 
in the interest of the Roman republic, or rather its people and its senate (together 
they are mentioned no less than six times in this short speech, see underlined). The 
speech also contains a rhetorical question and repeated anaphoras in both the first 
(quod…quod…quod…quam) and the second sentences (quam…quamque…quae… 
quamque). Worth noting are the striking similarities in the use of rhetorical features 
in this speech and in the speech before the battle against the Helvetii in 1.13-1.14.  
 
1.44 Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa 
praedicavit: transisse Rhenum sese non sua sponte, sed rogatum et arcessitum a 
Gallis; non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse; 
sedes habere in Gallia ab ipsis concessas, obsides ipsorum voluntate datos; 
stipendium capere iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint. Non sese Gallis 
sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse: omnes Galliae civitates ad se oppugnandum venisse 
ac contra se castra habuisse; eas omnes copias a se uno proelio pulsas ac superatas 
esse. Si iterum experiri velint, se iterum paratum esse decertare; si pace uti velint, 
iniquum esse de stipendio recusare, quod sua voluntate ad id tempus pependerint. 
Amicitiam populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio, non detrimento esse oportere, 
idque se hac spe petisse. Si per populum Romanum stipendium remittatur et dediticii 
subtrahantur, non minus se libenter recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam quam 
adpetierit. Quod multitudinem Germanorum in Galliam traducat, id se sui muniendi, 
non Galliae oppugnandae causa facere; eius rei testimonium esse quod nisi rogatus 
non venerit et quod bellum non intulerit sed defenderit. Se prius in Galliam venisse 
quam populum Romanum. Numquam ante hoc tempus exercitum populi Romani 
Galliae [provinciae] finibus egressum. Quid sibi vellet? Cur in suas possessiones 
veniret? Provinciam suam hanc esse Galliam, sicut illam nostram. Ut ipsi concedi non 
oporteret, si in nostros fines impetum faceret, sic item nos esse iniquos, quod in suo 
iure se interpellaremus. Quod a se[natu] fratres Haeduos appellatos diceret, non se 
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tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret neque bello Allobrogum 
proximo Haeduos Romanis auxilium tulisse neque ipsos in his contentionibus quas 
Aedui secum et cum Sequanis habuissent auxilio populi Romani usos esse. Debere se 
suspicari simulata Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui 
opprimendi causa habere. Qui nisi decedat atque exercitum deducat ex his regionibus, 
sese illum non pro amico sed pro hoste habiturum. Quod si eum interfecerit, multis se 
nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum – id se ab ipsis per 
eorum nuntios compertum habere – quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius 
morte redimere posset. Quod si decessisset et liberam possessionem Galliae sibi 
tradidisset, magno se illum praemio remuneraturum et quaecumque bella geri vellet 
sine ullo eius labore et periculo confecturum. 
 
Ariovistus likewise sticks to his guns; he repeats his claim that this part of Gaul is 
his. Caesar is most likely using sermocinatio here. That Ariovistus would have 
delivered a speech in fluent Latin, complete with annominatio56, commutatio and 
interrogatio seems implausible. The frequent mentions of the people of Rome 
continues (7 times), but the last instance also includes nobiles principesque, which 
does not occur elsewhere and the context in which it is mentioned (that these groups 
would be happy to see Caesar dead) could be said to support Wiseman’s theory that 
Caesar is writing for the people and not the nobility (cf. comments to chapter 1.39).   
 
1.45 Multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non 
posset: neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati ut optime meritos socios 
desereret, neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani. Bello 
superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos a Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus 
ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium posuisset. Quod si 
antiquissimum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse 
                                                             
56 It should however be noted that not all manuscripts contain the second iterum. 
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in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse 
Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset. 
 
This speech is interrupted by Ariovistus’s men throwing stones and darts at Caesar’s 
troops. Caesar refutes Ariovistus’s claim of having the right to Gaul through 
precedent; again it is in the interest of the Roman people and the senate, rather 
than his own, that Caesar is acting. Caesar states that he spoke at length, but we 
are not told what he said: “multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt…” It is not 
clear to me why Caesar does not deliver his speech in full here, but perhaps the idea 
is that what Ariovistus says in 1.44 is tantamount to a declaration of war, which 
means that there is no longer any need for rhetorical niceties. The remaining 
speeches in the book (in 1.47, 1.50 and 1.53) are certainly very short and do not 
contain anything worth commenting on, as far as rhetorics is concerned. 
 
6.1.2 Book 2 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no. of words 
2.1 Frequent rumours and dispatches 
from Labienus 
100 
2.3 Iccius and Andecombogius, legates of 
the Remi 
85 
2.4 Iccius and Andecombogius 210 
2.5 Caesar 20 
2.5 Caesar 40 
2.13 The people of Bratuspantium 15 
2.14 Diviciacus 85 
2.15 Caesar 30 
2.15 The Belgae 20 
2.16 Prisoners of Caesar’s 65 
2.21 Caesar 15 
49 
 
2.25 Caesar 15 
2.28 Legates of the Nervi 30 
2.28 Caesar  20 
2.30 The Aduatuci 20 
2.31 Legates of the Aduatuci 90 
2.32 Caesar 40 
 
Number of speeches: 17 
Total number of words spoken: 940 
Total number of words in Book II: 4150 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 20-25 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 7 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 180 
 
2.1 crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur litterisque item Labieni certior fiebat omnes 
Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus, contra populum Romanum 
coniurare obsidesque inter se dare. Coniurandi has esse causas: primum quod 
vererentur ne, omni pacata Gallia, ad eos exercitus noster adduceretur; deinde quod 
ab non nullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui, ut Germanos diutius in Gallia versari 
noluerant, ita populi Romani exercitum hiemare atque inveterascere in Gallia moleste 
ferebant, partim qui mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant; ab non nullis 
etiam quod in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates 
habebant vulgo regna occupabantur; qui minus facile eam rem imperio nostro 
consequi poterant. 
 
The most conspicuous phrase in this chapter is omni pacata Gallia. Is this a 
statement of intent from Caesar? Although this is uttered by the Gallic chiefs, 
Caesar actions in this and the following books do nothing to contradict this 
impression. There is certainly a strong contrast to the timid entrance on to the stage 
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at the beginning of book 157. The contrast between the Romans and the Gauls is 
also shown in the antithetic inveterascere and novis imperiis. Caesar is however still 
careful to point out that the conspiracy is against the Roman people and that the 
army does not belong to him, but to the Roman people.  
 
2.3 Remi, qui proximi Galliae ex Belgis sunt, ad eum legatos Iccium et 
Andecombogium, primos civitatis, miserunt, qui dicerent se suaque omnia in fidem 
atque potestatem populi Romani permittere, neque se cum reliquis Belgis consensisse 
neque contra populum Romanum omnino coniurasse, paratosque esse et obsides dare 
et imperata facere et oppidis recipere et frumento ceterisque rebus iuvare; reliquos 
omnes Belgas in armis esse, Germanosque qui cis Rhenum incolant sese cum his 
coniunxisse, tantumque esse eorum omnium furorem ut ne Suessiones quidem, fratres 
consanguineosque suos, qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, unum imperium 
unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant, deterrere potuerint quin cum iis 
consentirent. 
 
This speech, by the legates of Caesar’s allies, the Remi, is designed to show the 
strength and unity of the enemy, emphasized by the repeated use of the prefix con 
(see underlined). The enemy is also united in their fury (furor), which is worth noting 
because of the contrast to what follows in the very next speech: 
 
2.4 plerosque Belgos esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos propter 
loci fertilitatem ibi consedisse Gallosque qui ea loca incolerent expulisse, solosque 
esse qui, patrum nostrorum memoria omni Gallia vexata, Teutonos Cimbrosque intra 
suos fines ingredi prohibuerint; qua ex re fieri uti earum rerum memoria magnam sibi 
auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent. De numero eorum omnia se 
                                                             
57 In this context it is worth noting that Caesar uses the phrases omni Gallia pacata in 2.35 and 3.28 and pacatam 
Galliam in 3.7, but in these cases the meaning of the word is “peaceful [for the moment]” rather than 
“pacified/subjugated”. In 2.35, Caesar has not conquered the whole of Gaul, but the uprisings have been quelled 
temporarily. In 3.7 and 3.28 the claims of pacata are modified by subitum bellum in Gallia coortum est (3.7) and Morini 
Menapiique supererant, qui in armis essent neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent (3.28).  
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habere explorata Remi dicebant, propterea quod propinquitatibus adfinitatibusque 
coniuncti quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio ad id bellum 
pollicitus sit cognoverint. Plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et virtute et auctoritate et 
hominum numero valere: hos posse conficere armata milia centum, pollicitos ex eo 
numero electa milia sexaginta totiusque belli imperium sibi postulare. Suessiones suos 
esse finitimos; fines latissimos feracissimosque agros possidere. Apud eos fuisse 
regem nostra etiam memoria Diviciacum, totius Galliae potentissimum, qui cum 
magnae partis harum regionum, tum etiam Britanniae imperium obtinuerit; nunc esse 
regem Galbam: ad hunc propter iustitiam prudentiamque summam totius belli omnium 
voluntate deferri; oppida habere numero XII, polliceri milia armata quinquaginta; 
totidem Nervios, qui maxime feri inter ipsos habeantur longissimeque absint; 
quindecim milia Atrebates, Ambianos decem milia, Morinos XXV milia, Menapios 
novem milia, Caletos X milia, Veliocasses et Viromanduos totidem, Atuatucos decem 
et novem milia; Condrusos, Eburones, Caerosos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani 
appellantur, arbitrari ad XL milia. 
 
The furor of 2.3 and the mobilitate et levitate animi of 2.1 has been replaced with 
auctoritas, virtus, iustitia and prudentia. This, it could be argued, suggests that 
Caesar may be a somewhat unreliable narrator, who adapts the story to suit his 
needs; in 2.1 and 2.3 he wants to show that the enemy is fickle and untrustworthy 
and, having achieved this, he moves on to ratiocinatio in 2.4: Caesar now wants to 
convince the reader that the enemy is strong and a worthy opponent of the Roman 
army. 
 
2.5 Caesar Remos cohortatus liberaliterque oratione prosecutus omnem senatum ad 
se convenire principumque liberos obsides ad se adduci iussit. […] Ipse Diviciacum 
Haeduum magnopere cohortatus docet quanto opere rei publicae communisque salutis 
intersit manus hostium distineri, ne cum tanta multitudine uno tempore confligendum 
sit. Id fieri posse, si suas copias Haedui in fines Bellovacorum introduxerint et eorum 
agros populari coeperint.  
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2.21 Milites non longiore oratione cohortatus quam uti suae pristinae virtutis 
memoriam retinerent neu perturbarentur animo hostiumque impetum fortiter 
sustinerent 
 
2.25 in primam aciem processit centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos 
cohortatus milites signa inferre et manipulos laxare iussit, quo facilius gladiis uti 
possent.  
 
These four speeches (chapter 2.5 contains two speeches) constitute more than 50% 
of Caesar’s speeches in book 2. In the heat of the battle in 2.25 it is understandable 
that Caesar does not deliver a long speech, but even before the battle he points out 
the briefness of his speech, by means of a litotes. Caesar is content with short 
exhortations and does not see the need for a big speech in the vein of the one he 
delivered in 1.40. 
 
2.13 omnes maiores natu ex oppido egressi manus ad Caesarem tendere et voce 
significare coeperunt sese in eius fidem ac potestatem venire neque contra populum 
Romanum armis contendere.  
 
2.14 Bellovacos omni tempore in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse; impulsos 
ab suis principibus, qui dicerent Haeduos a Caesare in servitutem redactos. Omnes 
indignitates contumeliasque perferre, et ab Haeduis defecisse et populo Romano 
bellum intulisse. Qui eius consilii principes fuissent, quod intellegerent quantam 
calamitatem civitati intulissent, in Britanniam profugisse. Petere non solum 
Bellovacos, sed etiam pro his Haeduos, ut sua clementia ac mansuetudine in eos 
utatur. Quod si fecerit, Haeduorum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas amplificaturum, 
quorum auxiliis atque opibus, si qua bella inciderint, sustentare consuerint. 
 
2.15 Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Haeduorum causa sese eos in fidem recepturum 
et conservaturum dixit, et quod erat civitas magna inter Belgas auctoritate atque 
hominum multitudine praestabat, sescentos obsides poposcit.     
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Just like the exchanges before the battles in 2.5, 2.21 and 2.25 shorten, so do the 
exchanges after the battles; Caesar’s clementia is appealed to, most often granted 
and then Caesar asks for hostages, see for example 2.32, 4.9, 4.22, 4.27, 6.9, 7.12.  
 
2.30 quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae 
[…] tanti oneris turrim in muro sese conlocare confiderent? 
 
2.31 non se existimare Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantae altitudinis 
machinationes tanta celeritate promovere et ex propinquitate pugnare possent; se 
suaque omnia eorum potestati permittere dixerunt. Unum petere ac deprecari: si forte 
pro sua clementia ac mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Atuatucos 
esse conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret. Sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos 
ac suae virtuti invidere; a quibus se defendere traditis armis non possent. Sibi 
praestare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati 
quam ab iis per cruciatum interfici inter quos dominari consuessent. 
 
Here is another example of Caesar’s use of ratiocinatio: An enemy which Caesar has 
subjugated by means of Roman engineering skills (which the Aduatuci refer to as 
ope divina) state that all the other tribes in the area envy their virtus. There is also 
a certain element of comedy to this exchange: The only thing that matches the speed 
with which the Romans move the machine is the change of fortune for the Aduatuci; 
the open scorn and contempt quickly turns into dismay and outright surrender. 
 
6.1.3. Book 3 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no. of words 
3.2 Servius Galba’s scouts 115 
3.3 Some of those present at the council of 
war 
30 
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3.5 P. Sextius Baculus and Gaius 
Volusenus 
10 
3.5 Galba 30 
3.8 The Veneti 30 
3.18 Pretend deserter 30 
3.18 Gauls 10 
 
 
Number of speeches: 7 
Total number of words spoken: 255 
Total number of words in Book III: 3600 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 0 
 
3.2 subito per exploratores certior factus est ex ea parte vici, quam Gallis concesserat, 
omnes noctu discessisse montesque qui impenderent a maxima multitudine 
Sedunorum et Veragrorum teneri. Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli 
renovandi legionisque opprimendae consilium caperent: primum, quod legionem 
neque eam plenissimam detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui 
commeatus petendi causa missi erant, absentibus propter paucitatem despiciebant; 
tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent 
et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri existimabant. 
Accedebat quod suos ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant, et Romanos 
non solum itinerum causa sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare 
conari et ea loca finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant. 
 
The reasoning and the modus operandi of the Gauls are interesting – the 
suddenness of their actions are twice mentioned (subito). Furthermore, their main 
reason (primum) for attacking the Roman camp is because they despise (despicio) 
the size of the legion (i.e. it is small). The secondary reason is because they expect 
55 
 
it will be easy to win the battle, thanks to their attacking from higher ground. The 
fact that they have been forced to hand over their children as hostages and that they 
suspect that the Romans intend to permanently occupy their land are added almost 
as an afterthough (accedebat quod…). Caesar probably describes the actions of the 
Gauls in this fashion to emphasize the irrational nature of the Gauls; the use of the 
word despicio in this context is likely to make the reader suspicious about the 
reasoning of the Gauls.  
 
3.8 celeriter missis legatis per suos principes inter se coniurant nihil nisi communi 
consilio acturos eundemque omnes fortunae exitum esse laturos, reliquasque civitates 
sollicitant, ut in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint permanere quam 
Romanorum servitutem perferre malint. 
 
In the same way the exchanges between Caesar and the Gauls become 
“standardized” (cf. discussion of chapters 2.13-15), the discussions among the 
Gauls themselves follow a very similar pattern. Conspiracies, rashness, promises to 
endure any hardship, the yearning for freedom, given to them by their forefathers, 
and the indignity of Roman enslavement are brought up in almost every 
conversation between the Gauls when Caesar or other Romans are not present. To 
this list of themes can be added how easy it will be to achieve their goals (cf. the 
discussions among the Helvetii in 1.2 and 1.3), which will be a recurring theme in 
later intra-Gallic discussions, particularly evident in book 758.  
 
6.1.4 Book 4 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no. of words 
4.7 German deputies 80 
4.8 Caesar 70 
                                                             
58 Elements hereof can also be seen in 2.14 and 4.34 
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4.9 German deputies 20 
4.11 German deputies 60 
4.11 Caesar 50 
4.16 The Sugambri 25 
4.16 The Ubii 70 
4.19 The Ubii 55 
4.21 Caesar 15 
4.21 Caesar 15 
4.21 Caesar 15 
4.22 Legates from the Morini 25 
4.23 Caesar 40 
*4.25 Eagle-bearer of the 10th legion 15 
4.27 Legates of the Britons 10 
4.27 Caesar 20 
4.34 Messenger of the barbari 20 
 
Number of speeches: 17 
Total number of words spoken: 605 
Total number of words in Book IV: 4600 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 10-15 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 7 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 225 
 
4.7 quorum haec fuit oratio: Germanos neque priores populo Romano bellum inferre 
neque tamen recusare, si lacessantur, quin armis contendant, quod Germanorum 
consuetudo haec sit a maioribus tradita, Quicumque bellum inferant, resistere neque 
deprecari. Haec tamen dicere venisse invitos, eiectos domo; si suam gratiam Romani 
velint, posse iis utiles esse amicos; vel sibi agros attribuant vel patiantur tenere eos 
quos armis possederint: sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales 
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pares esse possint; reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare 
possint. 
 
The first speech of book 4 contains another good example of ratiocinatio, very similar 
to 2.31. The Germans state that not even the immortal gods are equal to the Suebi, 
but of course Caesar conveniently defeated them in book 1. Here the use of 
ratiocinatio serves a double purpose: not only does it give the reader a premonition 
of the Roman supremacy, it also shows the arrogance and ignorance of the enemy. 
It could also be argued that, just like in 2.31, there is a certain element of comedy 
to the naivety of the enemy. 
 
4.8 Ad haec Caesar quae visum est respondit; sed exitus fuit orationis: sibi nullam 
cum iis amicitiam esse posse, si in Gallia remanerent; neque verum esse, qui suos 
fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare; neque ullos in Gallia vacare agros qui dari 
tantae praesertim multitudini sine iniuria possint; sed licere, si velint, in Ubiorum 
finibus considere, quorum sint legati apud se et de Sueborum iniuriis querantur et a 
se auxilium petant: hoc se Ubiis imperaturus. 
 
4.9 Legati haec se ad suos relaturos dixerunt et re deliberata post diem tertium ad 
Caesarem reversuros: interea ne propius se castra moveret petierunt. Ne id quidem 
Caesar ab se impetrari posse dixit. 
 
The exchanges in 4.8 and 4.9 show how Caesar’s attitude has changed. Compared 
to Caesar’s careful response in 1.7, his refusal to accommodate any of the wishes of 
the enemy is quite striking. The pattern is the same – legates arrive and ask for 
Caesar’s permission – but the response is completely different59. 
 
                                                             
59 See Powell 127 for an interesting insight into how Caesar’s adventures in Germany were received by the senate in 
Rome (and Cato in particular).  
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4.16 Ad quos cum Caesar nuntios misisset, qui postularent eos qui sibi Galliae bellum 
intulissent sibi dederent, responderunt: populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire; si se 
invito Germanos in Galliam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sui quicquam esse 
imperii aut potestatis trans Rhenum postularet? Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis 
ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere 
orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur; vel, si id facere 
occupationibus rei publicae prohiberetur, exercitum modo Rhenum transportaret: id 
sibi auxilium spemque reliqui temporis satis futurum. Tantum esse nomen atque 
opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad 
ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse 
possint. Navium magnam copiam ad transportandum exercitum pollicebantur. 
 
Caesar uses the intrusion of the Germanic tribes in Gauls as an excuse to march 
across the Rhine. The exchange of arguments is reminiscent of the conflict with 
Ariovistus in book 1. The segment contains a rhetorical question and the start of 
that sentence which would no doubt have been pleasant to the Roman ear with its 
alliteration. This statement is also indirectly giving the Romans/Caesar the right to 
subjugate Gaul: everything which is not on the other side of the Rhine is within the 
imperium and potestas of the Romans. Caesar seems to have moved the goalposts, 
and quite a lot, at that. 
 
4.25 'desilite', inquit, 'commilitones, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe 
meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero.' 
 
This is the first instance of oratio recta in the BG. Rasmussen discusses these few 
words in detail on pp. 21-23. His perhaps most important argument is that “Der 
Soldat tritt für Augenblicke an die Stelle seines Feldherrn” (23). There is little that 
needs to be added to this, except possibly to echo Nordling’s argument that the 
reason oratio recta is used here is because the soldier needs to raise his voice to be 
heard in the heat of the battle. As to why Caesar chooses this particular point to 
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introduce oratio recta, my only theory is that this is the moment when Romans for 
the first time set foot in England and the use of OR adds emphasis to this fact. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.5 Book 5 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no. of words 
5.1 Legates of the Pirustae 15 
5.1 Caesar 15 
5.2 Caesar 15 
5.3 Cingetorix 20 
5.3 Indutiomarus 45 
5.6 Dumnorix 20 
5.6 Dumnorix 55 
5.20 Trinobantes 20 
5.26 Eburones 20 
5.27 Ambiorix 240 
5.28 Lucius Aurunculeius, several 
tribunes and centurions of the first 
grade 
60 
5.29 Titurius 150 
*5.30 Sabinus 50 
5.31 Participants of the Roman council of 
war 
30 
5.34 Leaders of the Belgae60 20 
                                                             
60 Presumably; this speech is introduced with the words at barbaris consilium defuit. 
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5.34 Ambiorix 30 
5.36 Ambiorix 25 
5.36 Titurius 20 
5.38 Ambiorix 45 
5.41 Leaders of the Nervii 70 
5.41 Cicero 30 
*5.44 Titus Pullo 20 
5.52 Caesar 20 
5.52 Caesar 30 
5.56 Indutiomarus 30 
 
Number of speeches: 25 
Total number of words spoken: 1090 
Total number of words in Book V: 7400 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 10-15 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 4 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 80 
 
5.1 Qua re nuntiata Pirustae legatos ad eum mittunt qui doceant nihil earum rerum 
publico factum consilio, seseque paratos esse demonstrant omnibus rationibus de 
iniuriis satisfacere. Accepta oratione eorum Caesar obsides imperat eosque ad certam 
diem adduci iubet; nisi ita fecerint, sese bello civitatem persecuturum demonstrat. 
 
This is very similar to previous exchanges between Caesar and Gallic legates, but in 
this case Caesar is dealing with an uprising in the Illyrian province and Caesar is 
more aggressive in his response than in the exchanges with the Gauls. Perhaps it 
could be argued that this exchange sets the tone for the rest of the book. 
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5.26 Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: 
habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui 
posse sperarent. 
 
Chapter 5.26 marks the start of the uprising of the Eburones, whose deceit will lead 
to the near annihilation of one of Caesar’s legions, commanded by Quintus Titurius 
Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, both of whom are killed by the Gauls 
(chapter 5.37). The apt choice of the word prodiret (appear) with its similarities to 
prodo (betray) gives the reader a premonition of what is to come. 
 
5.27 apud quos Ambiorix ad hunc modum locutus est: Sese pro Caesaris in se 
beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere, quod eius opera stipendio liberatus esset, quod 
Aduatucis, finitimis suis, pendere consuesset, quodque ei et filius et fratris filius a 
Caesare remissi essent, quos Aduatuci obsidum numero missos apud se in servitute 
et catenis tenuissent; neque id, quod fecerit de oppugnatione castrorum, aut iudicio 
aut voluntate sua fecisse, sed coactu civitatis, suaque esse eiusmodi imperia, ut non 
minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem. Civitati porro hanc 
fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit. Id 
se facile ex humilitate sua probare posse, quod non adeo sit imperitus rerum ut suis 
copiis populum Romanum superari posse confidat. Sed esse Galliae commune 
consilium: omnibus hibernis Caesaris oppugnandis hunc esse dictum diem, ne qua 
legio alterae legioni subsidio venire posset. Non facile Gallos Gallis negare potuisse, 
praesertim cum de recuperanda communi libertate consilium initum videretur. Quibus 
quoniam pro pietate satisfecerit, habere nunc se rationem offici pro beneficiis 
Caesaris: monere, orare Titurium pro hospitio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat. 
Magnam manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore biduo. 
Ipsorum esse consilium, velintne priusquam finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis 
milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum 
circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab iis absit. Illud se polliceri et iureiurando 
confirmare tutum iter per fines daturum. Quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, 
quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre.  
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Ambiorix’s speech is similar to Diviciacus’s speech in 1.31, albeit shorter (240 vs. 
400 words). In the description of the Gauls’ actions three of the elements from 3.27 
occur: Speed, conspiracy and the longing for freedom. The purpose of this speech of 
the genus deliberativum is to make the Romans leave the camp in order to give the 
Eburones the possibility of ambushing the legion. In good oratorical style Ambiorix 
starts off with praising Caesar (exordium with captatio benevolentiae), followed by a 
narratio which contains a strongly biased account of events and the speech ends 
with an argumentatio/peroratio where Caesar’s beneficia and merita are mentioned 
again and where Ambiorix warns and begs Sabinus to leave the camp followed by a 
promise and a solemn oath that no harm will befall him or his soldiers. In addition 
to being well-structured, the speech also contains two examples of polyptoton (in se 
multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem and non facile Gallos Gallis negare), two 
examples of incrementum (monere, orare and polliceri et iureiurando confirmare) and 
the impressive m- and n-alliterations in the phrase magnum manum Germanorum 
conductam Rhenum. The reader, helped by the premonition in chapter 26 will know 
that the message is not to trust the Gauls, even when they’re making promises.  
 
5.28 Itaque ad consilium rem deferunt magnaque inter eos exsistit controversia. 
Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones 
nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant: 
quantasvis [Gallorum] magnas etiam copias Germanorum sustineri posse munitis 
hibernis docebant: rem esse testimonio, quod primum hostium impetum multis ultro 
vulneribus illatis fortissime sustinuerint: re frumentaria non premi; interea et ex 
proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura subsidia: postremo quid esse levius aut 
turpius, quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium? 
 
Ambiorix’s speech causes an argument in the camp between the commanders. 
Cotta, who will be proved right in chapter 5.32, argues against leaving the camp. 
The key phrase here is iniussu Caesaris and the accusation of levity and 
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shamefulness of taking advice from the enemy is given further emphasis by being 
in the form of a rhetorical question. 
 
5.29 Contra ea Titurius sero facturos clamitabat, cum maiores manus hostium 
adiunctis Germanis convenissent aut cum aliquid calamitatis in proximis hibernis 
esset acceptum. Brevem consulendi esse occasionem. Caesarem arbitrari profectum 
in Italiam; neque aliter Carnutes interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse capturos, neque 
Eburones, si ille adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse. Non 
hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare: subesse Rhenum; magno esse Germanis dolori 
Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias; ardere Galliam tot contumeliis 
acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam superiore gloria rei militaris exstincta. 
Postremo quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa spe Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium 
descendisse? Suam sententiam in utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil esset durius, 
nullo cum periculo ad proximam legionem perventuros; si Gallia omnis cum Germanis 
consentiret, unam esse in celeritate positam salutem. Cottae quidem atque eorum, qui 
dissentirent, consilium quem habere exitum? In quo si non praesens periculum, at 
certe longinqua obsidione fames esset timenda. 
 
Sabinus argues that speed is the key to safety and his speech contains a dichotomy 
between speed and sloth. Speed is normally something which Caesar strongly 
favours, but in this case it comes across as rashness, a trait often given to the Gauls, 
and thus something negative, rather than swiftness. Sabinus focuses on movere in 
his speech. In addition to the two rhetorical questions there is also an elaborate and 
emotive metaphor (ardere Gallia…superior Gloria rei militaris exstincta), which would 
not have been out of place in a speech by Cicero.   
 
5.30 Hac in utramque partem disputatione habita, cum a Cotta primisque ordinibus 
acriter resisteretur, "Vincite," inquit, "si ita vultis," Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut 
magna pars militum exaudiret; "neque is sum," inquit, "qui gravissime ex vobis mortis 
periculo terrear: hi sapient; si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent, qui, 
si per te liceat, perendino die cum proximis hibernis coniuncti communem cum reliquis 
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belli casum sustineant, non reiecti et relegati longe a ceteris aut ferro aut fame 
intereant." 
 
This is the second instance of oratio recta, which Rasmussen analyses on pp. 23-
27. It could be argued that direct speech is used here, like the previous occurrence 
in 4.23, to emphasize the fact that the speaker raised his voice, clariore voce, 
although, with that reasoning Sabinus’s previous speech, which is introduced with 
the word clamitabat, should also have been in OR. Powell calls this “an artful little 
speech, at once flattering the common soldiery and appealing to their self-pity. It is 
given demagogic punch by numerous alliterative phrases”61 and just like Sabinus’s 
previous speech it contains an artful metaphor (aut ferro aut fame intereant).   
 
5.36 Ille appellatus respondit: si velit secum colloqui, licere; sperare a multitudine 
impetrari posse, quod ad militum salutem pertineat; ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri, inque 
eam rem se suam fidem interponere. Ille cum Cotta saucio communicat, si videatur, 
pugna ut excedant et cum Ambiorige una colloquantur: sperare se ab eo de sua ac 
militum salute impetrari posse.  
 
Ambiorix’s promise and solemn oath in 5.27 has now been reduced to feeble hope, 
which Sabinus foolishly clings on to. His only reward is to be slowly surrounded and 
killed by the enemy in the very next chapter. 
 
5.38 postero die in Nervios pervenit hortaturque, ne sui in perpetuum liberandi atque 
ulciscendi Romanos pro iis quas acceperint iniuriis occasionem dimittant: interfectos 
esse legatos duos magnamque partem exercitus interisse demonstrat; nihil esse 
negoti subito oppressam legionem quae cum Cicerone hiemet interfici; se ad eam rem 
profitetur adiutorem. 
 
                                                             
61 Powell & Welch, ed., 118. 
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Ambiorix arrives in the land of the Nervii and stirs up their will to fight, using the 
same arguments used by the Veneti in 3.8 (see above): eternal liberty, the need for 
haste and how easy it will be. By this stage the reader knows that the Gauls are 
foolish to believe this. 
 
5.41 Facta potestate eadem quae Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant: omnem 
esse in armis Galliam; Germanos Rhenum transisse; Caesaris reliquorumque hiberna 
oppugnari. Addunt etiam de Sabini morte: Ambiorigem ostentant fidei faciendae 
causa. Errare eos dicunt, si quidquam ab his praesidi sperent, qui suis rebus 
diffidant; sese tamen hoc esse in Ciceronem populumque Romanum animo, ut nihil 
nisi hiberna recusent atque hanc inveterascere consuetudinem nolint: licere illis 
incolumibus per se ex hibernis discedere et quascumque in partes velint sine metu 
proficisci. Cicero ad haec unum modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi 
Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem: si ab armis discedere velint, se 
adiutore utantur legatosque ad Caesarem mittant; sperare pro eius iustitia, quae 
petierint, impetraturos. 
 
Cicero is faced with the same dilemma as Sabinus, but unlike the latter he does 
everything right, including not putting any hope on being helped by the Gauls. 
Echoing Cotta’s sentiment in 5.28, Cicero refuses to yield to the suggestions/threats 
made by the Gauls and refers them to Caesar. Worth noting is also the phrase about 
refusing winter camps: This exact sentiment is propounded in 2.1. By repeating it 
here, Caesar shows that the Romans are setting the agenda. 
 
5.44 Ex his Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, "Quid dubitas," inquit, 
"Vorene? aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas? hic dies de nostris 
controversiis iudicabit." 
 
Rasmussen deals with this short exchange on pp. 27-29. Again it could be argued 
that direct speech is used by the speaker to make himself heard in the din which 
would have been caused by the cum accerime…pugnaretur.  
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5.52 Postero die contione habita rem gestam proponit, milites consolatur et confirmat: 
quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo 
ferendum docet, quod beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato 
incommodo neque hostibus diutina laetitia neque ipsis longior dolor relinquatur. 
 
All’s well that ends well. Caesar finishes off the campaign with a short speech, which 
puts all the blame on the legates and praises the gods and the bravery of the 
soliders. Could it be that the reference to the Gods is made because Caesar himself 
to a large extent was not involved in the battle62? 
 
6.1.6 Book 6 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no. of words 
6.1 Caesar 25 
6.8 Galli 30 
*6.8 Labienus 30 
6.9 Ubii 30 
6.10 Ubii 20 
6.10 Ubii 55 
6.32 Segni and Condrusi 25 
6.32 Caesar 20 
6.33 Caesar 30 
6.33 Caesar 30 
*6.35 A prisoner (unus ex captivis) 40 
6.40 Campfollowers 30 
6.41 Caesar’s troops 15 
6.42 Caesar 35 
                                                             
62 Cf. 6.42 
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Number of speeches: 13 
Total number of words spoken: 385 
Total number of words in Book VI: 5500 (without the digression in chapters 11-28:  
3400) 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10 (without the digression: 10-
15%) 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 4 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 155 
 
6.8 Galli cohortati inter se, ne speratam praedam ex manibus dimitterent – longum 
esse perterritis Romanis Germanorum auxilium exspectare, neque suam pati 
dignitatem ut tantis copiis tam exiguam manum praesertim fugientem atque 
impeditam adoriri non audeant […] "Habetis", inquit, "milites, quam petistis 
facultatem: hostem impedito atque iniquo loco tenetis: praestate eandem nobis 
ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperatori praestitistis, atque illum adesse et 
haec coram cernere existimate." 
 
Again we see an example of “strange” reasoning on the part of the Gauls63. It is an 
outrage to their dignity to let a small host of enemies get away, especially when the 
Gauls outnumber them heavily. In contrast to the spurious dignitas of the Gaul, 
Labienus in his short speech appeals to the virtus of the Roman soldiers. This is 
perhaps the best example of a speech which shows Caesar as the inspirer of men 
(cf. Nordling’s continuum, levels D and E, and Rasmussen, pp 29-31). Just by 
mentioning Caesar, who is not even present, Labienus manages to put the soldiers 
in fighting mood64. Although the valour of both the Romans and the Gauls are 
                                                             
63 Cf. 3.2 
64 Labienus more or less repeats the same speech in 7.62 
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referred to in this chapter, the use of different words, dignitas and virtus is probably 
deliberate to avoid a direct comparison between Romans and Gauls.  
 
6.35 Atque unus ex captivis "Quid vos," inquit, "hanc miseram ac tenuem sectamini 
praedam, quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos? Tribus horis Aduatucam venire 
potestis: huc omnes suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit: praesidi tantum est, 
ut ne murus quidem cingi possit, neque quisquam egredi extra munitiones audeat." 
 
This speech is mostly worth including here because it is in oratio recta. Apart from 
this, it contains little rhetorical flair, but Rasmussen argues that the prisoner, 
through this speech becomes the leader of the German army and that this speech 
is the beginning of “die Reihe der weit umfangreicheren und gewichtigeren 
Barbarenreden, die nur noch von der als Kontrast wirkenden direkten Rede des 
sterbend sich opferenden Centurionen Petronius unterbrochen wird” (31).  
 
6.42 unum, quod cohortes ex statione et praesidio essent emissae, questus ne minimo 
quidem casu locum relinqui debuisse, multum fortunam in repentino hostium adventu 
potuisse iudicavit, multo etiam amplius, quod paene ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum 
barbaros avertisset. 
 
The similarities to the speech in 5.52 are striking; here is another speech after a 
battle which Caesar did not participate in and again he talks about the effect of 
external/supernatural powers, made stronger in this case through the 
personification of fortuna. 
 
6.1.7 Book 7 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no of words 
7.1 Gallic chiefs 85 
7.2 The Carnutes 50 
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7.4 Vercingetorix 25 
7.5 Soldiers of the Aedui 20 
7.8 The Arveni 15 
7.9 Caesar 20 
7.12 Deputies from the town of Noviodunum 25 
7.14 Vercingetorix 165 
7.15 Convention of the Gauls 30 
7.15 The Bituriges 35 
7.17 Caesar’s soldiers 40 
7.19 Caesar 35 
7.20 Vercingetorix’s followers 45 
*7.20 Vercingetorix 145 
7.20 Slaves forced by Vercingetorix to pose 
as Roman soldiers 
50 
*7.20 Vercingetorix 35 
7.21 Vercingetorix’s followers 45 
7.27 Caesar 20 
7.29 Vercingetorix 115 
7.32 Chiefs of the Aedui 100 
7.34 Caesar 30 
7.37 Convictolitavis of the Aedui 65 
*7.38 Litaviccus of the Arveni 45 
7.38 Men induced by Litaviccus to lie about 
Roman treachery 
20 
7.38 Litaviccus 50 
7.39 Eporedorix of the Aedui 35 
7.41 Knights sent by Fabius  65 
7.43 The Aedui 20 
7.43 Caesar 15 
7.44 Gallic deserters 60 
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7.45 Caesar 30 
7.45 Caesar 30 
*7.50 Marcus Petronius, centurion 45 
7.52-3 Caesar 125 
7.54 Viridomanus and Eporedorix 15 
7.54 Caesar 50 
7.60 Caesar 60 
7.61 unknown65 25 
7.62 Labienus 25 
7.64 Vercingetorix 60 
7.66 Vercingetorix 130 
7.71 Vercingetorix 80 
7.75 The Bellovaci 15 
*7.77 Critognatus 330 
7.86 Caesar 15 
7.86 Caesar 15 
7.89 Vercingetorix 30 
 
Number of speeches: 48 
Total number of words spoken: 2585 
Total number of words in Book VII: 11500 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 20-25 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 12 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 415 
Speeches/utterances by Vercingetorix: 9 
Number of words spoken by Vercingetorix: 785 
 
                                                             
65 This speech is introduced only by the verb nuntiatur  
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7.1 Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis silvestribus ac remotis locis queruntur 
de Acconis morte; posse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant: miserantur 
communem Galliae fortunam: omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemiis deposcunt qui 
belli initium faciant et sui capitis periculo Galliam in libertatem vindicent. Eius in 
primis rationem esse habendam dicunt, priusquam eorum clandestina consilia 
efferantur, ut Caesar ab exercitu intercludatur. Id esse facile, quod neque legiones 
audeant absente imperatore ex hibernis egredi, neque imperator sine praesidio ad 
legiones pervenire possit. Postremo in acie praestare interfici quam non veterem belli 
gloriam libertatemque quam a maioribus acceperint recuperare. 
 
As mentioned in the discussion of chapter 3.8, when Caesar reports internal 
discussions among the Gauls, their exchanges are nearly always the same. This 
chapter is another good example of this: The Gallic leaders show their 
underhandedness (clandestine consilia) and hubris (id esse facile) and also that they 
are united in their cause (commune Galliae fortunam). Everything is at stake – it is 
better to die in battle than not to have the glory and freedom bestowed on them by 
their ancestors. They also accuse the Romans of cowardice (neque legiones audeant). 
 
7.2 His rebus agitatis profitentur Carnutes se nullum periculum communis salutis 
causa recusare principesque ex omnibus bellum facturos pollicentur et, quoniam in 
praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint ne res efferatur, at iureiurando ac 
fide sanciatur, petunt, collatis militaribus signis, quo more eorum gravissima 
caerimonia continetur, ne facto initio belli ab reliquis deserantur.  
 
The Carnutes’ speech is a continuation of the opening statement in 7.1. Again the 
joint cause of the Gauls is mentioned (communis salutis) and the fact that the matter 
is very serious is emphasised by the demand for a gravissima caerimonia. For all 
their talk of unity the last phrase (ab reliquis deserantur) shows that the Gauls are 
neither to be trusted nor do they completely trust each other. In 7.5. Caesar points 
out that not even his supposed allies, the Aedui, can be trusted:  
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7.5 legatisque nostris renuntiant se Biturigum perfidiam veritos revertisse, quibus id 
consili fuisse cognoverint, ut, si flumen transissent, una ex parte ipsi, altera Arverni 
se circumsisterent.  
 
The sentence following this speech is: Id eane de causa, quam legatis 
pronuntiaverint, an perfidia adducti fecerint, quod nihil nobis constat, non videtur pro 
certo esse ponendum. Caesar admits that he doesn’t know if treachery is involved or 
not, but by mentioning that this could be the cause he further emphasizes how 
untrustworthy the Gauls are.  
 
7.8 quem perterriti omnes Arverni circumsistunt atque obsecrant, ut suis fortunis 
consulat, neu se ab hostibus diripiantur, praesertim cum videat omne ad se bellum 
translatum.  
 
Not only are the Gauls treacherous and hubristic, they are also fickle and cowardly. 
As soon as the first set-back strikes the Arverni, they become panic-stricken and 
despondent.  
 
7.14 Vercingetorix tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Cenabi, Novioduni acceptis 
suos ad concilium convocat. Docet longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque 
antea gestum sit. Omnibus modis huic rei studendum, ut pabulatione et commeatu 
Romani prohibeantur. Id esse facile, quod equitatu ipsi abundent et quod anni tempore 
subleventur. Pabulum secari non posse; necessario dispersos hostes ex aedificiis 
petere: hos omnes cotidie ab equitibus deleri posse. Praeterea salutis causa rei 
familiaris commoda neglegenda: vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatio a 
via quoque versus, quo pabulandi causa adire posse videantur. Harum ipsis rerum 
copiam suppetere, quod, quorum in finibus bellum geratur, eorum opibus subleventur: 
Romanos aut inopiam non laturos aut magno periculo longius ab castris processuros; 
neque interesse, ipsosne interficiant, impedimentisne exuant, quibus amissis bellum 
geri non possit. Praeterea oppida incendi oportere, quae non munitione et loci natura 
ab omni sint periculo tuta, neu suis sint ad detractandam militiam receptacula neu 
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Romanis proposita ad copiam commeatus praedamque tollendam. Haec si gravia aut 
acerba videantur, multo illa gravius aestimare, liberos, coniuges in servitutem 
abstrahi, ipsos interfici; quae sit necesse accidere victis. 
 
Vercingetorix states that the Gauls need to change their tactics. Just like in 7.1 the 
phrase id esse facile is used, but Vercingetorix’s suggestions turn out to be anything 
but easy; what starts off with the need to disregard (neglegenda) for private property 
quickly escalates to the burning of whole towns. At the end of the speech, 
Vercingetorix paints a vivid picture of what could happen if the Gauls lose, which 
serves as a premonition for the reader and ties in with the start of the segment (tot 
continuis incommodis). 
 
7.15 quae etsi magno cum dolore omnes ferebant, tamen hoc sibi solati proponebant, 
quod se prope explorata victoria celeriter amissa recuperaturos confidebant. 
Deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incendi placeret an defendi. Procumbunt 
omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges, ne pulcherrimam prope totius Galliae urbem, quae 
praesidio et ornamento sit civitati, suis manibus succendere cogantur: facile se loci 
natura defensuros dicunt, quod prope ex omnibus partibus flumine et palude 
circumdata unum habeat et perangustum aditum.  
 
In spite of the set-backs that causes Vercingetorix to suggest drastic measures, the 
hubris of the Gauls quickly returns. The use of facile again combined with the 
phrase prope explorata victoria gives the impression of hopeless optimism. 
 
7.17 Quin etiam Caesar cum in opere singulas legiones appellaret et, si acerbius 
inopiam ferrent, se dimissurum oppugnationem diceret, universi ab eo, ne id faceret, 
petebant: sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam ignominiam 
acciperent, nusquam infecta re discederent: hoc se ignominiae loco laturos, si 
inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent: praestare omnes perferre acerbitates, quam 
non civibus Romanis, qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum interissent, parentarent. Haec 
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eadem centurionibus tribunisque militum mandabant, ut per eos ad Caesarem 
deferrentur. 
 
7.19 Indignantes milites Caesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent 
tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli exposcentes docet, quanto detrimento et quot 
virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam; quos cum sic animo paratos 
videat, ut nullum pro sua laude periculum recusent, summae se iniquitatis 
condemnari debere, nisi eorum vitam sua salute habeat cariorem. 
 
In 7.17 and 7.19 Caesar contrasts the behaviour of the Gauls with the upstanding 
attitude of his soldiers – perfidia Gallorum is the antithesis of nullam ignominiam 
acciperent and where the Arverni are perterriti (cf. 7.8) Caesar is flattered that his 
soldiers do not shy away from any danger (nullum pro sua laude periculum recusant). 
 
7.20 Vercingetorix, cum ad suos redisset, proditionis insimulatus, quod castra propius 
Romanos movisset, quod cum omni equitatu discessisset, quod sine imperio tantas 
copias reliquisset, quod eius discessu Romani tanta opportunitate et celeritate 
venissent: non haec omnia fortuito aut sine consilio accidere potuisse; regnum illum 
Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio – tali modo 
accusatus ad haec respondit: Quod castra movisset, factum inopia pabuli etiam ipsis 
hortantibus; quod propius Romanos accessisset, persuasum loci opportunitate, qui se  
ipsum sine munitione defenderet: equitum vero operam neque in loco palustri 
desiderari debuisse et illic fuisse utilem, quo sint profecti. Summam imperi se consulto 
nulli discedentem tradidisse, ne is multitudinis studio ad dimicandum impelleretur; 
cui rei propter animi mollitiem studere omnes videret, quod diutius laborem ferre non 
possent. Romani si casu intervenerint, fortunae, si alicuius indicio vocati, huic 
habendam gratiam, quod et paucitatem eorum ex loco superiore cognoscere et virtutem 
despicere potuerint, qui dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint. Imperium 
se a Caesare per proditionem nullum desiderare, quod habere victoria posset, quae 
iam sit sibi atque omnibus Gallis explorata: quin etiam ipsis remittere, si sibi magis 
honorem tribuere, quam ab se salutem accipere videantur. "Haec ut intellegatis," 
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inquit, "a me sincere pronuntiari, audite Romanos milites." Producit servos, quos in 
pabulatione paucis ante diebus exceperat et fame vinculisque excruciaverat. Hi iam 
ante edocti quae interrogati pronuntiarent, milites se esse legionarios dicunt; fame et 
inopia adductos clam ex castris exisse, si quid frumenti aut pecoris in agris reperire 
possent: simili omnem exercitum inopia premi, nec iam vires sufficere cuiusquam nec 
ferre operis laborem posse: itaque statuisse imperatorem, si nihil in oppugnatione 
oppidi profecissent, triduo exercitum deducere. "Haec," inquit, "a me," Vercingetorix, 
"beneficia habetis, quem proditionis insimulatis; cuius opera sine vestro sanguine 
tantum exercitum victorem fame paene consumptum videtis; quem turpiter se ex hac 
fuga recipientem ne qua civitas suis finibus recipiat a me provisum est." 
 
Vercingetorix returns and is accused of treason on four counts, enumerated with 
the anaforic quod. The speeches in this chapter contains the same elements as 
chapters 7.1, 7,2, 7.14 and 7.15: The fear of treachery (cf. 7.2), the weakness of the 
Gauls (animi mollitiem, diutius laborem ferre non possent), the hubris – the phrase 
victoria explorata (7.15) is used again66 – and the contempt for the Romans is 
repeated (dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint). Vercingetorix uses 
pretend deserters to convince his allies that he is on top of the situation. This 
practice was also used by Sabinus in 3.18, although the methods used to induce 
the pretenders to deliver their messages differ: Sabinus uses magnis praemiis 
pollicitationibusque, whereas Vercingetorix resorts to torture: quos…fame 
vinculisque excruciaverat. 
 
7.21 Conclamat omnis multitudo et suo more armis concrepat, quod facere in eo 
consuerunt cuius orationem approbant: summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem, nec de 
eius fide dubitandum, nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse. Statuunt, ut X 
milia hominum delecta ex omnibus copiis in oppidum submittantur, nec solis 
                                                             
66 See also 7.37, although the phrase used in this chapter is certicissima victoria. 
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Biturigibus communem salutem committendam censent, quod penes eos, si id 
oppidum retinuissent, summam victoriae constare intellegebant. 
 
Conviced by the lies, the Gauls state that Vercingetorix is a consummate leader and 
that they were wrong to doubt him. Through his rhetorical skills Vercingetorix 
manages to turn what is a very dangerous situation in his favour, but while the 
Gauls may have been fooled, the reader knows the truth. The sudden change of 
fortune, from traitor to consummate leader, which yet again highlights the 
fickleness of the Gauls is further emphasized by the antitheses of omnis, communis 
and solus, and the superlative summus. The use of the latter in the phrase summam 
victoriae constare intellegebant also suggests that situation is quite critical for the 
Gauls, in spite of Vercingetorix’s claims of an assured victory. Rasmussen argues 
that Caesar in 7.20 shows “Sympathie für seinen groβen Gegner” (40), which I find 
somewhat difficult to understand; although he wins a great rhetorical victory by 
clearing himself of the accusations of treachery, Vercingetorix has not managed to 
achieve anything. In 7.4 Caesar states that Vercingetorix’s followers call him king 
(rex) and considering the Roman aversion to all things royal it seems unlikely that 
Caesar is interested in showing any sympathy towards Vercingetorix67.  
 
7.29 Postero die concilio convocato consolatus cohortatusque est ne se admodum 
animo demitterent, neve perturbarentur incommodo. Non virtute neque in acie vicisse 
Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis68, cuius rei fuerint ipsi 
imperiti. Errare, si qui in bello omnes secundos rerum proventus exspectent. Sibi 
numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum 
imprudentia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum 
                                                             
67 Arne Jönsson puts forward the interesting theory that Caesar wants to drum up interest for his imminent triumph in 
Rome, at which Vercingetorix would be the “main attraction”.   
68 Cf. 1.13 and 1.40 That Caesar uses a similar phrase to describe the Gauls/Germans and the Romans I cannot ascribe 
to anything other than interdum bonus dormitat Homerus. There is also a certain echo of chapter 2.31: qui tantae 
altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere et ex propinquitate pugnare possent 
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acciperetur. Id tamen se celeriter maioribus commodis sanaturum. Nam quae ab 
reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum 
consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum possit 
obsistere; idque se prope iam effectum habere. Interea aequum esse ab iis communis 
salutis causa impetrari ut castra munire instituerent, quo facilius repentinos hostium 
impetus sustinerent. 
 
The pattern is yet again repeated; the Romans are scorned and although 
Vercingetorix’s aim is to encourage his troops, he has a backhanded way of doing 
this: the reason the Romans won the battle was because of Gallic imperitia (not 
much of a consolation in defeat), and he also accuses them of imprudentia and nimia 
obsequentia. Vercingetorix however still has a plan for certain victory (ne orbis 
quidem terrarium possit obsistere). After this grand-standing, the Gauls (and the 
readers) are brought back to “reality”; the plans for world domination will have to 
wait as they first need to worry about the sudden attacks of the Romans. 
 
7.32 legati ad eum principes Haeduorum veniunt oratum ut maxime necessario 
tempore civitati subveniat: summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus 
antiquitus creari atque regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent, duo 
magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum esse dicat. Horum esse 
alterum Convictolitavem, florentem et illustrem adulescentem, alterum Cotum, 
antiquissima familia natum atque ipsum hominem summae potentiae et magnae 
cognationis, cuius frater Valetiacus proximo anno eundem magistratum gesserit. 
Civitatem esse omnem in armis; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque 
eorum clientelas. Quod si diutius alatur controversia, fore uti pars cum parte civitatis 
confligat. Id ne accidat, positum in eius diligentia atque auctoritate. 
 
Just like in 1.11 the Aedui send legates to Caesar asking for help. At this stage, 
however, Caesar does not need them as an excuse to join the battle. By using words 
like maxime, singulis, summus, omnis and divisus Caesar shows how strained the 
78 
 
situation is. In the penultimate sentence, an elegant polyptoton is used, where 
Caesar simply could have said inter se.  
 
7.34 cohortatus Haeduos, ut controversiarum ac dissensionis obliviscerentur atque 
omnibus omissis iis rebus huic bello servirent ea[que] quae meruissent praemia ab se 
devicta Gallia exspectarent equitatumque omnem et peditum milia decem sibi celeriter 
mitterent 
 
Caesar responds to the plea from the Aedui with a short speech. The most 
interesting phrase here is devicta Gallia. In chapter 2.1 Caesar uses the phrase omni 
pacata Gallia, which in light of his careful speeches in book 1 sounds quite 
aggressive. Here Caesar goes one step further. It is doubtful how encouraging the 
Aedui will have found the promise of a defeated Gaul, even if it involved receiving 
booty from Caesar. 
 
7.38 "Quo proficiscimur", inquit, "milites? Omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas 
interiit; principes civitatis, Eporedorix et Viridomarus, insimulati proditionis ab 
Romanis indicta causa interfecti sunt. Haec ab his cognoscite, qui ex ipsa caede 
fugerunt: nam ego fratribus atque omnibus meis propinquis interfectis dolore 
prohibeor, quae gesta sunt, pronuntiare." Producuntur ii quos ille edocuerat quae dici 
vellet, atque eadem, quae Litaviccus pronuntiaverat, multitudini exponunt: multos 
equites Aeduorum interfectos, quod collocuti cum Arvernis dicerentur; ipsos se inter 
multitudinem militum occultasse atque ex media caede fugisse. Conclamant Haedui 
et Litaviccum obsecrant ut sibi consulat. "Quasi vero", inquit ille, "consili sit res, ac non 
necesse sit nobis Gergoviam contendere et cum Arvernis nosmet coniungere. An 
dubitamus quin nefario facinore admisso Romani iam ad nos interficiendos 
concurrant? Proinde, si quid in nobis animi est, persequamur eorum mortem qui 
indignissime interierunt, atque hos latrones interficiamus." 
 
This is very similar to the set-up of Vercingetorix’s speech in 7.20, although there is 
no explicit mention of torture here and the focus is on stirring up anti-Roman 
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sentiment. Rasmussen describes it as “eine zweite, verbesserte Auflage der Rede des 
Vercingetorix” (40). Litaviccus seems to use words that to the Roman reader better 
would describe his own deeds rather than those of the Romans. Caesar’s use of 
sermocinatio thus includes elements of irony. Lausberg refers to this typ of ironia as 
rhetorical irony, which “aims to expose the opposing party in the eyes of the 
audience by demonstrating the absurdity of the opponent’s analytical terminology” 
(405). Apart from the courtroom elements of the above definition this seems to me 
a very fitting description of the effect this speech has on the reader. 
 
7.50 "Quoniam," inquit, "me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe 
vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. Vos data 
facultate vobis consulite." […] "Frustra," inquit, "meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem 
iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legionem 
recipite."  
 
Caesar manages to use an episode in which his soldiers’ rashness lead to a serious 
set-back (which he will severely criticize in 7.52-53) to show the valour and courage 
of the Roman soldiers, in stark contrast to the treacherous actions of the Gauls. It 
is also interesting to note that the speaker, the centurion Petronius, admits to 
cupiditatis, the same error which Caesar will later criticize his soldiers of (see below).  
 
7.52-53 Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum 
reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid agendum 
videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque a tribunis militum 
legatisque retineri potuissent. Exposuit quid iniquitas loci posset, quod ipse ad 
Avaricum sensisset, cum sine duce et sine equitatu deprehensis hostibus exploratam 
victoriam dimisisset, ne parvum modo detrimentum in contentione propter iniquitatem 
loci accideret. Quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non 
castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto 
opere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de 
victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; non minus se a milite modestiam et 
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continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare. [7.53] Hac habita 
contione et ad extremam orationem confirmatis militibus, ne ob hanc causam animo 
permoverentur neu quod iniquitas loci attulisset id virtuti hostium tribuerent eadem 
de profectione cogitans quae ante senserat 
 
Caesar’s task is not an easy one: He needs to portray the Gauls as inferior to the 
Romans, but also show that they pose a real threat. Here Caesar uses many of the 
traits he has previously ascribed to the Gauls to criticize his own soldiers; his main 
criticisms is that the soliders believe that they know better than their commander, 
the same criticism he made in 1.40. In 7.45 Caesar orders his legates to make sure 
the soldiers do not advance too far and that the inequality of the ground is a 
problem, the very same issues that Caesar is pointing out here. It seems as if Caesar 
is covering his tracks. Towards the end of the speech Caesar makes sure to point 
out that it was not because of the enemy, but the unfavourable ground that this 
setback occurred, so as not to give any credit to the Gauls. In order to soften the 
criticism he also makes sure to encourage his soldiers and twice mentions their 
courage (animi magnitudinem). There are some interesting parallels to 
Vercingetorix’s speech in 7.29 here: Just like Vercingetorix, Caesar criticizes his 
troops but does not accept any personal blame for the set-back and they are both 
quick to point out that it was not because of virtus that the enemy won the day. 
There is however one important difference: Where Caesar does not give any credit 
to the Gauls, and explicitly states this, Vercingetorix talks about the scientia 
oppugnationis of the Romans – obviously a clever use of sermocinatio on Caesar’s 
part.  
 
7.62 Labienus milites cohortatus ut suae pristinae virtutis et secundissimorum 
proeliorum retinerent memoriam atque ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero 
hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent, dat signum proeli.  
 
Labienus repeats his speech from 6.8, with good effect. 
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7.64 Ille imperat reliquis civitatibus obsides. denique ei rei constituit diem. Huc omnes 
equites, quindecim milia numero, celeriter convenire iubet; peditatu quem antea 
habuerit se fore contentum dicit, neque fortunam temptaturum aut acie dimicaturum, 
sed, quoniam abundet equitatu, perfacile esse factu frumentationibus 
pabulationibusque Romanos prohibere, aequo modo animo sua ipsi frumenta 
corrumpant aedificiaque incendant, qua rei familiaris iactura perpetuum imperium 
libertatemque se consequi videant.  
 
7.66 Vercingetorix consedit convocatisque ad concilium praefectis equitum venisse 
tempus victoriae demonstrat. Fugere in provinciam Romanos Galliaque excedere. Id 
sibi ad praesentem obtinendam libertatem satis esse; ad reliqui temporis pacem atque 
otium parum profici: maioribus enim coactis copiis reversuros neque finem bellandi 
facturos. Proinde agmine impeditos adorirantur. Si pedites suis auxilium ferant atque 
in eo morentur, iter confici non posse; si, id quod magis futurum confidat, relictis 
impedimentis suae saluti consulant, et usu rerum necessariarum et dignitate 
spoliatum iri. Nam de equitibus hostium, quin nemo eorum progredi modo extra agmen 
audeat, ne ipsos quidem non debere dubitare. Id quo maiore faciant animo, copias se 
omnes pro castris habiturum et terrori hostibus futurum. Conclamant equites 
sanctissimo iureiurando confirmari oportere, ne tecto recipiatur, ne ad liberos, ne ad 
parentes, ad uxorem aditum habeat, qui non bis per agmen hostium perequitasset. 
 
The content of Vercingetorix’s speeches are familiar to the reader at this stage. There 
is talk of freedom, displays of confidence and how easily it will be to achieve freedom, 
contempt of the Romans and the enthusiastic cheering of the troops at the end. 
 
7.71 Discedentibus mandat ut suam quisque eorum civitatem adeat omnesque qui per 
aetatem arma ferre possint ad bellum cogant. Sua in illos merita proponit 
obtestaturque ut suae salutis rationem habeant neu se optime de communi libertate 
meritum in cruciatum hostibus dedant. Quod si indiligentiores fuerint, milia hominum 
delecta octoginta una secum interitura demonstrat. Ratione inita se exigue dierum 
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triginta habere frumentum, sed paulo etiam longius tolerari posse parcendo. […] 
Frumentum omne ad se referri iubet; capitis poenam eis qui non paruerint constituit:  
 
Excluding the short command in 7.4, this is Vercingetorix’s seventh speech and his 
last words before the showdown at Alesia, but unlike all the other ones, the self-
assured posturing is completely gone and instead he mainly talks about himself. 
Where the reader would expect a rousing speech on the eve of the battle, 
Vercingetorix dispenses with all talk about guaranteed victory and the unity of all 
Gaul and delivers a plea not to be handed over to the enemy if their battle plan fails.  
 
7.77 concilio coacto de exitu suarum fortunarum consultabant. Apud quos variis dictis 
sententiis, quarum pars deditionem, pars, dum vires suppeterent, eruptionem 
censebat, non praetereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter eius singularem et 
nefariam crudelitatem. Hic summo in Arvernis ortus loco et magnae habitus 
auctoritatis, "Nihil," inquit, "de eorum sententia dicturus sum, qui turpissimam 
servitutem deditionis nomine appellant, neque hos habendos civium loco neque ad 
concilium adhibendos censeo. Cum his mihi res sit, qui eruptionem probant; quorum 
in consilio omnium vestrum consensu pristinae residere virtutis memoria videtur. 
Animi est ista mollitia, non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse. Qui se ultro morti 
offerant facilius reperiuntur quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. Atque ego hanc 
sententiam probarem (tantum apud me dignitas potest), si nullam praeterquam vitae 
nostrae iacturam fieri viderem: sed in consilio capiendo omnem Galliam respiciamus, 
quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus. Quid enim hominum milibus LXXX uno loco 
interfectis propinquis consanguineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in 
ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogentur? Nolite hos vestro auxilio exspoliare, qui 
vestrae salutis causa suum periculum neglexerunt, nec stultitia ac temeritate vestra 
aut animi imbecillitate omnem Galliam prosternere et perpetuae servituti addicere. An, 
quod ad diem non venerunt, de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis? Quid ergo? 
Romanos in illis ulterioribus munitionibus animine causa cotidie exerceri putatis? Si 
illorum nuntiis confirmari non potestis omni aditu praesaepto, his utimini testibus 
appropinquare eorum adventum; cuius rei timore exterriti diem noctemque in opere 
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versantur. Quid ergo mei consili est? Facere, quod nostri maiores nequaquam pari 
bello Cimbrorum Teutonumque fecerunt; qui in oppida compulsi ac simili inopia 
subacti eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur vitam toleraverunt 
neque se hostibus tradiderunt. Cuius rei si exemplum non haberemus, tamen 
libertatis causa institui et posteris prodi pulcherrimum iudicarem. Nam quid illi simile 
bello fuit? Depopulata Gallia Cimbri magnaque illata calamitate finibus quidem nostris 
aliquando excesserunt atque alias terras petierunt; iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis 
reliquerunt. Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos 
fama nobiles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considere 
atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim umquam alia condicione bella 
gesserunt. Quod si ea quae in longinquis nationibus geruntur ignoratis, respicite 
finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus 
subiecta perpetua premitur servitute." 
 
This is the longest speech in book 7 (but shorter than the three big speeches in book 
1 by Diviciacus, Caesar and Ariovistus) and a lot has been written about it. As 
Rasmussen points out on p. 15, some have argued that this speech, because of its 
length and the fact that it is in OR, is more in the vein of history-writing and thus 
does not really fit into the commentarii genre. I would however argue that if one 
studies the themes of the speech, it fits in perfectly and serves as a climax to the 
Gallic speeches in 7.1, 7.2, 7.14, 7.15, 7.20, 7.29, 7.37 and 7.66. Rasmussen gives 
a good summary of the speech and its rhetorical features on pp. 47-54. To this could 
perhaps be added that the speech starts with an elegant praeteritio and that 
Critognatus, like Vercingetorix in 7.71 by their defeatist approach, emphasized by 
the idea to resort to cannibalism and the elaborate metaphor, replete with 
alliteration in the final noun phrase, seem to forebode the impending disaster. 
Thanks to Caesar’s sermocinatio, the reader is prepared for the Gallic defeat/Roman 
victory.  
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7.86 imperat, si sustinere non posset, deductis cohortibus eruptione pugnet; id nisi 
necessario ne faciat. Ipse adit reliquos, cohortatur ne labori succumbant; omnium 
superiorum dimicationum fructum in eo die atque hora docet consistere. 
 
Caesar’s last words before the battle are short, just like his speeches in book 2. To 
the brevity a prophetic tone is added, just as we will see is the case in Caesar’s 
speech before the battle of Pharsalus in book 3 of the BC69 (cf. discussion on 
chapters 3.85, 3.89 and 3.90 of the BC). Unlike Vercingetorix and Critognatus, he 
does not talk about himself: The hour is at hand, the time of talking is over he seems 
to say. 
 
7.89 Postero die Vercingetorix concilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum 
necessitatium, sed communis libertatis causa demonstrat, et quoniam sit fortunae 
cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu 
vivum tradere velint.  
 
After the defeat, Vercingetorix still talks about himself, but points out that he 
undertook the campaign for the sake of their common freedom, rather than for his 
own sake. All that remains for Vercingetorix and the Gauls now that the guaranteed 
victory failed to materialize is to yield to fortune. It might also be worth noticing the 
differences in Caesar’s behaviour towards Vercingetorix and Ariovistus in book 1: 
Caesar never says a word to Vercingetorix, not even after he has been handed over. 
He clearly sees no need to dignify Vercingetorix with any words. The two barbarian 
kings are defeated, but the way Caesar deals with them differ greatly. 
 
6.1.8 Book 8 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no. of words 
                                                             
69 Cf. also 7.27 
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8.7 Spies of the Bellovaci 150 
8.21 Gallic legates 70 
8.22 Caesar 65 
8.48 Commius 25 
8.50 Caesar’s opponents 35 
 
Number of speeches: 5 
Total number of words spoken: 345 
Total number of words in Book VIII: 6300 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 1 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 65 
 
8.7 A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve 
esset consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum 
locum convenisse, itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Veliocasses, Atrebates; 
locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse, impedimenta omnia in 
ulteriores silvas contulisse. Complures esse principes belli auctores, sed multitudinem 
maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani 
intellexissent. Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad 
auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset 
infinita. Constituisse autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebei 
cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad 
dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare 
cogerentur; si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco permanere quem delegissent, 
pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et 
frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos. 
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The two main adversaries of the Romans in book 8 are Correus and Commius. Just 
like Dumnorix in book 170, they are both described as being driven by hatred of all 
things Roman (cf. 8.48). Hirtius thus seems to adapt the stock descriptions and 
characterisations used by Caesar. 
 
8.21 Ceteri e vestigio mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit 
contentus hostium, quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia 
atque humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus. Adflictas opes equestri proelio 
Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix refugisse nuntios 
caedis. Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos eo proelio commodum esse 
consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli, concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. 
Numquam enim senatum tantum in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem 
potuisse. 
 
8.22 Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore anno 
Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum: pertinacissime hos ex 
omnibus in sententia permansisse neque ad sanitatem reliquorum deditione esse 
perductos. Scire atque intellegere se causam peccati facillime mortuis delegari. 
Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis 
repugnantibus infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset. Sed tamen se 
contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent. 
 
The description of the Gauls in 8.7 and 8.48 follow the pattern established by Caesar 
and so does the only exchange where Caesar is involved in book 8: The Gauls plead 
for Caesar’s mercy and he, in this case, however reluctantly, grants it71.  
 
                                                             
70 See 1.18 
71 Cf. discussion on 2.14-15 
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8.48 Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna parte amissa suorum legatos 
ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae 
imperarit, obsidibus datis firmat; unum illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in 
conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani. 
 
Mark Anthony indulges the request of Commius, on the grounds that this was based 
on legitimate fear (iusto nasci timore). Thus ends Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul.  
 
8.50 insolenter adversarii sui gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules 
creatos qui omnem honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser. Galbae 
consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragii valuisset, quod sibi coniunctus et 
familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset. 
 
In the final chapters of book 8 (chapters 49-55) Hirtius changes the focus from Gaul 
to the situation in Rome, which is clearly shown in this speech. The rhetoric however 
stays the same – Caesar’s honor and dignitas is emphasized and his adversaries are 
described in terms previously used for the Gauls. As we shall see in chapter 6.2, 
Luca Grillo argues that in the BC, Caesar gives the traits of the Gauls to his Roman 
adversaries. So where Hirtius in the previous speeches looked to the BG for 
inspiration, he is now taking a leaf from the BC.  
 
6.1.9 Summary of the results of the analysis of the excerpts from De Bello 
Gallico 
 
A recap and overview of the raw data might be in order:  
 
Book No. of 
speeches 
Total no. of 
words 
spoken 
Total no. of 
words in 
the book 
% of the book 
which consists 
of speeches 
No. of speeches 
by Caesar 
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1 40 3165 8200 35-40 1472 
2 17 940 4150 20-25 7 
3 7 255 3600 5-10 0 
4 17 605 4600 10-15 7 
5 25 1090 7400 10-15 4 
6 13 385 5500 5-10 4 
7 48 2585 11500 20-25 12 
8 5 345 6300 5-10 1 
Total 172 9370 51250 avg: 15-20 49 
 
What strikes me most is that there are so many speeches in book 1 and so few in 
books 3 and 6. Caesar does more talking in book 1 (approx. 1150 words) than in all 
the other books, including book 8, together (approx. 1100 words). Even in 
comparison with book 7, which is 40% longer, there are more words spoken in book 
1. That Hirtius does not include as many speeches as Caesar is less surprising; as 
he wrote (or at least finished and published73) his supplement after Caesar’s death 
he was probably more interested in relating what had happened (albeit with a pro-
Caesarian slant) rather than adding any rhetorical flair to the narrative. What few 
speeches there are in book 8 seem closely modelled on the speeches in the previous 
books, and in the case of the speech in 8.50, as we shall see, on the speeches of the 
BC. 
 
So, in terms of the number of speeches books 1 and 7 seem to merit a closer look74. 
When trying to analyse the speechs in book 1, it struck me that the phrases populus 
                                                             
72 Two of which through legates 
73 Welch (88) states that Hirtius produced book 8 in 44 BC, after Caesar’s death, but suggests that it might be a 
reworking of a an earlier draft and bases this assumption on “the bland portrait in [book 8] of Labienus” (104).  
 
74 For the relatively high number of speeches in book 5, please see my quote from Mutschler below on pp. 90-91. 
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Romanus and senatus seemed very frequent. A search for variations of the phrases 
populus Romanus and senatus gives this result:  
 
Book  Occurrences of the phrase 
populus Romanus (or inflected 
variations thereof) 
Occurrences of the word senatus 
(or inflected variations thereof) 
referring to the Roman senate75 
1 46 11 
2 10 1 
3 1 0 
4 8 2 
5 9 0 
6 2 1 
7 4 2 
8 3 1076 
 
Of the 46 occurrences of the phrase populus Romanus in book 1, 38 of these appear 
in speeches, and most notably in the build-up to the battle against Arivistus: in the 
speeches in chapters 1.34 – 1.45, populus Romanus is referred to no less than 24 
times (12 times by Caesar and 12 times by Ariovistus). Wiseman notes the frequent 
occurrence of the phrase in book one (but has the count at 41 rather than 4677), 
but he fails to address why the frequency of the phrase is so dramatically different 
in book 1 compared to the other books. It seems to me that if, as Wiseman argues, 
Caesar’s purpose is to champion the cause of the populares he would make sure to 
mention the populus Romanus to the same extent throughout the BG, but this is not 
                                                             
75 There are a few rare occurrences where the word senatus referes to the leadership of a Gallic tribe, e.g. 5.54  
76 The 10 occurrences in book 8 all occur in the last four chapters where Hirtius turns his focus away from Gaul to the 
situation in Rome which would lead to the civil war.  
77 Wiseman states that there are 41 occurrences, but listed in the footnote are only 40 occurrences. Not included in 
Wiseman’s list are the occurences of the phrase in 1.3 and 1.6 and the fact that the phrase occurs twice in 1.30 (not 
once), four times in 1.31 (not three times), twice in 1.33 (not once) and seven times in 1.44 (not six times). 
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the case. Nordling also comments on the frequency of the phrase populus Romanus: 
“After BG 1 there are few explicit links of this sort – not because Caesar breaks the 
link between himself and the Roman state after BG 1, but more probably because it 
is not in the author's best interests to hit his reader over the head with the presumed 
oneness between himself and the Roman state when the reader can be trusted to 
draw this conclusion on his own” (167). More plausible to me seems the possibility 
that Caesar is using the populus Romanus as a justification for being the aggressor. 
Once Caesar’s campaigns have won the approval of the readers, there is no longer 
any need for the justification. Worth noting in this context as well is the fact that 
populus Romanus is not mentioned after chapter 1.45, i.e. neither during the battle 
nor after it does Caesar see the need to invoke the name of the Roman people. 
 
In the same way it seems Caesar wants to show that he is in the right; a search for 
the use of the word ius and iniuria yields the following result: 
 
Book  Occurrences of the word iniuria  
(or inflections thereof) 
Occurrences of the words ius, 
iustus, iustitiae (or inflections 
thereof) 
1 1578 879 
2 3 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 
5 3 1 
                                                             
78 6 times the iniurias refer to the Helvetii, 4 times to Ariovistus. In 1.36 Ariovistus accuses Caesar of iniuria. In addition 
to this Caesar talks about avenging personal iniurias in 1.12 and in 1.20 Diviacus admits the iniurias of his brother, 
Dumnorix. Apart from these, the remaining mention of iniuria in book 1 is in chapter 1.9 and pertains to an agreement 
between the Helvetii and the Sequani and thus of less relevance in this context. 
 
79 The eight occurrences are all in the chapters 1.36-1.45 in the discussions between Caesar and Ariovistus (3 times in 
1.36, twice in 1.43, twice in 1.44 and once in 1.45). Who is in the right is clearly important to Caesar. 
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6 4 480 
7 2 781 
8 0 582 
 
The conclusion seems to be that Caesar in book 1 is very eager to establish that he 
is acting on behalf of the Roman people (and the senate) and that he is in the right. 
Both these themes are given a lot less focus in the other books. In the same sense, 
Caesar does not extol his own virtues to the same extent as he does in the big speech 
in 1.40 anywhere else; in the other books, he seems to content to point out his 
leniency and his swiftness.  
 
There is further evidence of the aberrant character of book 1: Caesar sends deputies 
to Ariovistus to request a parley. This does not happen anywhere else in the BG. 
The reason why Ariovistus is treated with what could be described as unusal 
deference is of course because of the special status awarded to him by Caesar and 
the senate. When Caesar elsewhere in BG mentions legatus it is always in the sense 
of deputy or lietenant-general, never legate or ambassador. Labienus is for example 
referred to as legatus, but he is never sent on any diplomatic missions, his tasks 
are strictly military. Variations of the phrase legatos ad Caesarem 
miserunt/venerunt with the purpose of surrendering, offering hostages, asking for 
help or the like are on the other hand very common. 9 times in book 1; 6 times in 
book 2; in book 3 where Caesar is largely absent from the ”plot”, the legates are sent 
to Galba and Crassus (once each); 9 times in book 4; 7 times in book 5; 5 times in 
                                                             
80 All the occurrences of ius and iniuria, with one exception in 6.10, appear in the digression in chapters 11-28.  
 
81 Only once does Caesar refer to “de iure belli” (7.41), the other occurrences (once in 7.33, twice in 7.37, once in 7.76 
and twice in 7.77), all refer to Gallic laws. 
 
82 Twice the phrase “ius dicere” is used about Caesar (8.4 and 8.23), the other three occurrences appear in 8.50, 8.52 
and 8.55, where Hirtius is referring to the wrong-doings of the Pompeians, where again Caesar is eager to show that he 
is in the right. See chapter 6.2 for more on this. 
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book 6; 6 times in book 7 and in book 8 5 times plus once to Marc Anthony. On a 
few occasions83 Caesar does send messengers (nuntii) to the various tribes, but these 
are sent with the purpose of ordering them to do something or giving them an 
ultimatum. Caesar also extends this practice to tribes which are supposed to be his 
allies and in book 4, Caesar even goes so far as to say: Hoc facto proelio Caesar 
neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis 
qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent (4.13). 
 
If Caesar’s justifications of his actions are what set book 1 apart from the rest, the 
many reproduced speeches among the Gauls in book 7 stand out. In previous books 
the Gauls are of course allowed to speak, but with very few exceptions the party 
they are speaking to is Caesar or another Roman: 
 
Book Total no. of speeches No. of speeches among  
Gauls, no Romans present 
1 40 2 
2 17 0 
3 7 1 
4 17 0 
5 25 6 
6 13 1 
7 48 24 
8 5 0 
 
Given free rein the Gauls only seem to have two things on their mind: Victory will 
be easy and freedom will be eternal. The Gauls are not described as rounded 
characters, which is why the speeches become somewhat repetitive. To Caesar’s 
                                                             
83 The only instances I have found are 1,26, 4.16, 6.34 and 7.41.  
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intended audience, this was probably of no importance84, just like a proper 
Hollywood film needs a villain, if the simile is allowed. What should be pointed out 
in this context is also: When Caesar relates a speech which he cannot have heard, 
it means he is using sermocinatio. This probably explains why Vercingetorix, for all 
his considerable influence and previous rhetorical mastery (e.g. the speech in 7.20 
where he manages to turn the charge of treason into a unanimous declaration of 
confidence) delivers such a lousy speech in 7.71 before the final face-off with the 
Romans at Alesia. I strongly suspect that Caesar is distorting the truth here to put 
himself in a better light and the Gauls in a worse light.  
 
So, to summarize the findings in BG, I cannot find any evidence in the BG in support 
of Rasmussen’s theory of an “ansteigende Kurve”85, at least as far as the use of 
rhetorical features is concerned. It seems to me that books 1 and 7 stand out. I am 
therefore much more inclined to agree with Mutschler:  
 
Da die Vernichtung des Sabinus und des Cotta, der Überfall der Sugambrer auf das 
Lager Ciceros und die Niederlage bei Gergovia auch objektiv gesehen die drei für die 
Römer unglücklichsten und verlustreichsten Ereignisse während des Gallischen 
Krieges waren, kann man also sagen, daβ Caesar innerhalb des BG da am 
intensivsten auf den Leser Einfluβ zu nehmen sucht, wo die Erreichung des einen 
und im BG vorrangigen seiner Darstellungsziele, “to show that he was successful”, 
am meisten gefährdet ist. (238) 
 
I would perhaps go even further and state that Caesar, by means of rhetorical finery, 
tries to gloss over the weak spots in his narrative, therefore the rhetoric is more 
abundant in book 1, especially in 1.13-14 and in 1.43 because Caesar wants to give 
himself the right to be the aggressor, and in books 5 and 7, as Mutschler mentions, 
to cover up the dire straits he was in. 
                                                             
84 I find Grillo’s quote (106, n.3) from Vasaly quite fitting in this context: “no Roman orator ever came to grief 
overestimating his audience’s prejudices toward ethnic minorities”.  
85 Cf. p. 9 
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6.2 De Bello Civili 
 
This chapters contains an analysis of the three books of the BC. The analysis of the 
results follows in chapter 6.3, which also includes a comparison with the results 
from the analysis of the BG. It should also be noted that Rasmussen, Mutschler and 
Grillo cover many of the rhetorical features in the speeches, so the focus in the 
analysis will be on aspects and themes they have not already discussed, but also on 
parallels and similarities to the BG. 
 
6.2.1. Book 1 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx no. 
of words 
1.1 Lentulus 45 
1.1 Scipio 25 
1.2 Marcellus 30 
1.2 Calidius 30 
1.3 Pompeius 20 
1.6 Pompeius 40 
1.7 Caesar 160 
1.7 Caesar’s soldiers 10 
1.8 Pompeius, through L. Caesar 60 
1.9 Caesar 170 
1.10 The consuls (Lentulus and Marcellus) and Pompeius 30 
1.13 The decurions at Auximum 35 
1.17 Domitius, through messenger 30 
1.19 Domitius 15 
1.19 Pompeius 30 
1.20 Domitius’s soldiers 30 
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1.20 Domitius’s soldiers 15 
1.22 Lentulus 30 
1.22 Caesar 40 
1.22 Lentulus 20 
1.23 Caesar 15 
1.24 Caesar, through N. Magius, Pompeius’s chief engineer 40 
1.26 Caesar, through Caninius Rebilus 50 
1.30 Cato 35 
1.32 Caesar 190 
1.33 Pompeius 15 
1.35 Caesar 30 
1.35 The Massilians 70 
1.64 Caesar’s soldiers, through the centurions and tribunes 20 
1.66 Scouts, from Caesar’s and Afranius’s and Petreius’s camps 25 
1.67 Participants at the council in Afranius’s and Petreius’s 
camp 
100 
1.71 Caesar’s legates, tribunes and centurions 65 
1.72 Caesar’s soldiers 15 
1.74 Soldiers in Petreius’s and Afranius’s camp 85 
1.76 Petreius 30 
1.84 Afranius 70 
1.85 Caesar 340 
1.87 Caesar 30 
 
Number of speeches: 37 
Total number of words spoken: 2,090 
Total number of words in Book I: 10,900 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 15-20 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 10, of which 2 through legates/messengers 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 1065 
96 
 
 
1.1 L. Lentulus consul senatu rei[que] publicae se non defuturum pollicetur, si 
audacter ac fortiter sententias dicere velint; sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius 
gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum 
neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum: habere se quoque ad Caesaris gratiam 
atque amicitiam receptum. In eandem sententiam loquitur Scipio: Pompeio esse in 
animo rei publicae non deesse, si senatus sequatur; si cunctetur atque agat lenius, 
nequiquam eius auxilium, si postea velit, senatum imploraturum. 
 
Just like Vercingetorix’s speech in BG 7.29 this speech is delivered by one of 
Caesar’s enemies and meant to criticize Caesar, but it is cleverly constructed (from 
Caesar’s point of view) to mention positive traits in connection to Caesar: lenis, 
gratia (twice) and amicitia.86 The actions of the Pompians on the other hand are 
introduced with negations: non defuturum, neque…obtemperaturum, non deesse.  
 
1.2 ut primo M. Marcellus, ingressus in eam orationem, non oportere ante de ea re ad 
senatum referri, quam dilectus tota Italia habiti et exercitus conscripti essent, quo 
praesidio tuto et libere senatus, quae vellet, decernere auderet; ut M. Calidius, qui 
censebat, ut Pompeius in suas provincias proficisceretur, ne qua esset armorum 
causa: timere Caesarem ereptis ab eo duabus legionibus, ne ad eius periculum 
reservare et retinere eas ad urbem Pompeius videretur. 
 
Caesar is no stranger to using emotive language in BG, in particular in books 1,5 
and 7, but it seems as if he sharpens the tone in BC. An example of this can be 
found in this speech: Caesar expresses fear. Caesar is the subject of the verb timere 
4 times in book 1 and 7 times in book 3. In the whole of BG this occurs only once 
(7.56). The senate is also described as fearful87. 
                                                             
86 For the inherent contradictions in Lentulus’s speech, see Batstone & Damon, pp 44-45. 
87 Cf. also Batstone & Damon, 123-25 and 193, n.7 
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1.7 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar apud milites contionatur. Omnium temporum 
iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat; a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium 
queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper 
faverit adiutorque fuerit. Novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut 
tribunicia intercessio armis votaretur atque opprimeretur, quae superioribus annis 
[sine] armis esset restituta. Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen 
intercessionem liberam reliquisse. Pompeium, qui amissa restituisse videatur bona 
etiam, quae ante habuerint, ademisse. Quotienscumque sit decretum, darent operam 
magistratus, ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet, qua voce et quo senatus consulto 
populus Romanus ad arma sit vocatus, factum in perniciosis legibus, in vi tribunicia, 
in secessione populi templis locisque editioribus occupatis: atque haec superioris 
aetatis exempla expiata Saturnini atque Gracchorum casibus docet; quarum rerum illo 
tempore nihil factum, ne cogitatum quidem. nulla lex promulgata, non cum populo agi 
coeptum, nulla secessio facta. Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIIII annis rem 
publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam 
Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis 
defendant. Conclamant legionis XIII, quae aderat, milites – hanc enim initio tumultus 
evocaverat, reliquae nondum convenerant – sese paratos esse imperatoris sui 
tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere. 
 
Caesar speaks to his soldiers. That he extols his own virtues and criticizises the 
Pompeians is hardly surprising, but it is worth noting how strongly he attacks 
Pompey; he is described as even worse than Sulla: Sullam…tamen…Pompeium 
…etiam. Pompey’s actions are further emphasized by annominatio: amissa… 
ademisse. Contemporary readers would have been well aware of the implications of 
this, as the Sullan proscriptions still were fresh in many people’s minds. Caesar 
here also introduces a dichotomy between old and new, where the Pompeians are 
described as introducing novum exemplum and Caesar puts himself forward as the 
protector of the old traditions. Worth noting is also that Caesar, for all his later talk 
of wanting nothing but peace, is coming across as quite belligerent here, although 
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of course clothed in the terms of defending his honour and righting the wrongs of 
the Pompeians. The word pax is for example not mentioned.  
 
1.8 habere se a Pompeio ad eum privati officii mandata demonstrat: velle Pompeium 
se Caesari purgatum, ne ea, quae rei publicae causa egerit, in suam contumeliam 
vertat. Semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus habuisse potiora. 
Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei 
publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis, ut, cum illis nocere se speret, 
rei publicae noceat. Pauca eiusdem generis addit cum excusatione Pompei coniuncta.  
 
1.9 petit ab utroque, quoniam Pompei mandata ad se detulerint, ne graventur sua 
quoque ad eum postulata deferre, si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque 
omnem Italiam metu liberare possint. Sibi semper primam fuisse dignitatem vitaque 
potiorem. Doluisse se, quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab 
inimicis extorqueretur, ereptoque semenstri imperio in urbem retraheretur, cuius 
absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset. Tamen hanc iacturam 
honoris sui rei publicae causa aequo animo tulisse; cum litteras ad senatum miserit, 
ut omnes ab exercitibus discederent, ne id quidem impetravisse. Tota Italia delectus 
haberi, retineri legiones II, quae ab se simulatione Parthici belli sint abductae, 
civitatem esse in armis. Quonam haec omnia nisi ad suam perniciem pertinere? Sed 
tamen ad omnia se descendere paratum atque omnia pati rei publicae causa. 
Proficiscatur Pompeius in suas provincias, ipsi exercitus dimittant, discedant in Italia 
omnes ab armis, metus e civitate tollatur, libera comitia atque omnis res publica 
senatui populoque Romano permittatur. Haec quo facilius certisque condicionibus 
fiant et iureiurando sanciantur, aut ipse propius accedat aut se patiatur accedere: 
fore uti per colloquia omnes controversiae componantur. 
 
Pompey (through L. Caesar) and Caesar have a competition about who loves the 
republic more, where they both contrast their personal honour with what is best for 
the republic. Caesar wins and the fact that he says he will endure anything for the 
republic, but refuses to accept the terms of the Pompeians, ties in with his speech 
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to the soldiers in 1.7: Caesar’s case here is that the Pompeians do not represent the 
republic, a theme he will expound on throughout the BC, where the Pompeians are 
described as a tiny minority (cf. 1.22, 1.35, 1.85, 2.21). The fear mentioned in 1.2 
and alluded to in 1.7 is now made more explicit through the mention of metus, twice. 
As an aside, the phrase nocere se speret in 1.8 would probably have been pleasing 
to the ears of the Roman readers and listeners with its alliteration and assonance.  
 
1.20 inter se per tribunos militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui generis 
colloquuntur: obsideri se a Caesare, opera munitionesque prope esse perfectas; 
ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque fiducia permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae 
consilium capere: debere se suae salutis rationem habere. 
 
1.22 Cum eo de salute sua [agit], orat atque obsecrat, ut sibi parcat, veteremque 
amicitiam commemorat Caesarisque in se beneficia exponit; quae erant maxima: quod 
per eum in collegium pontificum venerat, quod provinciam Hispaniam ex praetura 
habuerat, quod in petitione consulatus erat sublevatus. Cuius orationem Caesar 
interpellat: se non maleficii causa ex provincia egressum, sed uti se a contumeliis 
inimicorum defenderet, ut tribunos plebis in ea re ex civitate expulsos in suam 
dignitatem restitueret, et se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in 
libertatem vindicaret. Cuius oratione confirmatus Lentulus, ut in oppidum reverti 
liceat, petit: quod de sua salute impetraverit, fore etiam reliquis ad suam spem solatio; 
adeo esse perterritos nonnullos, ut suae vitae durius consulere cogantur.  
 
In 1.20 Caesar is careful to exonerate the soldiers and put the blame on the 
Pompeian officers; the many are contrasted with the few, a pattern which will also 
recur in 1.35 and 1.85. Furthermore, both Lentulus in 1.22 and, to a certain extent, 
Ahenobarbus in 1.20 display the same selfishness as Vercingetorix in 7.61 – note 
the many occurrences of se and suum88. Lentulus plea for mercy constitutes another 
                                                             
88 Grillo, pp. 110-121 convincingly argues that Caesar gives the Pompeians traits which he had used in the BG to 
describe Gauls and Germans. 
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example of emotive language. It also comes across as very weak – Caesar cleverly 
uses it to show that he has already been extremely generous towards Lentulus and 
now he has the temerity to expect Caesar to repay the lack of gratitude by sparing 
him.  
 
1.30 Quibus rebus paene perfectis adventu Curionis cognito queritur in contione sese 
proiectum ac proditum a Cn. Pompeio, qui omnibus rebus imparatissimis non 
necessarium bellum suscepisset et ab se reliquisque in senatu interrogatus omnia sibi 
esse ad bellum apta ac parata confirmavisset. 
 
Just like in 1.22 Caesar uses the words of his opponents to work in his favour. In 
this case, Curio’s arrival in Sicily provides Caesar with the opportunity to show 
dissent in the enemy camp, given extra punch by the antitheton in parata – 
imparatissimus. Caesar’s old arch-enemy Cato is portrayed as a coward (the 
chapters ends with the words haec in contione questus ex provincia fugit) and then, 
apart from a quick mention in 1.32, he disappears completely from the narrative89.  
 
1.32 Coacto senatu iniurias inimicorum commemorat. Docet se nullum 
extraordinarium honorem appetisse, sed exspectato legitimo tempore consulatus eo 
fuisse contentum, quod omnibus civibus pateret. Latum ab X tribunis plebis 
contradicentibus inimicis, Catone vero acerrime repugnante et pristina consuetudine 
dicendi mora dies extrahente, ut sui ratio absentis haberetur, ipso consule Pompeio; 
qui si improbasset, cur ferri passus esset? Si probasset, cur se uti populi beneficio 
prohibuisset? Patientiam proponit suam, cum de exercitibus dimittendis ultro 
postulavisset; in quo iacturam dignitatis atque honoris ipse facturus esset. 
Acerbitatem inimicorum docet, qui, quod ab altero postularent, in se recusarent, atque 
omnia permisceri mallent, quam imperium exercitusque dimittere. Iniuriam in 
eripiendis legionibus praedicat, crudelitatem et insolentiam in circumscribendis 
                                                             
89 Grillo, pp. 43-45, calls this an attempt at damnatio memoriae of Cato on Caesar’s part, an attempt which failed, as 
Cato became stuff of legends after his suicide.  
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tribunis plebis; condiciones a se latas, expetita colloquia et denegata commemorat. 
Pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat, ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una secum 
administrent. Sin timore defugiant, illis se oneri non futurum et per se rem publicam 
administraturum. Legatos ad Pompeium de compositione mitti oportere, neque se 
reformidare, quod in senatu Pompeius paulo ante dixisset, ad quos legati mitterentur, 
his auctoritatem attribui timoremque eorum, qui mitterent significari. Tenuis atque 
infirmi haec animi videri. Se vero, ut operibus anteire studuerit, sic iustitia et aequitate 
velle superare. 
 
Caesar uses emotive language again and sets out his credentials as a vir bonus in 
possession of patientia, dignitas, honor, iustitia and equitas, in stark contrast to the 
acerbitas, crudelitas and insolentia of his enemies. Grillo (111-117) refer to this as 
“the barbarization of the enemy”. There are also some distinct echoes to Caesar’s 
speech in BG 1.40 where the traits ascribed to Caesar and the Romans are virtus, 
diligentia, constantia and innocentia. The use of the phrase omnia permisceri90 and 
the criticism which follows can be seen as a reference to the novum exemplum in 
1.7. 
 
1.35 Evocat ad se Caesar Massilia XV primos; cum his agit, ne initium inferendi belli 
a Massiliensibus oriatur: debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam 
unius hominis voluntati obtemperare. Reliqua, quae ad eorum sanandas mentes 
pertinere arbitrabatur, commemorat.  
 
The phrase ne initium inferendi belli a Massiliensibus oriatur is interesting because 
of its inaccuracy. In 1.16 Caesar’s soldiers fight with Domitius’s soldiers, so 
technically the war has already started. Furthermore, in 1.29 Caesar states ita 
saepius rem frustra temptatam Caesar aliquando dimittendam sibi iudicat et de bello 
agendum. Caesar seems to imply that the Massilians even considering supporting 
                                                             
90 Cf. Batstone & Damon, p. 55. 
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Pompey is mind-boggling and he hopes to set their minds right – sanandas mentes. 
Again the fact that his opponents are a small minority, in this case reduced to only 
one man, Pompey, is emphasized and contrasted with the whole of Italy. 
 
1.64 Totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum 
necessario longius duci; centuriones tribunosque militum adire atque obsecrare, ut per 
eos Caesar certior fieret, ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse 
et audere ea transire flumen, qua traductus esset equitatus. 
 
In 1.7 Caesar’s soldiers declare they are ready to defend Caesar’s honour. Here they 
go one step further, just like in BG 7.17 and 7.19 where they state nullam 
ignominiam acciperent and nullum pro sua laude periculum recusant. At these two 
crucial stages in the narrative, before the siege of Avaricum in book 7 of the BG, 
where Caesar actually offer to withdraw if the soldiers find the task too arduous, 
and here before the first proper battle against Pompey’s troop, Caesar is eager to 
show that it is the soldiery and not he that provides the impetus for the actions 
which follow. 
 
1.67 Disputatur in consilio a Petreio atque Afranio et tempus profectionis quaeritur. 
Plerique censebant, ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri, quam 
sentiretur. Alii, quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset in Caesaris castris, argumenti 
sumebant loco non posse clam exiri. Circumfundi noctu equitatum Caesaris atque 
omnia loca atque itinera obsidere; nocturnaque proelia esse vitanda, quod perterritus 
miles in civili dissensione timori magis quam religioni consulere consuerit. At lucem 
multum per se pudorem omnium oculis, multum etiam tribunorum militum et 
centurionum praesentiam afferre; quibus rebus coerceri milites et in officio contineri 
soleant. Quare omni ratione esse interdiu perrumpendum: etsi aliquo accepto 
detrimento, tamen summa exercitus salva locum, quem petant, capi posse. Haec vincit 
in consilio sententia, et prima luce postridie constituunt proficisci. 
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Whereas Caesar have to reign in his soldiers who are eager for their commander to 
give the signal for battle,  the Pompeians are struggling and talking about forcing 
their terrified soldiers to stick to their duties. 
 
1.71 Concurrebant legati, centuriones tribunique militum: ne dubitaret proelium 
committere; omnium esse militum paratissimos animos. Afranianos contra multis 
rebus summi timoris signa misisse: quod suis non subvenissent, quod de colle non 
decederent, quod vix equitum incursus sustinerent collatisque in unum locum signis 
conferti neque ordines neque signa servarent. Quod si iniquitatem loci timeret, datum 
iri tamen aliquo loco pugnandi facultatem, quod certe inde decedendum esset Afranio 
nec sine aqua permanere posset. 
 
This continues the theme from 1.64 and stands in stark contrast to Cato’s complaint 
(imparatissimis) in 1.30 and the problems facing Afranius and Petreius in 1.67.  
 
1.72 milites vero palam inter se loquebantur, quoniam talis occasio victoriae 
dimitteretur, etiam cum vellet Caesar, sese non esse pugnaturos. 
 
1.74 Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem vulgo procedunt, 
et quem quisque in [Caesaris] castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirit atque 
evocat. Primum agunt gratias omnes omnibus, quod sibi perterritis pridie 
pepercissent: eorum se beneficio vivere. Deinde imperatoris fide quaerunt, rectene se 
illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque quod cum hominibus 
necessariis et consanguineis contulerint, queruntur. His provocati sermonibus fidem 
ab imperatore de Petreii atque Afranii vita petunt, ne quod in se scelus concepisse neu 
suos prodidisse videantur. Quibus confirmatis rebus se statim signa translaturos 
confirmant legatosque de pace primorum ordinum centuriones ad Caesarem mittunt. 
 
Caesar does not want to do battle, a strategy which in 1.72 is very impopular with 
the soldiers. Whereas it makes perfect strategic sense in book 7 of the BG to 
encourage the soldiers’ fighting spirit, Caesar’s agenda is obviously different here 
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and his restraint pays off: In 1.74 the mood changes dramatically and amidst the 
general rejoicing they all thank each other; when the soldiers of Afranius and 
Petreius say eorum se beneficio vivere, the reader knows that it is thanks to Caesar 
and Caesar only that they are alive. 
 
1.76 Quibus rebus confectis flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, neu 
se neu Pompeium, absentem imperatorem suum, adversariis ad supplicium tradant, 
obsecrat. […] Postulat, ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque 
prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis consilium capturos.  
 
1.84 Audiente utroque exercitu loquitur Afranius: non esse aut ipsis aut militibus 
suscensendum, quod fidem erga imperatorem suum Cn. Pompeium conservare 
voluerint. Sed satis iam fecisse officio satisque supplicii tulisse perpessos omnium 
rerum inopiam; nunc vero paene ut feras circummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi 
ingressu, neque corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse. Itaque se victos 
confiteri; orare atque obsecrare, si qui locus misericordiae relinquatur, ne ad ultimum 
supplicium progredi necesse habeat. Haec quam potest demississime et subiectissime 
exponit. 
 
Grillo (60-65) shows that the Pompeians breaking their oaths is a recurring theme, 
a trait they share with the Gauls (cf. BG 5.27). In this case, Afranius and Petreius, 
who in 1.76 force the soldiers to take an oath not to take any measures for their 
own safety, here ask for a colloquium with Caesar, if possible, in a place where the 
soldiers cannot hear them. Caesar of course refuses. It is also worth contrasting the 
pitiful appeal of Afranius with the fighting spirit of Caesar’s soldiers in 3.4991 where 
they say they will resort to eating the bark of the trees rather than letting Pompey 
get away.  
                                                             
91 crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur, prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros, quam Pompeium 
e manibus dimissuros. 
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1.85 Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partis vel querimoniae vel miserationis 
minus convenisse. Reliquos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse: [se] qui etiam 
bona condicione, et loco et tempore aequo, confligere noluerit, ut quam integerrima 
essent ad pacem omnia; exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque 
interfectis, quos in sua potestate habuerit, conservarit et texerit; illius denique 
exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda pace egerint; qua in re omnium suorum 
vitae consulendum putarint. Sic omnium ordinum partis in misericordia constitisse: 
ipsos duces a pace abhorruisse; eos neque colloquii neque indutiarum iura servasse 
et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse. Accidisse 
igitur his, quod plerumque hominum nimia pertinacia atque arrogantia accidere 
soleat, uti eo recurrant et id cupidissime petant, quod paulo ante contempserint. Neque 
nunc se illorum humilitate neque aliqua temporis opportunitate postulare, quibus 
rebus opes augeantur suae; sed eos exercitus, quos contra se multos iam annos 
aluerint, velle dimitti. Neque enim sex legiones alia de causa missas in Hispaniam 
septimamque ibi conscriptam neque tot tantasque classes paratas neque submissos 
duces rei militaris peritos. Nihil horum ad pacandas Hispanias, nihil ad usum 
provinciae provisum, quae propter diuturnitatem pacis nullum auxilium desiderarit. 
// Omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut 
idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens 
tot annis obtineat; in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, 
ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur; in se aetatis 
excusationem nihil valere, quin superioribus bellis probati ad obtinendos exercitus 
evocentur; in se uno non servari, quod sit omnibus datum semper imperatoribus, ut 
rebus feliciter gestis aut cum honore aliquo aut certe sine ignominia domum 
revertantur exercitumque dimittant. Quae tamen omnia et se tulisse patienter et esse 
laturum; // neque nunc id agere, ut ab illis abductum exercitum teneat ipse, quod 
tamen sibi difficile non sit, sed ne illi habeant, quo contra se uti possint. Proinde, ut 
esset dictum, provinciis excederent exercitumque dimitterent; si id sit factum, se 
nociturum nemini. Hanc unam atque extremam esse pacis condicionem. 
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After Afranius and Petreius have finally surrendered Caesar delivers a speech full of 
emotive language. It is almost as if he is getting rid of pent up anger. The contrast 
between the many (Caesar, his soldiers, the soldiers from the other camp) and the 
few (Afranius and Petreius, the Pompeian commanders) is repeated from previous 
speeches, just like the complaint about novi generis imperia92. In the same sense 
the antitheton in ad pacem and a pace serves to further emphasize the differences 
between Caesar and his enemies. The many repetition of nihil and neque give the 
speech the character of a relentless attack on an enemy who has caused Caesar so 
much grief93. The fact that he still says he will spare them in the end obviously adds 
credence to his talks of clemency and leniency. Worth noticing is also that the 
speech consists of two parts (I have marked the digression with //).94 Caesar 
changes the topic, from the current situation to a lament of the whole campaign 
against him, before he finishes his speech with his very reasonable conditions for 
peace. 
 
6.2.2 Book 2 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no of 
words 
2.12 “the enemy” (the Massilians) 65 
2.13 Caesar, via dispatch 20 
2.17 Varro 40 
2.18 Varro 20 
2.21 Caesar 35 
2.27 Two Marsic centurions from Curio’s camp who 
desert to Varus 
20 
                                                             
92 Cf. chapter 1.7 
93 Batstone & Damon (121) refer to this as the “rejected negative”. 
94 For more on this speech and Afranius’s speech in the preceding chapter, see Grillo 80-91 and 160-64. 
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2.28 Quintilius 55 
2.30 Participants in the council of war in Curio’s 
camp 
100 
*2.31 Curio 200 
*2.32 Curio 410 
2.33 Curio’s soldiers 20 
*2.34 Rebilus 10 
2.34 Curio 10 
2.38 Deserters from the town of Utica 20 
*2.39 Curio 35 
2.40 Saburra 20 
2.42 Curio 15 
 
 
Number of speeches: 17 
Total number of words spoken: 1095 
Total number of words in Book II: 6400 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 15-20 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 2 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 55 
 
2.12 Ubi hostes ad legatos exercitumque pervenerunt, universi se ad pedes proiciunt; 
orant, ut adventus Caesaris exspectetur: captam suam urbem videre: opera perfecta, 
turrim subrutam; itaque ab defensione desistere. Nullam exoriri moram posse, 
quominus, cum venisset, si imperata non facerent ad nutum, e vestigio diriperentur. 
Docent, si omnino turris concidisset, non posse milites contineri, quin spe praedae in 
urbem irrumperent urbemque delerent. Haec atque eiusdem generis complura ut ab 
hominibus doctis magna cum misericordia fletuque pronuntiantur. 
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2.13 Caesar enim per litteras Trebonio magnopere mandaverat, ne per vim oppidum 
expugnari pateretur, ne gravius permoti milites et defectionis odio et contemptione sui 
et diutino labore omnes puberes interficerent 
 
At this stage Caesar’s clemency is so well-known that the mention of his name seems 
to be enough. Caesar is at pains to convey this image of himself and just as he does 
in 1.72 he shows that his decision makes him impopular with his soldiers. In this 
case, his leniency will be abused by the Massilians who break the truce and thus 
cause his soldiers more grief, which goes some way to proving that Caesar is willing 
to back up his claim in 1.9: omnia pati rei publicae causa.   
 
2.21 Caesar contione habita Cordubae omnibus generatim gratias agit: civibus 
Romanis, quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere; Hispanis, quod 
praesidia expulissent; Gaditanis, quod conatus adversariorum infregissent seseque 
in libertatem vindicassent; tribunis militum centurionibusque, qui eo praesidii causa 
venerant, quod eorum consilia sua virtute confirmassent.  
 
Ceasar’s emphasis on omnis continues. Just as in 1.22, 1.74 and 1.85 the reader is 
left with the impression that nearly everyone was on Caesar’s side. Regarding the 
use of virtus, which in the above speech seems to extend from the military tribunes 
and the centurions to omnes, including the Spanish and the people of Gades: Gallo 
(54-55) interestingly points out that virtus is never ascribed to Romans fighting 
against Caesar in the BC, only to the Gauls allied with Pompey; in the BG Caesar 
sees no problems with describing the Gauls as having virtus. 
 
2.30 Quibus de causis consilio convocato de summa rerum deliberare incipit. Erant 
sententiae, quae conandum omnibus modis castraque Vari oppugnanda censerent, 
quod [in] huiusmodi militum consiliis otium maxime contrarium esse arbitrarentur; 
postremo praestare dicebant per virtutem in pugna belli fortunam experiri, quam 
desertos et circumventos ab suis gravissimum supplicium perpeti. Erant, qui 
censerent de tertia vigilia in castra Cornelia recedendum, ut maiore spatio temporis 
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interiecto militum mentes sanarentur, simul, si quid gravius accidisset, magna 
multitudine navium et tutius et facilius in Siciliam receptus daretur. 
 
In chapter 2.23 the “Curio section” starts, perhaps the most rhetorically dense part 
of all of the BG and the BC. Much has been written about the speeches and to 
Mutschler’s thorough analysis of this section there are only a few comments to add. 
On pp. 100-110 Mutschler shows how Caesar uses a register and vocabulary which 
“nicht durchgehend von dem Stilideal schlichter Sachlichkeit bestimmt ist” (110). 
This could be said to start with the very first sentence of this section: et iam ab initio 
copias P. Atti Vari despiciens (2.23). In 2.27 – 2.29 some soldiers desert Curio, which 
Varus, one of Pompey’s commanders, tries to exploit to entice more soliders to follow 
suit. In 2.30 Curio summons a council to deal with the situation. In 1.35 Caesar 
uses the phrase quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur about the 
Massilians, but fails. The reader thus knows that it is highly unlikely that Curio will 
succeed where Caesar himself does not; although Curio’s speech to the soldiers in 
2.32 does instil them with the will to fight, the reaction of the soldiers in chapter 
2.33 (see below) is not overly positive. 
 
2.31 Curio utrumque improbans consilium, quantum alteri sententiae deesset animi, 
tantum alteri superesse dicebat: hos turpissimae fugae rationem habere, illos etiam 
iniquo loco dimicandum putare. "Qua enim," inquit, "fiducia et opere et natura loci 
munitissima castra expugnari posse confidimus? Aut vero quid proficimus, si accepto 
magno detrimento ab oppugnatione castrorum discedimus? Quasi non et felicitas 
rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia 
concilient! Castrorum autem mutatio quid habet nisi turpem fugam et desperationem 
omnium et alienationem exercitus? Nam neque pudentes suspicari oportet sibi parum 
credi, neque improbos scire sese timeri, quod illis licentiam timor augeat noster, his 
[suspicio] studia deminuat. Quod si iam," inquit, "haec explorata habeamus, quae de 
exercitus alienatione dicuntur, quae quidem ego aut omnino falsa aut certe minora 
opinione esse confido, quanto haec dissimulari et occultari, quam per nos confirmari 
praestet? An non, uti corporis vulnera, ita exercitus incommoda sunt tegenda, ne spem 
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adversariis augeamus? At etiam, ut media nocte proficiscamur, addunt, quo maiorem, 
credo, licentiam habeant, qui peccare conentur. Namque huiusmodi res aut pudore 
aut metu tenentur; quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est. Quare neque tanti sum 
animi, ut sine spe castra oppugnanda censeam, neque tanti timoris, uti spe deficiam, 
atque omnia prius experienda arbitror magnaque ex parte iam me una vobiscum de 
re iudicium facturum confido." 
 
Just like the Pompeians in 1.67, Curio expresses his worry about the detrimental 
effect darkness will have on the morale of the soldiers. This is clearly not a good 
sign95. Curio’s comment about how the commander can win the confidence and 
goodwill of the soldiers echoes Caesar’s comment in his big speech to the soldiers 
in 1.4096. The speech which Curio then delivers in 2.32 (see below) also show 
distinct similarities to Caesar’s big speech: The purpose of both speeches is to boost 
the morale of the troops and the reaction of the soldiers after the speech is recorded 
in both instances. As we will see below, there are, however, also some important 
differences, which explain why Caesar succeeds and Curio ultimately fails. 
 
2.32 Dimisso consilio contionem advocat militum. Commemorat, quo sit eorum usus 
studio ad Corfinium Caesar, ut magnam partem Italiae beneficio atque auctoritate 
eorum suam fecerit. "Vos enim vestrumque factum omnia," inquit, "deinceps municipia 
sunt secuta, neque sine causa et Caesar amicissime de vobis et illi gravissime 
iudicaverunt. Pompeius enim nullo proelio pulsus vestri facti praeiudicio demotus 
Italia excessit; Caesar me, quem sibi carissimum habuit, provinciam Siciliam atque 
Africam, sine quibus urbem atque Italiam tueri non potest, vestrae fidei commisit. At 
sunt, qui vos hortentur, ut a nobis desciscatis. Quid enim est illis optatius, quam uno 
tempore et nos circumvenire et vos nefario scelere obstringere? aut quid irati gravius 
de vobis sentire possunt, quam ut eos prodatis, qui se vobis omnia debere iudicant, 
                                                             
95 See Gallo 46-49 for a comparison of the two situations 
96 scire enim, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore 
comperto avaritiam esse convictam. 
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in eorum potestatem veniatis, qui se per vos perisse existimant? An vero in Hispania 
res gestas Caesaris non audistis? duos pulsos exercitus, duos superatos duces, duas 
receptas provincias? haec acta diebus XL, quibus in conspectum adversariorum 
venerit Caesar? An, qui incolumes resistere non potuerunt, perditi resistant? vos 
autem incerta victoria Caesarem secuti diiudicata iam belli fortuna victum 
sequamini, cum vestri officii praemia percipere debeatis? Desertos enim se ac proditos 
a vobis dicunt et prioris sacramenti mentionem faciunt. Vosne vero L. Domitium, an 
vos Domitius deseruit? Nonne extremam pati fortunam paratos proiecit ille? nonne sibi 
clam vobis salutem fuga petivit? non proditi per illum Caesaris beneficio estis 
conservati? Sacramento quidem vos tenere qui potuit, cum proiectis fascibus et 
deposito imperio privatus et captus ipse in alienam venisset potestatem? Relinquitur 
nova religio, ut eo neglecto sacramento, quo tenemini, respiciatis illud, quod deditione 
ducis et capitis deminutione sublatum est. At, credo, si Caesarem probatis, in me 
offenditis. Qui de meis in vos meritis praedicaturus non sum, quae sunt adhuc et mea 
voluntate et vestra exspectatione leviora; sed tamen sui laboris milites semper eventu 
belli praemia petiverunt, qui qualis sit futurus, ne vos quidem dubitatis: diligentiam 
quidem nostram aut, quem ad finem adhuc res processit, fortunam cur praeteream? 
An poenitet vos, quod salvum atque incolumem exercitum nulla omnino nave 
desiderata traduxerim? quod classem hostium primo impetu adveniens profligaverim? 
quod his per biduum equestri proelio superaverim? quod ex portu sinuque 
adversariorum CC naves oneratas abduxerim eoque illos compulerim, ut neque 
pedestri itinere neque navibus commeatu iuvari possint? Hac vos fortuna atque his 
ducibus repudiatis Corfiniensem ignominiam, Italiae fugam, Hispaniarum deditionem, 
Africi belli praeiudicia, sequimini! Equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui, vos me 
imperatoris nomine appellavistis. Cuius si vos poenitet, vestrum vobis beneficium 
remitto, mihi meum nomen restituite, ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini." 
 
It seems to me that Curio in his speech makes three major mistakes. Firstly, where 
Caesar in his speeches and actions is striving towards unity, whether real or 
propagandistic, and repeatedly emphasizes that omnes are on his side, Curio here 
constructs a plethora of seemingly opposing forces, which is given extra emphasis 
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through the abundant use of pronouns, peaking in vestrum vobis…mihi meum in 
the last sentence. There are 24 variations of vos or vester but only 3 variations of 
nos and noster, seemingly creating a divide, where Curio should rather have striven 
for unity. Secondly, just like Petreius in 1.76, Curio introduces a nova religio. 
Adopting the strategy of an already vanquished enemy and in addition thereto 
Caesar’s aversion towards all things novae does not bode well for Curio. Lastly and 
perhaps most importantly, Curio is guilty of hubris on two counts (see underlined 
and in bold). Unlike Caesar who never crosses the line from confidence to hubris, 
Curio talks as if victory is certain. Considering his less assertive stance in the 
previous chapter this rings hollow to the reader, and the soldiers response in 2.33 
(see below) is less than rapturous. It should also be noted that Curio in this speech 
refers to news of Caesar’s victories in Spain, news which will not reach the camp 
until 2.37.97 
 
2.33 Qua oratione permoti milites crebro etiam dicentem interpellabant, ut magno cum 
dolore infidelitatis suspicionem sustinere viderentur, discedentem vero ex contione 
universi cohortantur, magno sit animo, neubi dubitet proelium committere et suam 
fidem virtutemque experiri.  
 
Whereas Caesar’s speech in BG 1.40 is greeted by the soldiers with alacritas and 
cupiditas belli gerendi, Curio’s speech is received with heavy hearts. The phrase 
magno sit animo, neubi dubitet also sounds more like an attempt to comfort Curio 
than a unanimous battle cry. The premonition in this short speech is heavy, with 
words like dolor, infidelitas, suspicio and dubito. 
 
                                                             
97 This is apparently a slip-up on Caesar’s part which, together with i.a. the references to the disaster at Curicta, which is 
not described in the BG (cf. chapter 3.10 and Batstone & Damon, p. 191, n.9) shows that Caesar left the BC in an 
unfinished state.. 
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2.34 "perterritum," inquit, "hostem vides, Curio: quid dubitas uti temporis 
opportunitate?" Ille unum elocutus, ut memoria tenerent milites ea, quae pridie sibi 
confirmassent, sequi se iubet et praecurrit ante omnes.  
 
Curio’s rashness is encouraged by Rebilus and just like in 2.33 the word dubito is 
used. Curio does win this battle, but it only serves to increase his hubris. 
 
2.38 probatisque consiliis ex perfugis quibusdam oppidanis audit Iubam revocatum 
finitimo bello et controversiis Leptitanorum restitisse in regno et Saburram, eius 
praefectum, cum mediocribus copiis missum Uticae appropinquare. 
 
2.39 e captivis quaerit, quis castris ad Bagradam praesit: respondent Saburram. 
Reliqua studio itineris conficiendi quaerere praetermittit proximaque respiciens signa, 
"videtisne," inquit, "milites, captivorum orationem cum perfugis convenire? abesse 
regem, exiguas esse copias missas, quae paucis equitibus pares esse non potuerint? 
Proinde ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis vestris et de referenda 
gratia cogitare incipiamus."  
 
By this stage Curio’s over-confidence knows no bounds. He only hears what he 
wants to hear, and foolishly listens to unreliable sources. Readers of the BG knows 
that no good will ever come of this (cf. BG 5.28). In less than two chapters Curio’s 
fate will be sealed and he dies fighting, paying the ultimate price for his rashness 
and thus ends book 2.98 
 
6.2.3 Book 3 
 
Chapter Speaker Approx. no of 
words 
                                                             
98 See Grillo, 172, for an interesting theory on why Caesar chooses to end book 2 with Curio’s death. 
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3.6 Caesar 35 
3.6 Caesar’s soldiers 10 
3.10 Caesar 180 
3.13 Labienus 10 
3.16 Libo 100 
3.17 Caesar 75 
*3.18 Pompeius 30 
3.19 Caesar, through P. Vatinius 25 
3.19 Aulus Varro 20 
*3.19 Labienus 15 
3.45 Pompeius 20 
3.49 Caesar’s soldiers 10 
3.53 Caesar 20 
3.57 Caesar (statement in a letter given to A. Clodius) 75 
3.60 Caesar 10 
*3.64 Eagle-bearer in Caesar’s army 35 
3.71 Labienus 10 
3.73 Caesar 150 
3.80 Caesar 30 
3.82 Pompey 15 
3.82 Pompey’s soldiers 15 
3.82 Officers in Pompey’s camp 50 
3.83 L. Domitius 50 
*3.85 Caesar 25 
*3.86 Pompey 90 
*3.87 Labienus 100 
3.89 Caesar 25 
3.90 Caesar 45 
*3.91 C. Crastinus, reservist in Caesar’s army 40 
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*3.94 Pompey 15 
3.96 Pompey 20 
3.98 Caesar 20 
3.107 Caesar 25 
 
 
Number of speeches: 31 
Total number of words spoken: 1,355 
Total number of words in Book III: 15,000 
Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10 
Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 14, of which 2 through legates/letter 
Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 740 
 
3.6 Caesar, ut Brundisium venit, contionatus apud milites, quoniam prope ad finem 
laborum ac periculorum esset perventum, aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta 
in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent, quo maior numerus militum 
posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent, conclamantibus 
omnibus, imperaret, quod vellet, quodcumque imperavisset, se aequo animo esse 
facturos 
 
The first speech after the Curio disaster paints a picture of concord99 and, unlike 
Curio, Caesar does not take victory for granted; the key word in the above speech is 
sperarent. 
 
3.10 Erat autem haec summa mandatorum: debere utrumque pertinaciae finem facere 
et ab armis discedere neque amplius fortunam periclitari. Satis esse magna utrimque 
incommoda accepta, quae pro disciplina et praeceptis habere possent, ut reliquos 
casus timerent: illum Italia expulsum amissa Sicilia et Sardinia duabusque Hispaniis 
                                                             
99 Cf. Grillo 133. 
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et cohortibus [in] Italia atque Hispania civium Romanorum centum atque XXX; [se] 
morte Curionis et detrimento Africani exercitus et Antoni militumque deditione ad 
Curictam. Proinde sibi ac rei publicae parcerent, [cum] quantum in bello fortuna 
posset, iam ipsi incommodis suis satis essent documento. Hoc unum esse tempus de 
pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confideret et pares ambo viderentur; si vero alteri 
paulum modo tribuisset fortuna, non esse usurum condicionibus pacis eum, qui 
superior videretur, neque fore aequa parte contentum, qui se omnia habiturum 
confideret. Condiciones pacis, quoniam antea convenire non potuissent, Romae ab 
senatu et a populo peti debere. Interesse id rei publicae et ipsis placere oportere, si 
uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo exercitum dimissurum. 
Depositis armis auxiliisque, quibus nunc confiderent, necessario populi senatusque 
iudicio fore utrumque contentum. Haec quo facilius Pompeio probari possent, omnes 
suas terrestres ubique copias dimissurum…[lacuna] 
 
Nordling (186, footnote) points out that it is believed that there is a lacuna between 
chapter 8 and 9 as Caesar does not elaborate on the disaster at Curicta, where 
Caesar’s legate Gaius Antonius loses his fleet and is forced to surrender100. The last 
sentence is also corrupt so no far-reaching conclusions should be made here. Worth 
noting, however, is Caesar’s reference to fortuna, although the set-backs he 
mentions on Pompey’s side are caused either by Pompey’s own incompetence or the 
masterful actions of Caesar, whereas Caesar’s set-backs are lesser in extent and 
number (two as opposed to the four for Pompey) and incurred by Caesar’s deputies. 
Caesar does not admit to any wrong-doings101. 
 
3.16 Prodit Libo atque excusat Bibulum, quod is iracundia summa erat inimicitiasque 
habebat etiam privatas cum Caesare ex aedilitate et praetura conceptas: ob eam 
causam colloquium vitasse, ne res maximae spei maximaeque utilitatis eius iracundia 
                                                             
100 Batstone & Damon, 30. 
101 A theme continued from BG – cf. 7.52. See also Nordling’s discussion on the surrender of Sabinus, pp. 186-87. 
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impedirentur. Suam [Pompei] summam esse ac fuisse semper voluntatem, ut 
componeretur atque ab armis discederetur, sed potestatem eius rei nullam habere, 
propterea quod de consilii sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio 
permiserint. Sed postulatis Caesaris cognitis missuros ad Pompeium, atque illum 
reliqua per se acturum hortantibus ipsis. Interea manerent indutiae, dum ab illo rediri 
posset, neve alter alteri noceret. Huc addit pauca de causa et de copiis auxiliisque 
suis. 
 
Just as in BG 5.26 and below in 3.19, the use of the word prodeo does not bode 
well. This speech by Lido turns out to be an attempt to gain time, not unsimilar to 
the behaviour of the Germans in BG 4.9. Caesar concludes in the following chapter 
that there is no reason to indulge this behaviour. He returns his focus to the war 
effort: Quem ubi Caesar intellexit praesentis periculi atque inopiae vitandae causa 
omnem orationem instituisse neque ullam spem aut condicionem pacis afferre, ad 
reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit. 
 
3.18 Quem ingressum in sermonem Pompeius interpellavit et loqui plura prohibuit. 
"Quid mihi," inquit, "aut vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere 
videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit, cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum,[lacuna] 
reductus existimabor bello perfecto." 
 
Although this speech contains a short lacuna, it still perfectly illustrates Pompey’s 
foolish pride and hypocrisy. In 1.8 Pompey, using L. Caesar as his mouthpiece, tells 
Caesar that he (i.e. Pompey) has always put the interests of the republic before his 
own personal interests and that Caesar must do the same. Here Pompey clearly 
shows that these were just empty words. Considering what Labienus says in the 
very next speech (see below), Caesar probably wants to show that all bridges have 
been burnt and there can be no hope of a reconciliation. And the blame rests 
squarely with the Pompeians.  
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3.19 Mittit P. Vatinium legatum ad ripam ipsam fluminis, qui ea, quae maxime ad 
pacem pertinere viderentur, ageret et crebro magna voce pronuntiaret, liceretne 
civibus ad cives [de pace duos] legatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo 
praedonibusque licuisset, praesertim cum id agerent, ne cives cum civibus armis 
decertarent? Multa suppliciter locutus est, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, 
silentioque ab utrisque militibus auditus. […] Qua ex frequentia, Titus Labienus prodit, 
summissa oratione loqui de pace atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit. Quorum mediam 
orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa; quae ille obtectus armis militum 
vitavit; vulnerantur tamen complures, in his Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, 
centuriones militesque nonnulli. Tum Labienus: "desinite ergo de compositione loqui; 
nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest." 
 
Vatinius talks about peace, citizens and of course he mentions omnes, all in line 
with Caesar’s propaganda. Labienus on the other hand appears on the scene, 
creates division and showcases his cruelty, of which there is no trace in the BG102. 
The spears thrown is strikingly similar to the scene in BG 1.46 – Before a decisive 
battle where Caesar might be seen as the agressor, the enemy does something to 
shift the blame onto themselves. The fact that the incident occurs at this stage 
warrants suspicion - in both cases103.  
 
3.45 Dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse: non recusare se, quin 
nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris 
sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae. 
 
                                                             
102 See also 3.71 for an example of how the portrayal of Labienus has changed; here Caesar refers to Labienus as a 
deserter (perfuga), who after insulting the Caesarian soldiers kills them in omnium conspectu.  
103 cf. Grillo 113 and Rasmussen 115-16. 
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Just like Labienus, Pompey is also shown to have a cruel streak. Grillo (112-13, 
151-56) points out that there are allusions here both to barbarian/foreign104 and 
Sullan cruelty: “[A]pparently, Pompey himself reminded everyone of his ties with the 
dictator: toward the beginning of the war he threatened Italian municipalities, 
saying in public Sulla potuit; ego non potero? (Att. 9.10.2). As one may expect, the 
BC uses this association between Sulla and Pompey for invective” (152).  
 
3.57 Huic dat litteras mandataque ad eum; quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de 
pace expertum nihil adhuc [effecisse; id] arbitrari vitio factum eorum, quos esse 
auctores eius rei voluisset, quod sua mandata perferre non opportuno tempore ad 
Pompeium vererentur. Scipionem ea esse auctoritate, ut non solum libere quae 
probasset exponere, sed etiam ex magna parte compellare atque errantem regere 
posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad 
coercendum haberet. Quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem 
imperii uni omnes acceptam relaturos. 
 
In spite of the continued and increasingly aggressive rebuffs from the Pompeians, 
Caesar makes one last attempt at achieving a peaceful solution. The focus on omnes 
who want peace is given further emphasis through its antithetical juxtaposition to 
uni.  
 
3.64 "hanc ego," inquit, "et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc 
moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo. Nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exercitu 
Caesaris non accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque ad eum 
deferte."  
 
                                                             
104 The most obvious parallel is probably to Ariovistus, cf. the description of him in BG 1.31. 
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The battle of Dyrrachium was one of the greatest disasters to befall Caesar during 
the civil war campaigns. Nordling, referring to Caesar’s statement in 3.73105 says: 
“[S]o great were the set-backs at Dyrrachium, in fact, that Caesar was forced to alter 
his entire mode of campaign – as close as he ever comes to expressing a loss of 
confidence in himself” (205). In an effort to downplay the seriousness of the situation 
or perhaps one could even say, distract the reader’s attention, Caesar focuses on 
the virtuous actions and words of one of his soldiers. The parallels to the description 
of the disaster at Gergovia, where Caesar quotes Petronius (BG 7.50), are 
unmistakeable.  
 
3.73 contionem apud milites habuit hortatusque est, ne ea, quae accidissent, graviter 
ferrent neve his rebus terrerentur multisque secundis proeliis unum advesrum et id 
mediocre opponerent. Habendam fortunae gratiam, quod Italiam sine aliquo vulnere 
cepissent, quod duas Hispanias bellicosissimorum hominum peritissimis atque 
exercitatissimis ducibus pacavissent, quod finitimas frumentariasque provincias in 
potestatem redegissent; denique recordari debere, qua felicitate inter medias hostium 
classes oppletis non solum portibus, sed etiam litoribus omnes incolumes essent 
transportati. Si non omnia caderent secunda, fortunam esse industria sublevandam. 
Quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuiusvis potius quam suae culpae debere tribui. 
Locum se aequum ad dimicandum dedisse, potitum se esse hostium castris, expulisse 
ac superasse pugnantes. Sed sive ipsorum perturbatio sive error aliquis sive etiam 
fortuna partam iam praesentemque victoriam interpellavisset, dandam omnibus 
operam, ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur. Quod si esset factum [lacuna] 
ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, uti ad Gergoviam contigisset, atque ei qui ante 
dimicare timuissent, ultro se proelio offerrent. 
 
There are certain echoes of Vercingetorix’s speech in BG 7.29 and Caesar’s own 
speech in 7.52 here. Both Caesar and Vercingetorix talk about not all battles being 
                                                             
105 Caesar ab superioribus consiliis depulsus omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit. 
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secunda and also that if they are looking for someone to blame, they should look 
elsewhere. Similar to his speech in BG 6.42, Caesar emphasizes the workings of 
fortuna, but whereas in 6.42 he probably refers to fortuna because he himself was 
not present during the battle, it is not clear to me why Caesar mentions it in this 
speech. 
 
3.82 contionatusque apud cunctum exercitum suis agit gratias, Scipionis milites 
cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes […] si 
quando quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, 
sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero 
dicerent. […] magnaque inter eos in consilio fuit controversia, oporteretne Lucili Hirri, 
quod is a Pompeio ad Parthos missus esset, proximis comitiis praetoriis absentis 
rationem haberi, cum eius necessarii fidem implorarent Pompei, praestaret, quod 
proficiscenti recepisset, ne per eius auctoritatem deceptus videretur, reliqui, in labore 
pari ac periculo ne unus omnes antecederet, recusarent. 
 
3.83 Et L. Domitius in consilio dixit placere sibi bello confecto ternas tabellas dari ad 
iudicandum eis, qui ordinis essent senatorii belloque una cum ipsis interfuissent, 
sententiasque de singulis ferrent, qui Romae remansissent quique intra praesidia 
Pompei fuissent neque operam in re militari praestitissent: unam fore tabellam, qui 
liberandos omni periculo censerent; alteram, qui capitis damnarent; tertiam, qui 
pecunia multarent.  
 
In the build-up to the final battle at Pharsalus, which starts in 3.92, there are no 
less than 10 speeches (although most of them are quite brief) which gives the reader 
an insight into both the Caesarian and the Pompeian camp. In 3.82 and 3.83 
Pompey, his soldiers and his officers are talking, discussing and quarrelling. The 
guaranteed victory, sharing the spoils, and punishing those who did not participate 
are the main themes of discussion. The display of cruelty, hubris and greed is very 
similar to, or perhaps even worse than in the Gallic camps in book 7 of the BG. For 
the Pompeian soldiers’ comment on their leader’s slowness, see Grillo, 25.  
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3.85 Tum Caesar apud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, "differendum est" inquit, 
"iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus; animo 
simus ad dimicandum parati: non facile occasionem postea reperiemus" 
 
This is ”[t]he only passage of the Commentarii where Caesar himself speaks in oratio 
recta” (Nordling, 19, n.). It stands in stark contrast both to the preceeding speeches 
in 3.82 and 3.83 and to Pompey’s and Labienus’s speeches in 3.86 and 3.87 
 
3.86 "scio me," inquit, "paene incredibilem rem polliceri; sed rationem consilii mei 
accipite, quo firmiore animo [ad] proelium prodeatis. Persuasi equitibus nostris, idque 
mihi facturos confirmaverunt, ut, cum propius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu 
ab latere aperto aggrederentur et circumventa ab tergo acie prius perturbatum 
exercitum pellerent, quam a nobis telum in hostem iaceretur. Ita sine periculo legionum 
et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. Id autem difficile non est, cum tantum 
equitatu valeamus." Simul denuntiavit, ut essent animo parati in posterum et, 
quoniam fieret dimicandi potestas, ut saepe rogitavissent, ne suam neu reliquorum 
opinionem fallerent. 
 
3.87 Hunc Labienus excepit et, cum Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium 
summis laudibus efferret, "noli," inquit, "existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum, qui 
Galliam Germaniamque devicerit. Omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam 
rem pronuntio. Perexigua pars illius exercitus superest; magna pars deperiit, quod 
accidere tot proeliis fuit necesse, multos autumni pestilentia in Italia consumpsit, multi 
domum discesserunt, multi sunt relicti in continenti. An non audistis ex eis, qui per 
causam valetudinis remanserunt, cohortes esse Brundisi factas? Hae copiae, quas 
videtis, ex dilectibus horum annorum in citeriore Gallia sunt refectae, et plerique sunt 
ex coloniis Transpadanis. Ac tamen quod fuit roboris duobus proeliis Dyrrachinis 
interiit." Haec cum dixisset, iuravit se nisi victorem in castra non reversurum 
reliquosque, ut idem facerent, hortatus est.  
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Both Pompey and Labienus are given Gallic traits here. Most telling is Pompey’s use 
of the phrase id autem difficile non est which is nearly identical to the words of the 
Gallic chiefs in 7.1 and Vercingetorix in 7.14, and similar to Orgetorix claim at the 
very beginning of the BG. Grillo (72-74) shows how little Pomey’s and Labienus’s 
oaths106 are worth. In just a few chapters Pompey will return to the camp and then 
escape, only to meet his death in 3.98. To Grillo’s list of cruelty, treachery and 
ignorance (see pp. 110-17) can also be added hubris – all traits displayed by the 
Gauls, particularly in book 7 – the Pompeians repeatedly talk about guaranteed 
victory. Just as Lentulus in 1.1 involuntarily sings Caesar’s praises so does 
Labienus here. If Caesar himself had claimed to have conquered Gaul and Germany 
it would not have been credible, but when his most rabid opponent states this, the 
words are given greater credence. This is of course another example of Caesar’s use 
of sermocinatio.  
 
3.89 quid fieri vellet, ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute 
constare. Simul tertiae aciei totique exercitui imperavit, ne iniussu suo concurreret: se, 
cum id fieri vellet, vexillo signum daturum. 
 
3.90 Exercitum cum militari more ad pugnam cohortaretur suaque in eum perpetui 
temporis officia praedicaret, imprimis commemoravit: testibus se militibus uti posse, 
quanto studio pacem petisset; quae per Vatinium in colloquiis, quae per Aulum 
Clodium cum Scipione egisset, quibus modis ad Oricum cum Libone de mittendis 
legatis contendisset. Neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam 
alterutro exercitu privare voluisse. 
 
These are Caesar’s last words before the battle. Although they are in OO, I would 
argue against Rasmussen’s claim about the importance of Caesar’s use of OR in 
                                                             
106 Cf. also Labienus’s oath in 3.13 which he also does not keep: perterrito etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit 
iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset.  
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3.85 and say that these two short speeches are more important and expound on his 
idealized leadership style and ambitions and ties in with his speech in BG 1.40.  
 
3.91 Hic signo dato, "sequimini me," inquit, "manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro 
imperatori quam constituistis operam date. Unum hoc proelium superest; quo confecto 
et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus." Simul respiciens 
Caesarem, "faciam," inquit, "hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias 
agas."  
 
This scene is reminiscent of the eagle-bearer in book 4 of the BG. It also serves the 
purpose of showing the unity of his army, who at times during the BC have been 
unhappy about Caesar’s willingness to fight. 
 
3.94 et eis centurionibus, quos in statione ad praetoriam portam posuerat, clare, ut 
milites exaudirent, "tuemini," inquit, "castra et defendite diligenter, si quid durius 
acciderit. Ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo."  
 
3.96 saepe, ut dicebatur, querens tantum se opinionem fefellisse, ut, a quo genere 
hominum victoriam sperasset, ab eo initio fugae facto paene proditus videretur 
 
The oath Pompey took in 3.87 is now proven to be as worthless as any Gallic oath. 
Grillo describes it succinctly: “Pompey, who betrays everyone, laments that he has 
been betrayed, accusing his cavalry of fleeing in the middle of his own flight” (73). 
  
3.98 passisque palmis proiecti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt, consolatus 
consurgere iussit et pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus, quo minore essent timore, 
omnes conservavit militibusque suis commendavit, ne qui eorum violaretur, neu quid 
sui desiderarent.  
 
Caesaer’s victory over Pompey is completed and Caesar is given another chance to 
display his vaunted clemency. 
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6.3 Summary of the results of the analysis of the excerpts from De Bello Civili 
and a comparison with the results from De Bello Gallico 
 
Here are the raw data for the BC: 
 
Book No. of 
speeches 
Total no. of 
words 
spoken 
Total no. of 
words in 
the book 
% of the book 
which consists 
of speeches 
No. of speeches 
by Caesar 
1 37 2090 10900 15-20 10107 
2 17 1075 6400 15-20 2 
3 29 1325 15000 5-10 14108 
Total 83 4490 32300 avg: 10-15 26 
 
The differences between the books are less pronounced than in the BG, but it is still 
interesting to note that book 1 contains more speeches than book 3, both in absolute 
figures and expressed as a percentage. Even if the chapters after the battle of 
Pharasalus (chapters 3.99 – 3.112 (approx. 2200 words) where there is only one 
short speech) are excluded from the above figures, the speeches in book 3 would 
still only account for little over 10% of the book.  
 
A search for the phrase populus Romanus and the word senatus prove less fruitful 
than in the BG: 
 
Book  Occurrences of the phrase 
populus Romanus (or inflected 
variations thereof) 
Occurrences of the word senatus 
(or inflected variations thereof) 
1 5 30 
2 0 1 
                                                             
107 Two of which through legates/messengers 
108 Two of which through legates/messengers 
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3 5 7 
 
The high number for senatus in book 1 looks interesting, but unfortunately there is 
very little that can be deduced from this, apart from the fact that some of the 
chapters are set in the senate. The phrase cives Romani, which is not used in BG, 
appears once in book 1, 5 times in book 2 and 8 times in book 3. To argue that he 
is acting on behalf of the Roman people probably did not serve Caesar’s purposes 
now that he had left Gaul and started a civil war. 
 
A search for the words ius and iniuria, however, shows a similar pattern to the BG: 
 
Book  Occurrences of the word iniuria  
(or inflections thereof) 
Occurrences of the words ius, 
iustus, iustitiae (or inflections 
thereof) 
1 8 7109 
2 0 0 
3 1 2 
 
All the occurrences of iniuria and most of the occurrences of ius in book 1 are 
connected to Caesar’s complaints of Pompey’s or his allies’ wrong-doings against 
Caesar, and in a few cases, the citizens. It seems that once Caesar has established 
the clear boundaries between right (himself) and wrong (the Pompeians) he is happy 
to leave the matter to the side in the other two books.  
 
If the words populus Romanus and senatus grabs the reader’s attention in the BG, 
Caesar’s use of novus, which is given distinctly negative connotations and ascribed 
                                                             
109 The perhaps strongest condemnation of the Pompeians can be found in 1.6: omnia divina humanaque iura 
permiscentur. Caesar makes a similar accusation in 1.32: omnia permisceri mallent, quam imperium exercitusque 
dimittere  
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to the Pompeians, in chapter 1.7 has a similar effect110. A search for the word novus 
in the two commentarii show that the word is not very frequently used, but when it 
is used it is often with a negative connotation. The Gauls look for novae res, nova 
consilia or nova imperia a total of 9 times (not counting novissimum in the meaning 
“last” or “rearguard”, variations of novus only occurs 20 times in the whole of BG, 
including book 8111). The contrast to Caesar’s modus operandi is distinct, compare 
for examples the opening speeches in book 1 of the BG where Caesar justifies his 
actions by referring to more et exemplo populi Romani (BG 1.8), i.e. he, unlike the 
Pompeians, is observing the customs and traditions of the Roman people. The 
perhaps most negative use of novus occurs in BC 3.60, when the two Allobrogian 
brothers desert to Pompey: novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias experiri 
constituerant; Gallic treachery is combined with Pompeian cruelty, clearly a good 
match and it is difficult not to read at least a certain amount of irony into Caesar’s 
valedictory thoughts on the Gallic brothers. In a society where the belief that the 
Golden age was in the past, introducing new-fangled traditions would quite likely 
have been seen as severe criticism. In combination with the allusions to Sullan 
prospcriptions112 Caesar’s message will have been doubly explosive. 
 
There are many similarities between the BG and the BC. Caesar seems to carry over 
some themes from the BG to the BC with good effect. I believe for example that Grillo 
is absolutely right when he argues that the Pompeians are given Gallic traits like 
greed, cruelty, hubris, treachery and ignorance and there are plenty of examples in 
the speeches of the BC to support this. I also believe that Mutschler is right when 
                                                             
110 See also 1.76 and 1.85. It should however be noted that in 1.34 the roles are reversed (ab urbe discedens Pompeius 
erat adhortatus, ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent) so one should be 
careful not to draw too far-reaching conclusions here. 
111 The figure for BC is the same, 20, of which most occurrences are referring to military matters, e.g. novis dilectibus, 
novo generi belli, i.e. phrases where the word novus is used to state facts and does not contain any positive or negative 
connotations. 
112 There is even an explicit mention of Sulla, made by Lentulus in chapter 1.4: seque alterum fore Sullam intersuos 
gloriatur 
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he argues that certain events causes Caesar to become “more rhetorical”, such as, 
in the BG, the need to justify the war (book 1), the Sabinus disaster (book 5) and 
the massive uprising in Gaul (book 7) and, in the BC, the justification of the war 
(again), the battle against Afranius/Petreius, Curio’s disaster, the disaster at 
Dyrrachium and the final battle at Pharsalus. Similarly, just as Caesar in book 7 of 
the BG never speaks to Vercingetorix, he never speaks directly to Pompey in all of 
the BC, although in the latter case it is not for the lack of trying. In this respect 
Ariovistus stands out – Caesar speaks more to him than any other person in the 
whole of the commentarii.  
 
There are a few differences as well, of course. As discussed in connection with the 
speeches in 1.2, 1,32, 1.85 and elsewhere, Caesar’s language seems to become more 
emotive in the BC, which is hardly surprising considering what is at stake. I am 
therefore, like Mutschler, somewhat reluctant to accept Konche’s statement that 
Caesar’s only interest is docere (see p.20). I would suggest that Caesar’s goal is not 
only docere, but also movere. It should also be noted that there are a few rare 
instances of delectare as well, e.g. BG 2.31. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
First and foremost I believe that De Witt’s comment (see p.7) can safely be put to 
bed; although the rhetoric in the speeches in the BG and the BC is in many cases 
less pronounced than in Cicero’s speeches, I believe the analysis show beyond a 
doubt that rhetorics form an intrinsic element to many of the speeches.  
 
Rasmussen states that there are 21 direct speeches and 190 indirect speeches in 
BG and BC, but he does not account for how he has arrived at these figures. I have 
found a total of 255 speeches longer than approximately 10 words. The 21 direct 
speeches are undisputed, which leaves 234 indirect speeches, a discrepancy of 44 
speeches compared to Rasmussen. Of the 255 speeches I have found, 172 occur in 
the BG and 83 in the BC. Caesar speaks a total of 75 times, 49 times in the BG and 
26 times in the BC.  
 
Of these 255 speeches, there are quite a few which do fit De Witt’s description; I 
have consigned a total of 94 speeches (66 from the BG and 28 from the BC) to 
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Appendix 1, simply because I have not been able to find anything in theses speeches 
worth commenting on. This however leaves 161 speeches, of which I would consider 
the following 23 significant: Caesar’s, the Gallic chiefs’ and Ariovistus’s speeches in 
book 1 of the BG (1.13, 1.14, 1.18, 1.31, 1.35, 1.36, 1.40, 1.43, 1.44); Ambiorix’s 
and Titurius’s speeches in book 5 (5.27, 5.29); Caesar’s, Vercingetorix’s and 
Critognatus’s speeches in book 7 (7.14, 7.20, 7.52-3, 7.66, 7.77). In the BC Caesar’s 
four speeches in book 1 (1.7, 1.9, 1.32, 1.85); Curio’s speeches in book 2 (2.31, 2.32) 
and Caesar’s speeches in book 3 (3.10, 3.73) stand out. Admittedly the selection of 
these speeches is somewhat arbitrary; there are longer speeches (BG 2.4 and 8.7) 
but I feel the subject matter in these two speeches (reports on Gallic tribes) does not 
really justify describing them as significant.  
 
The below diagramme shows what percentage of each book of the BG consists of 
speeches. Far from confirming Rasmussen’s theory of a perfect curve, it shows that 
books 1 and 7, as stated in chapter 6.1.9, are the most prolix. 
 
 
 
The result of a similar comparison of the BC is similarly inconclusive, at least as far 
as Rasmussen’s theory is concerned: 
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It should of course be pointed out that just because there are a greater number of 
speeches in one book, does not mean they are “more rhetorical”, but it still seems 
to me that there is little to support Rasmussen’s theory of an “ansteigende Kurve”. 
 
Similarly it seems that the differences between direct and indirect discourse are not 
as great as Rasmussen wants us to believe. Nordling (88) correctly points out: ”direct 
discourse in Caesar does not in itself guarantee that this is significant discourse. 
Sometimes, according to Rasmussen (17-18), a direct speech merely indicates the 
volume of a raised voice”. Nordling continues: “Nor do the direct speeches of dying 
centurions or faithful aquilifers seem to serve much purpose beyond that of 
exemplary illustration or to convey the emotional intensity of the moment” (88)113. 
Perhaps this is why Caesar, with only one exception, uses OO in his own speeches: 
to appear more detached and unbiased. It does not befit Caesar, the commander, 
who is always on top of the situation, or at least has to portray himself as being on 
top of the situation, to let himself be governed by emotions, unlike Gauls (like 
Critognatus and Vercingetorix), the impulsive Curio or even Pompey, whose speech 
                                                             
113 Five of the 21 speeches in OR can be said to fall in this category: BG 4.25, 5.44, 7.50, BC 3.64, 3.91 
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in OR in BC 3.18 amounts to little more than an emotional outburst and a display 
of wounded pride. 
 
If one focuses on Caesar own speeches, he displays a great range when reproducing 
them, from short commands and exhortations to the long “judicial” speeches against 
Ariovistus and the inspirational speech before his troops in BG 1.40. However, he is 
no stranger to giving that same rhetorical flair to his opponents or his legates when 
it suits him (best illustraded by Critognatus in BG 7.77 and Curio in BC 2.32) or, 
for that matter, the same brevity and/or lack of rhetorical dazzle. Therefore I am 
inclined to say that it is not possible to find anything that sets Caesar’s speeches 
apart from speeches delivered by other characters in the two works. 
 
Regarding the question who is allowed to speak, it seems that Caesar is quite 
generous and lets almost everyone have a say, from slaves, deserters and 
townspeople to the highest commanders, himself included. The only discernible 
pattern I have found is that when Caesar is present he is the only Roman voice, or 
in the case of the BG, the only pro-Caesarian voice. Unlike his legates who partake 
in discussions (e.g. Sabinus and Titurius in book 5 of the BG and Curio in book 2 
of the BC) Caesar never shares the stage with anyone, with the rare exception of the 
common soldier who gives a short motivational speech in the same vein as Caesar. 
This is pehaps most evident in the lead-up to the battle at Pharsalus: we get the 
point of view of the Pompeian soldiers and officers and Pompey himself, of the 
Caesarian soldiers and Caesar. The only perspective missing is that of the Caesarian 
officers. Wiseman’s theory that Caesar is writing for the populares is interesting, but 
the evidence in favour of it is rather thin on the ground. It should also be pointed 
out that although Caesar in BG 1.39 does take a swipe at the nobility, in 1.40 he 
says he will march with the 10th legion only, if needed and thus he extends the 
criticisms to most of the soldiery as well. I am more inclined to believe Welch who 
states that the main reason why Caesar does not allow his officers to speak to any 
larger extent is: “With Caesar’s main aim in view, that is to publicise himself, 
omissions concerning legates are probably more often collateral damage than 
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determined policy” (102). I don’t think the data in the analysis can be said to produce 
any further clues as to Caesar’s intended audience.   
 
As for rhetorical features, it is clear that Caesar knows “all the tricks in the book” 
and he sometimes deploys them. Most noteworthy is probably Caesar’s use of 
sermocinatio and ratiocinatio. To start with the latter, ratiocinatio, for obvious 
reasons, only occurs in the BG, and more specifically only in the first half of the 
book (in 1.3, 1.39, 2.4, 2.31 and 4.7). Perhaps Caesar feels that having defeated 
both Gallic and German adversaries, he no longer needs to aggrandize his own feats 
in this manner and in the BC it is not in Caesar’s best interest to try to make the 
Pompeian adversaries more impressive than they are. As discussed in chapter 6.1.9, 
the use of sermocinatio peaks in book 7 of the BG. Caesar clearly had less freedom 
putting words in the mouths of his enemies in the BC; none of his readers would 
have known (or perhaps even cared) what was said in a Gallic camp, but there were 
plenty of sources who could tell what went on in Pompey’s camp. This does however 
not mean that Caesar does not use sermocinatio in the BC, rather his use of it 
becomes more ingenious. Lentulus (1.1), Cato (1.30) and Labienus (3.87) are all 
unwittingly made to sing the praises of Caesar. Vercingetorix’s comment in BG 7.29 
(non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia 
oppugnationis) can also be said to fall in this category; what is meant as a criticism 
is given a clever twist by Caesar the author and actually turns into praise, 
inadvertently on the speaker’s part, and because these words are spoken by 
characters portrayed as Caesar’s fiercest enemies, the actually carry more weight 
than if Caesar himself had said it. 
 
In addition to the rhetorical features, there are also a number of recurring themes, 
either spanning across both the BG and the BC or within them. Here follows a 
summary of the most prominent themes:  
 
The description of the Gauls, Caesar’s representation of the exchanges between 
himself and the Gauls, and the discussions among the Gauls themselves all follow 
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a strict pattern. As discussed in chapters 6.1.9 and 6.3 Caesar repeatedly shows 
that the Gauls are untrustworthy114 and they are given traits like greed, cruelty and 
ignorance. In the exchanges between Caesar and the Gauls the structure is nearly 
always: Caesar defeats the Gauls, who then send legates asking for Caesar’s mercy, 
which he grants, sometimes reluctantly115. Likewise, the discussions among the 
Gauls usually involve conspiracies, outbursts of rashness, promises to endure any 
hardship, yearnings for freedom given to them by their forefathers and the 
indignation felt because of the Roman enslavement. The Gauls also repeatedly 
mention how easy it will be to achieve their goals. This is particularly evident in 
book 7, where Caesar more than anywhere else lets the Gauls discuss among 
themselves. These descriptions and representations of the Gauls and their 
behaviour is then carried over to the Pompeians in the BC with good effect. As 
mentioned in chapter 6.3, I believe Grillo is absolutely right when he says that 
Caesar gives Gallic or even Germanic traits to the Pompeians, even down to the 
behaviour of interrupting peace talks by throwing spears (cf. BG 1.45 and BC 3.19). 
 
There is a very prominent theme which only occurs at the beginning of the BG: 
Through the repeated use of the phrase populus Romanus and the word iniuria in 
book 1 of the BG, Caesar’s makes strong attempts at what seems to me the 
justification of the attacks on the Gauls and the Germans. In 1.35 Caesar talks 
about a defensive war against Ariovistus, based on a decision by the senate: si non 
impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti 
quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, 
Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Aeduorum iniurias non 
neglecturum. Caesar’s objectives change during the course of the BG; where in book 
1 he is eager to find excuses for an attack, in book 7 he openly states that the target 
is devicta Gallia.  
                                                             
114 see also discussion on BG 1.30 on p. 34 
115 see the discussion of chapters 2.13-15 on p. 50 
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Similarly, there is a theme in the BC which does not appear in the BG: Because 
Caesar is no longer fighting an external enemy, but Roman citizens he needs to 
convince the readers not only that he is in the right, but also that he is supported 
by the vast majority of the people. Therefore we find in the BC a dichotomy between 
the many (who support Caesar) and the few (the Pompeians), which does not exist 
in the BG, for obvious reasons. There also seems to be, an, albeit less pronounced, 
dichotomy between old (which Caesar represents) and new (the Pompeians). Here it 
is possible to see a link between the Gauls who strive for novae res and the 
Pompeians who introduce nova exempla in their attempts to thwart Caesar. 
 
Caesar’s interactions with his soldiers form another recurring theme. In both the 
BG and the BC, Caesar uses rhetoric to good effect to strengthen the bond with his 
own soldiers116. The best example hereof is his speech in BG 1.40. Yet Caesar is not 
afraid to take a stand against his soldiers if they clamour for a course of action 
which Caesar does not approve of, most notably in BC 1.72, where Caesar refuses 
to give in to the soldiers’ wish to do battle. There is a similar episode in BG 7.19117, 
both spurred on by Caesar’s concern for the lives of Roman soldiers/citizens. Caesar 
also uses the strong connection with his soldiers as a convenient cover-up. Caesar 
does not admit to any mistakes and in situations where things do not go according 
to plan, Caesar sometimes changes the narrative focus from a broad overview of the 
situation to the heroic, but ultimately futile, actions of a single soldier, see BG 7.50 
and BC 3.64. Curio’s heroic death in BC 2.42118 can perhaps also be said to belong 
in this category. 
                                                             
116 Nordling shows this in his analysis of the harangues – level E in his continuum, “Caesar as the inspirer of men” (192-
201). 
117 Indignantes milites Caesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli 
exposcentes edocet, quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam 
118 At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu, quem a Caesare fidei commissum acceperit, in eius conspectum reversurum 
confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur.  
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To finish off the discussion on recurring themes, a few more words must be said 
about BG 1.40. I believe that Walsh is absolutely right in her claim that Caesar 
“claims many of the qualities outlined by Cicero in De Imperio Cn. Pompei” (104). I 
would suggest that Caesar, with Cicero’s speech in mind, goes one step further in 
the BC and makes sure to divest Pompey of all the characteristics he was given by 
Cicero in 66 BC. Here are the quotes from Cicero which I used in the discussion of 
BG 1.40: in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere,—scientiam rei 
militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem (28); Neque enim illae sunt solae virtutes 
imperatoriae, quae volgo existimantur,—labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, 
industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo (29); Ac primum, 
quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores? quanta deinde in omnibus rebus 
temperantia? quanta fide? quanta facilitate? quanto ingenio? quanta humanitate? 
(36). As Grillo shows, Caesar’s description of Pompey gives him Gallic traits, 
including cruelty, treachery and fickleness, thus disowning him of all claims to 
innocentia, temperantia, fides and humanitas. Compared to Cicero’s list in chapter 
28 of the four traits a commander must have, we find that Caesar questions 
Pompey’s military skills (BC 3.92); by leaving the battle field and later fleeing from 
the camp (BC 3.94 and 3.96) Pompey’s claim to virtus is made null and void; his 
strange promise in chapter 3.86 (persuasi equitibus nostris idque mihi facturos 
confirmaverunt, ut…) seems to show that Pompey’s auctoritas is not worth much if 
he has to persuade rather than order the cavalry to do something; and as he loses 
the final battle and thus the war, in spite of having superior (at least in a numerical 
sense) forces at his command, he clearly lacks felicitas. Pompey’s behaviour, as 
described by Caesar, in the lead-up to and during the battle of Pharsalus disowns 
Pompey of all the traits outlined by Cicero in chapter 29 of his speech: labor in 
negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium 
in providendo (29). In particular Pompey’s lack of celeritas is stressed: si quando 
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quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, sed illum 
delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent (3.82). 
Caesar’s purpose when writing the BC would thus have been to show that, just as 
in the BG, he is Rome’s summus imperator, but also that Pompey could never even 
have qualified as a contender.  
 
To finish off the study, it might be worthwile to see if the data can provide any clues 
on the dates of production and publication. Welch (93-95) argues convincingly that 
the disparate portraits of Sabinus in books 3 and 5 is a clear sign that the books 
were written (but perhaps not published) close to the events they portray. The 
frequent mentions of the phrase populus Romanus and the word senatus in book 1 
of the BG, which does not occur in the other books of the BG seems to suggest that 
Caesar wrote and published it very soon after the events and when he knew that his 
actions had been well-received in Rome he no longer felt the need to emphasize the 
links to SPQR to the same extent in the subsequent books. There are however 
arguments against a serial publication as well. For example, I find the textual link 
between books 1 and 2 very strong (ita ut supra demonstravimus; quam tertiam esse 
Galliae partem dixeramus) and there also seems to be a lingering “verbosity” from 
book 1 in the second book (see table on p. 123). Perhaps these two books were 
published as a unit? Then there is also the case of Caesar’s use of emotive language 
in sections where he wants to make sure the reader does not stray from his side, in 
book 1, 5 and 7 of the BG, which gives the work a homogenous feel. In this context 
Hirtius does not provide any further clues; he dispenses with direct discourse and 
there are only five instances of indirect discourse in book 8 and thus there is not 
enough material to allow for a rewarding comparison. All in all, I don’t think the 
data in this analysis present the opportunity for any far-reaching conclusions 
regarding the year of publication for either the BG or the BC, unfortunately.  
 
The picture of Caesar painted in the two commentarii differ greatly from the picture 
emerging when reading, for example, Suetonius’s chapter on Divus Iulius. It is 
important to keep in mind that this depends on what the authors choose to include, 
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and perhaps more importantly, choose not to include.  The latter may be considered 
one of Caesar’s hallmarks – by not mentioning captured booty, by covering up 
setbacks, completely ignoring personal issues and giving only the scantest regard 
to political and economical quandaries, he manages to portray himself in the best 
possible light. Caesar makes good use of his rhetorical education and skills to 
achieve this. So we arrive back at Conte’s comment (see p. 5) about “the apparently 
objective, impassive tone of Caesar’s narration”. The key word here is of course 
“apparently”. At times it felt as if I was trying to wring blood from a stone, but I hope 
to have shown that there is a lot more going on beneath the polished and seemingly 
simple and “objective” façade of Caesar’s writings. 
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Appendix 1. Segments not analysed 
 
De Bello Gallico  
 
1.10 Caesari renuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et 
Haeduorum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, 
quae civitas est in provincia. 
 
1.16 graviter eos accusat, quod, cum neque emi neque ex agris sumi possit, tam 
necessario tempore, tam propinquis hostibus ab iis non sublevetur, praesertim cum 
magna ex parte eorum precibus adductus bellum susceperit; multo etiam gravius quod 
sit destitutus queritur. 
 
1.19 cum eo conloquitur; simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio Gallorum 
de Dumnorige sint dicta, et ostendit quae separatim quisque de eo apud se dixerit. 
Petit atque hortatur ut sine eius offensione animi vel ipse de eo causa cognita statuat 
vel civitatem statuere iubeat. 
 
1.20 Diviciacus multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid 
gravius in fratrem statueret: scire se illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam 
se doloris capere, propterea quod, cum ipse gratia plurimum domi atque in reliqua 
Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per se crevisset; quibus opibus ac 
nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed paene ad perniciem suam uteretur. 
Sese tamen et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri. Quod si quid ei a 
Caesare gravius accidisset, cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum teneret, 
neminem existimaturum non sua voluntate factum; qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae 
animi a se averterentur. […] 
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1.22 Considius equo admisso ad eum accurrit, dicit montem, quem a Labieno occupari 
voluerit, ab hostibus teneri: id se a Gallicis armis atque insignibus cognovisse. 
 
1.26 Caesar ad Lingonas litteras nuntiosque misit, ne eos frumento neve alia re 
iuvarent: qui si iuvissent, se eodem loco quo Helvetios habiturum. 
 
1.28 Helvetios, Tulingos, Latobrigos in fines suos, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit, 
et, quod omnibus frugibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent, Allobrogibus 
imperavit ut iis frumenti copiam facerent; ipsos oppida vicosque, quos incenderant, 
restituere iussit.  
 
1.37 Haedui questum quod Harudes, qui nuper in Galliam transportati essent, fines 
eorum popularentur: sese ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere 
potuisse; Treveri autem, pagos centum Sueborum ad ripas Rheni consedisse, qui 
Rhemum transire conarentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium fratres. 
 
1.41 princepsque X. legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum 
iudicium fecisset, seque esse ad bellum gerendum paratissimam confirmavit. […] se 
neque umquam dubitasse neque timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium sed 
imperatoris esse existimavisse.  
 
1.42 Ariovistus legatos ad eum mittit: quod antea de conloquio postulasset, id per se 
fieri licere, quoniam propius accessisset seque id sine periculo facere posse 
existimaret. […] Ariovistus postulavit ne quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar 
adduceret: vereri se ne per insidias ab eo circumveniretur; uterque cum equitatu 
veniret: alia ratione sese non esse venturum. […] non inridicule quidam ex militibus 
decimae legionis dixit: plus quam pollicitus esset Caesarem facere; pollicitum se in 
cohortis praetoriae loco X. legionem habiturum ad equum rescribere. 
 
1.47 Biduo post Ariovistus ad Caesarem legatos misit: velle se de iis rebus quae inter 
eos egi coeptae neque perfectae essent agere cum eo: uti aut iterum conloquio diem 
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constitueret aut, si id minus vellet, ex suis legatis aliquem ad se mitteret. […] 
conclamavit: Quid ad se venirent? An speculandi causa? 
 
1.50 Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar quam ob rem Ariovistus proelio non decertaret, 
hanc reperiebat causam, quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset ut matres 
familiae eorum sortibus et vaticinationibus declararent utrum proelium committi ex 
usu esset necne; eas ita dicere: non esse fas Germanos superare, si ante novam 
lunam proelio contendissent. 
 
1.53 Is se praesente de se ter sortibus consultum dicebat, utrum igni statim necaretur 
an in aliud tempus reservaretur: sortium beneficio se esse incolumem.  
 
2.4 Cum ab iis quaereret quae civitates quantaeque in armis essent et quid in bello 
possent, sic reperiebat: 
 
2.15 esse homines feros magnaeque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos 
Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent; 
confirmare sese neque legatos missuros neque ullam condicionem pacis accepturos. 
 
2.16 inveniebat ex captivis Sabim flumen a castris suis non amplius milibus passuum 
X abesse; trans id flumen omnes Nervios consedisse adventumque ibi Romanorum 
expectare una cum Atrebatibus et Viromanduis, finitimis suis (nam his utrisque 
persuaserant uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur); expectari etiam ab iis 
Atuatucorum copias atque esse in itinere; mulieres quique per aetatem ad pugnam 
inutiles viderentur in eum locum coniecisse quo propter paludes exercitui aditus non 
esset. 
 
2.28 legatos ad Caesarem miserunt seque ei dediderunt; et in commemoranda 
civitatis calamitate ex DC ad tres senatores, ex hominum milibus LX vix ad D, qui 
arma ferre possent, sese redactos esse dixerunt. Quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac 
supplices usus misericordia videretur, diligentissime conservavit suisque finibus 
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atque oppidis uti iussit et finitimis imperavit ut ab iniuria et maleficio se suosque 
prohiberent. 
 
2.32 Ad haec Caesar respondit: se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum 
civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent; sed 
deditionis nullam esse condicionem nisi armis traditis. Se id quod in Nerviis fecisset 
facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam 
inferrent.  
 
3.3 prope iam desperata salute non nullae eius modi sententiae dicebantur, ut 
impedimentis relictis eruptione facta isdem itineribus quibus eo pervenissent ad 
salutem contenderent. Maiori tamen parti placuit, hoc reservato ad extremum casum 
consilio interim rei eventum experiri et castra defendere. 
 
3.5 ad Galbam accurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta 
extremum auxilium experirentur. Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites 
certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium ac tantum modo tela missa exciperent 
seque ex labore reficerent, post dato signo ex castris erumperent, atque omnem spem 
salutis in virtute ponerent. 
 
3.18 Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit, quibus angustiis 
ipse Caesar a Venetis prematur docet, neque longius abesse quin proxima nocte 
Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum educat et ad Caesarem auxilii ferendi causa 
proficiscatur. Quod ubi auditum est, conclamant omnes occasionem negotii bene 
gerendi amittendam non esse: ad castra iri oportere. 
 
4.11 qui in itinere congressi magnopere ne longius progrederetur orabant. Cum id non 
impetrassent, petebant uti ad eos [equites] qui agmen antecessissent praemitteret eos 
pugna prohiberet, sibique ut potestatem faceret in Ubios legatos mittendi; quorum si 
principes ac senatus sibi iure iurando fidem fecisset, ea condicione quae a Caesare 
ferretur se usuros ostendebant: ad has res conficiendas sibi tridui spatium daret. […] 
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tamen sese non longius milibus passuum IIII aquationis causa processurum eo die 
dixit: huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis 
cognosceret. Interim ad praefectos, qui cum omni equitatu antecesserant, mittit qui 
nuntiarent ne hostes proelio lacesserent, et si ipsi lacesserentur, sustinerent quoad 
ipse cum exercitu propius accessisset. 
 
4.19 haec ab iis cognovit: Suebos, postea quam per exploratores pontem fieri 
comperissent, more suo concilio habito nuntios in omnes partes dimisisse, uti de 
oppidis demigrarent, liberos, uxores suaque omnia in silvis deponerent atque omnes 
qui arma ferre possent unum in locum convenirent. Hunc esse delectum medium fere 
regionum earum quas Suebi obtinerent; hic Romanorum adventum expectare atque ibi 
decertare constituisse. 
 
4.21 Huc naves undique ex finitimis regionibus et quam superiore aestate ad 
Veneticum bellum fecerat classem iubet convenire. […]Quibus auditis, liberaliter 
pollicitus hortatusque ut in ea sententia permanerent, eos domum remittit […] Huic 
imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur 
seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet. 
 
4.22 ex magna parte Morinorum ad eum legati venerunt, qui se de superioris temporis 
consilio excusarent, quod homines barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti bellum 
populo Romano fecissent, seque ea quae imperasset facturos pollicerentur. 
 
4.27 in petenda pace eius rei culpam in multitudinem contulerunt et propter 
imprudentiam ut ignosceretur petiverunt. Caesar questus quod, cum ultro in 
continentem legatis missis pacem ab se petissent, bellum sine causa intulissent, 
ignoscere se imprudentiae dixit obsidesque imperavit 
 
4.34 Interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt paucitatemque nostrorum 
militum suis praedicaverunt et quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui 
liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt. 
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5.2 Collaudatis militibus atque eis qui negotio praefuerant, quid fieri velit ostendit 
atque omnes ad portum Itium convenire iubet 
 
5.3 se suosque omnes in officio futuros neque ab amicitia populi Romani defecturos 
confirmavit quaeque in Treveris gererentur ostendit. 
 
5.20 legatos ad Caesarem mittunt pollicenturque sese ei dedituros atque imperata 
facturos; petunt, ut Mandubracium ab iniuria Cassivellauni defendat atque in 
civitatem mittat, qui praesit imperiumque obtineat.  
 
5.26 Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: 
habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui 
posse sperarent. 
 
5.34 Qua re animadversa Ambiorix pronuntiari iubet, ut procul tela coniciant neu 
propius accedant et, quam in partem Romani impetum fecerint, cedant (levitate 
armorum et cotidiana exercitatione nihil eis noceri posse), rursus se ad signa 
recipientes insequantur. 
 
5.56 His rebus confectis, in concilio pronuntiat arcessitum se a Senonibus et 
Carnutibus aliisque compluribus Galliae civitatibus; huc iturum per fines Remorum 
eorumque agros popula turum ac, priusquam id faciat, castra Labieni oppugnaturum. 
Quae fieri velit praecipit. 
 
6.1 simul ab Gnaeo Pompeio proconsule petit, quoniam ipse ad urbem cum imperio rei 
publicae causa remaneret, quos ex Cisalpina Gallia consulis sacramento rogavisset, 
ad signa convenire et ad se proficisci iuberet 
 
147 
 
6.9 Ubii, qui ante obsides dederant atque in deditionem venerant, purgandi sui causa 
ad eum legatos mittunt, qui doceant neque auxilia ex sua civitate in Treveros missa 
neque ab se fidem laesam: petunt atque orant ut sibi parcat, ne communi odio 
Germanorum innocentes pro nocentibus poenas pendant; si amplius obsidum vellet, 
dare pollicentur. 
 
6.10 ab Ubiis certior Suebos omnes in unum locum copias cogere atque eis nationibus 
quae sub eorum sint imperio denuntiare, ut auxilia peditatus equitatusque mittant.[…] 
Suebos omnes, posteaquam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint, cum 
omnibus suis sociorumque copiis, quas coegissent, penitus ad extremos fines se 
recepisse: silvam esse ibi infinita magnitudine, quae appellatur Bacenis; hanc longe 
introrsus pertinere et pro nativo muro obiectam Cheruscos ab Suebis Suebosque ab 
Cheruscis iniuriis incursionibusque prohibere: ad eius initium silvae Suebos 
adventum Romanorum exspectare constituisse. 
 
6.32 legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum, ne se in hostium numero duceret neve 
omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam iudicaret: nihil se 
de bello cogitavisse, nulla Ambiorigi auxilia misisse. […] si qui ad eos Eburones ex 
fuga convenissent, ad se ut reducerentur, imperavit; si ita fecissent, fines eorum se 
violaturum negavit. 
 
6.33 Titum Labienum cum legionibus tribus ad Oceanum versus in eas partes quae 
Menapios attingunt proficisci iubet; Gaium Trebonium cum pari legionum numero ad 
eam regionem quae ad Aduatucos adiacet depopulandam mittit 
 
6.40 Alii cuneo facto ut celeriter perrumpant censent, quoniam tam propinqua sint 
castra, et si pars aliqua circumventa ceciderit, at reliquos servari posse confidunt; alii, 
ut in iugo consistant atque eundem omnes ferant casum. Hoc veteres non probant 
milites 
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6.41  Sic omnino animos timor praeoccupaverat ut paene alienata mente deletis 
omnibus copiis equitatum se ex fuga recepisse dicerent neque incolumi exercitu 
Germanos castra oppugnaturos fuisse contenderent. 
 
7.4 Qua oblata potestate omnibus his civitatibus obsides imperat, certum numerum 
militum ad se celeriter adduci iubet, armorum quantum quaeque civitas domi quodque 
ante tempus efficiat constituit; in primis equitatui studet. 
 
7.9 Brutum adulescentem his copiis praeficit; hunc monet, ut in omnes partes equites 
quam latissime pervagentur: daturum se operam, ne longius triduo ab castris absit.  
 
7.12 legati ad eum venissent oratum ut sibi ignosceret suaeque vitae consuleret, ut 
celeritate reliquas res conficeret, qua pleraque erat consecutus, arma conferri, equos 
produci, obsides dari iubet. 
 
7.27 suosque languidius in opere versari iussit et quid fieri vellet ostendit. 
Legionibusque intra vineas in occulto expeditis, cohortatus ut aliquando pro tantis 
laboribus fructum victoriae perciperent, eis qui primi murum ascendissent praemia 
proposuit militibusque signum dedit. 
 
7.37 Cum his praemium communicat hortaturque, ut se liberos et imperio natos 
meminerint. Vnam esse Aeduorum civitatem, quae certissimam Galliae victoriam 
detineat; eius auctoritate reliquas contineri; qua traducta locum consistendi Romanis 
in Gallia non fore. Esse nonnullo se Caesaris beneficio adfectum, sic tamen, ut 
iustissimam apud eum causam obtinuerit; sed plus communi libertati tribuere. Cur 
enim potius Aedui de suo iure et de legibus ad Caesarem disceptatorem, quam 
Romani ad Aeduos veniant? 
 
7.39 Ex eis Eporedorix cognito Litavicci consilio media fere nocte rem ad Caesarem 
defert; orat ne patiatur civitatem pravis adulescentium consiliis ab amicitia populi 
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Romani deficere; quod futurum provideat, si se tot hominum milia cum hostibus 
coniunxerint, quorum salutem neque propinqui neglegere, neque civitas levi momento 
aestimare posset. 
 
7.41 Medio fere itinere equites a Fabio missi, quanto res in periculo fuerit, exponunt. 
Summis copiis castra oppugnata demonstrant, cum crebro integri defessis 
succederent nostrosque assiduo labore defatigarent, quibus propter magnitudinem 
castrorum perpetuo esset isdem in vallo permanendum. Multitudine sagittarum atque 
omnis generis telorum multos vulneratos; ad haec sustinenda magno usui fuisse 
tormenta. Fabium discessu eorum duabus relictis portis obstruere ceteras pluteosque 
vallo addere et se in posterum diem similemque casum apparare. 
 
7.43 Interim nuntio allato omnes eorum milites in potestate Caesaris teneri, 
concurrunt ad Aristium, nihil publico factum consilio demonstrant; quaestionem de 
bonis direptis decernunt, Litavicci fatrumque bona publicant, legatos ad Caesarem sui 
purgandi gratia mittunt. […] Quae tametsi Caesar intellegebat, tamen quam mitissime 
potest legatos appellat: nihil se propter inscientiam levitatemque vulgi gravius de 
civitate iudicare neque de sua in Aeduos benevolentia deminuere. 
 
7.44 Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam, quorum magnus ad eum cotidie numerus 
confluebat. Constabat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, 
dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed hunc silvestrem et angustum, qua esset 
aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; huic loco vehementer illos timere nec iam aliter 
sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene 
circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur 
 
7.45 Hac re cognita Caesar mittit complures equitum turmas; eis de media nocte 
imperat, ut paulo tumultuosius omnibus locis vagarentur. Prima luce magnum 
numerum impedimentorum ex castris mulorumque produci deque his stramenta 
detrahi mulionesque cum cassidibus equitum specie ac simulatione collibus 
circumvehi iubet. […] quos singulis legionibus praefecerat, quid fieri velit ostendit: in 
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primis monet ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius 
progrediantur; quid iniquitas loci habeat incommodi proponit: hoc una celeritate posse 
mutari; occasionis esse rem, non proeli. 
 
7.54 Ibi a Viridomaro atque Eporedorige Aeduis appellatus discit cum omni equitatu 
Litaviccum ad sollicitandos Aeduos profectum: opus esse ipsos antecedere ad 
confirmandam civitatem. […] Discedentibus his breviter sua in Aeduos merita 
exposuit, quos et quam humiles accepisset, compulsos in oppida, multatos agris 
omnibus ereptis copiis, imposito stipendio, obsidibus summa cum contumelia extortis, 
et quam in fortunam quamque in amplitudinem deduxisset, ut non solum in pristinum 
statum redissent, sed omnium temporum dignitatem et gratiam antecessisse 
viderentur. His datis mandatis eos ab se dimisit. 
 
7.60 Sub vesperum consilio convocato cohortatus ut ea quae imperasset diligenter 
industrieque administrarent, naves, quas Metiosedo deduxerat, singulas equitibus 
Romanis attribuit, et prima confecta vigilia quattuor milia passuum secundo flumine 
silentio progredi ibique se exspectari iubet.  
 
7.61 Uno fere tempore sub lucem hostibus nuntiatur in castris Romanorum praeter 
consuetudinem tumultuari et magnum ire agmen adverso flumine sonitumque 
remorum in eadem parte exaudiri et paulo infra milites navibus transportari. 
 
7.75 Ex his Bellovaci suum numerum non compleverunt, quod se suo nomine atque 
arbitrio cum Romanis bellum gesturos dicebant neque cuiusquam imperio 
obtemperaturos 
 
De Bello Civili 
 
1.3 Misso ad vesperum senatu omnes, qui sunt eius ordinis, a Pompeio evocantur. 
Laudat promptos Pompeius atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque 
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incitat. Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum 
evocantur 
 
1.6 Pompeius eadem illa, quae per Scipionem ostenderat agit; senatus virtutem 
constantiamque collaudat; copias suas exponit; legiones habere sese paratas X; 
praeterea cognitum compertumque sibi alieno esse animo in Caesarem milites neque 
eis posse persuaderi, uti eum defendant aut sequantur. 
 
1.10 Illi deliberata re respondent scriptaque ad eum mandata per eos remittunt; 
quorum haec erat summa: Caesar in Galliam reverteretur, Arimino excederet, 
exercitus dimitteret; quae si fecisset, Pompeium in Hispanias iturum. Interea, quoad 
fides esset data Caesarem facturum, quae polliceretur, non intermissuros consules 
Pompeiumque delectus. 
 
1.13 decuriones Auximi ad Attium Varum frequentes conveniunt; docent sui iudicii 
rem non esse; neque se neque reliquos municipes pati posse C. Caesarem 
imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque 
prohiberi; proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui.  
 
1.17 Re cognita Domitius ad Pompeium in Apuliam peritos regionum magno proposito 
praemio cum litteris mittit, qui petant atque orent, ut sibi subveniat: Caesarem duobus 
exercitibus et locorum angustiis facile intercludi posse frumentoque prohiberi. Quod 
nisi fecerit, se cohortesque amplius XXX magnumque numerum senatorum atque 
equitum Romanorum in periculum esse venturum.  
 
1.19 Domitius dissimulans in consilio pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio 
venturum hortaturque eos, ne animo deficiant quaeque usui ad defendendum 
oppidum sint parent. […] Pompeius enim rescripserat: sese rem in summum periculum 
deducturum non esse, neque suo consilio aut voluntate Domitium se in oppidum 
Corfinium contulisse; proinde, si qua fuisset facultas, ad se cum omnibus copiis 
veniret. 
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1.20 legatosque ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: sese paratos esse portas 
aperire, quaeque imperaverit facere et L. Domitium vivum in eius potestati tradere. 
 
1.23 pauca apud eos loquitur, [queritur] quod sibi a parte eorum gratia relata non sit 
pro suis in eos maximis beneficiis; dimittit omnes incolumes. 
 
1.24 Quem Caesar ad eum remittit cum mandatis: quoniam ad id tempus facultas 
colloquendi non fuerit, atque ipse Brundisium sit venturus, interesse rei publicae et 
communis salutis se cum Pompeio colloqui; neque vero idem profici longo itineris 
spatio, cum per alios condiciones ferantur, ac si coram de omnibus condicionibus 
disceptetur. 
 
1.26 Itaque Caninium Rebilum legatum, familiarem necessariumque Scriboni Libonis, 
mittit ad eum colloquii causa; mandat, ut Libonem de concilianda pace hortetur; 
imprimis, ut ipse cum Pompeio colloqueretur, postulat; magnopere sese confidere 
demonstrat, si eius rei sit potestas facta, fore, ut aequis condicionibus ab armis 
discedatur. Cuius rei magnam partem laudis atque existimationis ad Libonem 
perventuram, si illo auctore atque agente ab armis sit discessum. 
 
1.33 Pompeius enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco, 
qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Caesaris fuissent 
 
1.35 Cuius orationem legati domum referunt atque ex auctoritate haec Caesari 
renuntiant: intellegere se divisum esse populum Romanum in partes duas; neque sui 
iudicii neque suarum esse virium discernere, utra pars iustiorem habeat causam. 
Principes vero esse earum partium Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem patronos civitatis; 
quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et Helviorum publice iis concesserit, alter 
bello victos Sallyas attribuerit vectigaliaque auxerit. Quare paribus eorum beneficiis 
parem se quoque voluntatem tribuere debere et neutrum eorum contra alterum iuvare 
aut urbe aut portibus recipere. 
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1.66 Uterque idem suis renuntiat: V milia passuum proxima intercedere itineris 
campestris, inde excipere loca aspera et montuosa; qui prior has angustias 
occupaverit, ab hoc hostem prohiberi nihil esse negotii. 
 
1.87 Caesar ex eo tempore, dum ad flumen Varum veniatur, se frumentum daturum 
pollicetur. Addit etiam, ut, quod quisque eorum in bello amiserit, quae sint penes 
milites suos, eis, qui amiserint, restituatur 
 
2.17 M. Varro in ulteriore Hispania initio cognitis eis rebus, quae sunt in Italia gestae, 
diffidens Pompeianis rebus amicissime de Caesare loquebatur: praecoccupatum sese 
legatione ab Cn. Pompeio teneri obstrictum fide; necessitudinem quidem sibi nihilo 
minorem cum Caesare intercedere, neque se ignorare, quod esset officium legati, qui 
fiduciariam operam obtineret, quae vires suae, quae voluntas erga Caesarem totius 
provinciae.  
 
2.18 Ipse habuit graves in Caesarem contiones. Saepe ex tribunali praedicavit 
adversa Caesarem proelia fecisse, magnum numerum ab eo militum ad Afranium 
perfugisse: haec se certis nuntiis, certis auctoribus comperisse.  
 
2.27 confirmant quidem certe totius exercitus animos alienos esse a Curione 
maximeque opus esse in conspectum exercitus venire et colloquendi dare facultatem.  
 
2.28 Hanc nactus appellationis causam Quintilius circuire aciem Curionis atque 
obsecrare milites coepit, ne primam sacramenti, quod apud Domitium atque apud se 
quaestorem dixissent, memoriam deponerent, neu contra eos arma ferrent, qui eadem 
essent usi fortuna eademque in obsidione perpessi, neu pro his pugnarent, a quibus 
cum contumelia perfugae appellarentur. Huc pauca ad spem largitionis addidit, quae 
ab sua liberalitate, si se atque Attium secuti essent, exspectare deberent. 
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2.40 Suspicatus praemissis equitibus ipsum affore Curionem Saburra copias equitum 
peditumque instruit atque his imperat, ut simulatione timoris paulatim cedant ac 
pedem referant: sese, cum opus esset, signum proelii daturum et, quod rem postulare 
cognovisset, imperaturum. 
 
2.42 At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu, quem a Caesare fidei commissum 
acceperit, in eius conspectum reversurum confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur.  
 
3.13 perterrito etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non 
deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset.  
 
3.17 Postulabat Caesar, ut legatos sibi ad Pompeium sine periculo mittere liceret, 
idque ipsi fore reciperent aut acceptos per se ad eum perducerent. Quod ad indutias 
pertineret, sic belli rationem esse divisam, ut illi classe naves auxiliaque sua 
impedirent, ipse ut aqua terraque eos prohiberet. Si hoc sibi remitti vellent, remitterent 
ipsi de maritimis custodiis; si illud tenerent, se quoque id retenturum. Nihilo minus 
tamen agi posse de compositione, ut haec non remitterentur, neque hanc rem illi esse 
impedimento.  
 
3.19 Aulum Varronem profiteri se altera die ad colloquium venturum atque una 
visurum, quemadmodum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent 
 
3.53 Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritus et de re publica, donatum milibus CC 
collaudatumque ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit 
 
3.71 At Labienus, cum ab eo impetravisset, ut sibi captivos tradi iuberet, omnes 
productos ostentationis, ut videbatur, causa, quo maior perfugae fides haberetur, 
commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia interrogans, solerentne 
veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interfecit. 
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3.80 cohortatus milites docuit, quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium 
rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis 
exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter, priusquam auxilia concurrerent.  
 
3.107 ostendit sibi placere regem Ptolomaeum atque eius sororem Cleopatram 
exercitus, quos haberent, dimittere et de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter 
se armis disceptare. 
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Appendix II: Summary of the books of the BG and the BC. The summary of BG 
from Edwards edition of the BG, Loeb Classical Library, 1917. The chronology of 
the BC from Luca Grillo’s The Art of Caesar’s Bellum Civile 
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